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ABSTRACT 
The thesis investigates the effects of false memory and belief in the paranormal on 
reports of events. The first chapter reviews the existing literature on false memory. The 
main theories of how false memory develops are described and the individual 
differences of those susceptible to false memories are considered. The paranormal belief 
literature is then examined, particularly with regard to the cognitive differences between 
believers and disbelievers. It is concluded that these differences would be suggestive of 
a relationship between paranormal belief and false memory. 
The second chapter considers the relationship between imagination inflation, paranormal 
belief and ESP. No correlation between the factors was found. The third chapter 
examines whether pre-event suggestion and belief in the paranormal can affect 
experiences of `ghostly' phenomena in an allegedly haunted location. Evidence for the 
effect of belief in the paranormal was found, but there was no effect of pre-event 
suggestion or an interaction between the two factors. The fourth chapter investigates the 
effects of positive and negative during-event suggestion and paranormal belief on 
reports of events in the seance room, and the fifth chapter explores the effects of during- 
event suggestion on reports of a key bending video. There was some evidence that 
during-event suggestion is effective in altering reports of events, and the causes for this 
effect are considered. Paranormal belief was not shown to consistently affect acceptance 
of suggestion, but may affect reports of phenomena which are judged to be paranormal. 
The thesis concludes that during-event suggestion and negative suggestion are areas 
which offer great potential for further research. The relationship between paranormal 
belief and false memory development has not been demonstrated. However, it has been 
shown that belief and suggestion can affect the manner in which situations are attended 
to and interpreted. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FALSE MEMORY AND 
PARANORMAL BELIEF 
This thesis investigates the possible relationship between false memory, suggestibility 
and belief in the paranormal. The work builds on previous research looking at the effects 
of imagination and misleading information on memory, and expands the existing 
literature by considering the role of pre-event and during-event suggestion. 
This introduction firstly reviews the existing literature on false memory, describing the 
existing protocols for developing false memories, the main theories explaining the false 
memory effect and the individual differences of those susceptible to false memory 
generation. It then considers the belief in the paranormal literature, specifically 
considering the evidence that believers and disbelievers have differing cognitive 
processes and susceptibility to suggestion. The findings indicative of a possible 
relationship between the two factors are then examined. 
FALSE MEMORY 
Surprisingly for such a pervasive concept as `false memory', there is no clear definition 
in the literature as to what actually constitutes a false memory. Entire books have been 
written on the subject without the authors fully explaining what the phrase actually 
means (e. g. Spanos, 1996; Bjorkland, 2000). In some cases, the term is used 
interchangeably with `memory distortion', `repressed memory' or `recovered memory' 
(e. g. Loftus & Ketcham, 1994; Ofshe & Watters, 1994). Schacter (1995), reviewing 
studies of clinical patients, suggests that false memory could be broken down into two 
separate areas: `confabulation' "where patients misremember the time and other 
contextual aspects of actual events" (p. 11); and `fabrication' "where patients concoct 
improbable and bizarre scenarios that could not have in fact occurred" (p. 11). Despite 
this emphasis on false memory as a symptom of a neurological disorder, Loftus and 
Ketcham (1991) indicate that development of false memory may be the norm for most 
people. They argue that, because the human memory is fallible and liable to be 
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reconstructed according to the current situation, most of the things that are 
`remembered' are, at best, rough approximations of what actually occurred. The 
difference between false memories for everyday events and false memories for large, 
traumatic events is that everyday events are rarely questioned in detail, so the degree of 
memory error is not discovered. 
The researchers seem to agree that false memory does not involve forgetting, or lack of 
encoding at the time. Instead, for a memory to be `false' it should be distorted in some 
way. This could involve the alteration or elaboration of an existing event, or a memory 
created where one did not previously exist. 
There are two main areas of false memory currently being investigated by researchers. 
The first of these is false memory developed as a result of misleading information being 
suggested to participants. The second is false memory developed as a result of source 
confusion or imagination inflation. 
Misinformation in laboratory studies 
Traditional misinformation studies have followed the paradigm established by Loftus 
and colleagues in the 1970s. For example, Loftus, Miller and Burns (1978) ran a series 
of studies which involved showing participants slides depicting a traffic accident. They 
were then read a narrative which contained misleading information about the slides 
which they had just seen (specifically, the narrative claimed that the slides showed a 
yield sign rather than a stop sign). Participants were then tested on their recall of the 
events. A strong and consistent effect has been found whereby the misinformation 
affects participants' reports of the scene that they viewed. A great deal of discussion has 
taken place as to the extent of interference and memory impairment that results when 
participants are subjected to false information. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) argued 
that the original misinformation studies did not actually affect memory and the results 
obtained were a mixture of incorrect interpretation of results, and demand characteristics 
caused by the experimental setting. For example, a participant may clearly remember 
seeing the original stimuli but will appear to accept the misinformation because they feel 
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that that is what the experimenter wants. According to McCloskey and Zaragoza, the 
obtained results were indicative that a situation in the original scene was not adequately 
encoded, and therefore the misinformation was filling a gap in knowledge rather than 
overwriting existing knowledge. Alternatively, the participants may simply have been 
guessing the answers. 
McCloskey and Zaragoza's hypothesis caused researchers to refine studies in order to 
fully assess whether misinformation can, in fact, affect memory. The original paradigm 
involved participants being asked whether they saw the misleading item or the original 
item. Belli (1989) introduced a new testing procedure where participants were asked to 
give yes or no answers to one of two possible questions; whether they saw the original 
item or a novel item (not previously mentioned) related to the other two items. No 
participant was questioned about both the items. Tversky and Tuchin (1989) asked three 
separate questions; did they see the original item, did they see the misleading item, and 
did they see a new item. Both papers indicate that participants who received misleading 
information were less likely to give `yes' answers to the original item. Misled 
participants also tended to reject the possibility of having seen the new item, thus 
suggesting that they were not simply randomly guessing the correct answer. 
Loftus, Donders, Hoffman and Schooler (1989) presented evidence which indicated that 
the misinformation causes interference with the original memory trace, although it does 
not necessarily replace the original memory. Their studies were carried out using a 
similar paradigm to that of Loftus et al. (1978), with participants being shown a 
slideshow of a burglary and then being subjected to misinformation. In a recall test, 
participants quickly and confidently selected the misinformation as being the correct 
answer. However, some participants were not presented with the misinformation item as 
a possible option. In these cases, participants selected the original item as often as 
control subjects, but their responses were much slower. This indicates that although the 
original memory was still present, the misinformation had created difficulty in retrieval. 
Loftus and Hoffman (1989) reviewed the basic changes to the misinformation paradigm 
and concluded that there was now little support for the notion that memory was not 
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affected by misinformation, but there remained considerable confusion as to the exact 
nature of the changes to memory. 
Studies have also been conducted to examine whether false memory generation is 
caused by source monitoring errors (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a). This indicates that 
participants remember the suggested item, but fail to remember whether it occurred in 
the original stimuli or the misinformation. Lindsay and Johnson (1989b), and Rantzen 
and Markham (1992) conducted studies using what they called the `reversed eyewitness 
testimony design' in order to test the source monitoring account. This involves 
presenting participants with a piece of misinformation before showing the stimuli. 
Rantzen and Markham (1992) extended Lindsay and Johnson's original design to 
include different contexts for the introduction of the misinformation. The 
misinformation was either presented by an experimenter reading aloud or through the 
form of a read narrative. The purpose behind this was to investigate the possibility of 
context effects and demand characteristics affecting the results. The researchers reported 
that there was no effect of misinformation context, indicating that participants were not 
answering in accordance with the wishes of the experimenter. However, suggestion 
continued to affect responses, with participants reporting the misinformation as accurate. 
These studies provide strong support for the source monitoring explanation for the 
misinformation effect, indicating that participants accept misinformation because they 
do not remember where it comes from. The studies were also an important indication 
that suggestion does not have to occur after an event in order to successfully alter 
accounts of that event. 
The misinformation studies described thus far concern incorrect responses to small scale 
laboratory based events. However, studies have also been conducted examining whether 
it is possible to affect autobiographical memories using misinformation. 
Misinformation in autobiographical memories 
The laboratory based studies of misinformation have been very successful in altering 
accounts of events viewed. However, the research into misinformation and suggestion 
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has now been extended in order to examine whether participants could alter their real- 
life memories as a result of suggestion. Loftus (1997) describes her `lost in a shopping 
mall' experiment, in which she succeeded in implanting `memories' for childhood 
events that never happened (see also Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). For each participant, a 
booklet was prepared containing short narratives about three events that had actually 
happened (provided by a family member) and one false event - namely the scenario of 
being lost in a shopping centre. After reading the booklet, the participants were asked to 
write down everything they recalled about each of the four events, and this was followed 
by two subsequent interviews in which they were questioned about their recollection of 
the events. There was a high level of recollection for the true events at each of the three 
test stages, with approximately two thirds of the scenarios being recalled. With regard to 
the false event, one third of the participants claimed to remember being lost in the 
shopping centre consistently over the three stages of interview. Hyman, Husband and 
Billings (1995) report similar levels of suggestion acceptance in their study of implanted 
childhood memory. They used a similar protocol to that of Loftus, but included a variety 
of false childhood events such as hospitalisation with an ear infection or attending a 
birthday party where there was a clown. They found that, although none of the 
participants recalled the events at the initial interview, one fifth claimed that they 
remembered it at the second interview. 
The creation of false childhood memories through misinformation was extended further 
by Porter, Yuille and Lehman (1999). They used a similar technique to that of Loftus 
(1997) and Hyman et al. (1995) but concentrated on implanting memories for highly 
emotional situations in which a child would experience above average levels of stress 
(such as serious attack by an animal or a serious medical procedure). This was for two 
reasons; firstly, it is unlikely that these items could be mistaken for other childhood 
events; and secondly, if Porter et al. succeeded in implanting memories for traumatic 
childhood experiences, there would be obvious implications for the debate into 
repressed memory of sexual abuse. Porter et al. comment that the previous studies 
involving false memories for childhood events may not be generalisable to the repressed 
memory debate because they involve relatively mundane events, rather than the 
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traumatic, extraordinary events being reported as repressed memories. Porter et al. 
reported that one quarter of participants developed a complete memory for the false 
traumatic experience and a further third of participants recalled some aspects of the 
event. 
It has been established that it is possible to implant memories for both autobiographical 
and laboratory based events as a result of misinformation. Researchers were able to 
elicit detailed descriptions of memories which the participants claimed were accurate 
(Hyman & Pentland, 1996). It is worth considering, therefore, whether these reports of 
fictitious events are the same as real memory reports, or whether they can, in fact, be 
distinguished. 
The nature of memories developed through misinformation 
Schooler, Gerhard and Loftus (1986) indicated that memories of perceived events 
should differ from memories of events that have been suggested because of the different 
processes involved in creating the memories. Memories for events that have actually 
been witnessed should contain more sensory detail because those details are encoded 
when the event is perceived. In contrast, Schooler et al. suggest that memories derived 
from misinformation should include references to cognitive processes that are used 
when the individual imagines the event. Schooler et al. (1986) showed participants a 
slide sequence depicting a car crash. After seeing this sequence, a false memory for a 
road sign was implanted through suggestion. Participants were asked to describe this 
sign, and the language used was compared to the language used by participants that had 
actually seen the sign. The experimenters found that the participants describing false 
memories showed less confidence and fewer words were used in the descriptions. 
Accounts of the signpost were less detailed with regard to sensory information (e. g. 
colour, size, shape), but contained more details about the purpose of the sign. 
Participants whose memories were a result of suggestion included more detail of their 
cognitive processes (for example: "... the answer I gave was more of an 'immediate' 
impression of what I remembered... " p. 173) and used more 'verbal hedges', such as "I 
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think" and "I believe". Thus, Schooler et al. report evidence for their hypothesis that real 
memories and those developed through misinformation differ in terms of content. 
Porter et al. (1999) used similar criteria to compare descriptions of actual childhood 
events with descriptions of implanted and fabricated memories. They divided the criteria 
into two separate groups: firstly, the subjective nature of the description, such as clarity 
of memory, confidence, and experiencing lack of memory; and secondly, the 
'presentation-specific' features of the description. This group is concerned with items 
such as amount of detail, coherence and relevance. The results showed that implanted 
memories were significantly poorer in terms of vividness and clarity and participants 
were less confident of these memories. Pickel (1999) placed participants in the situation 
of viewing a scene involving several objects on a desk. The objects were incidental to 
the task at hand and were not mentioned specifically, although the desk was referred to. 
In some cases, a calculator was on the desk at the time. In other cases, the presence of 
the calculator was suggested to the participants after they left the room. Pickel later 
asked participants to describe the calculator and found a similar pattern of results to that 
of Porter et al. She reported that memories developed as a result of suggestion contained 
less sensory information, included more verbal hedges, more use of the pronoun `I' and 
more admissions of memory failure. In addition, Pickel found that participants 
describing suggested memories spoke faster than than those describing accurate 
memories and made significantly more eye contact. 
Imagination inflation 
In addition to false memories developed through misinformation, individuals are also 
susceptible to false memories developed naturally as a result of imagination and source 
confusion. Tsai, Loftus and Polage (2000) label this form of false memory `imagination 
inflation'. Roediger and McDermott (1995) initiated a line of research concerning 
incorrect recall of words not presented in lists. Participants were read lists of words, 
with each list being formed of words related to one, unpresented word (known as the 
critical lure). For example a list for the critical lure `hospital' might feature words such 
as `doctor', nurse', `surgery', `ward', etc. When participants were asked to recall the 
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lists, Roediger and McDermott found a large incidence of critical lures being `recalled'. 
Furthermore, when presented with recognition lists, participants were likely to rate the 
critical lure as having been presented previously. These findings have been reproduced 
by many other researchers (e. g. Payne, Elie, Blackwell & Neushatz, 1996; Read, 1996). 
and the protocol has also been expanded to investigate other areas of the phenomenon. 
For example, Payne et al. (1996) examined the durability of the critical lure effect and 
found that it did not decrease over a 24 hour period, despite the fact that recognition of 
presented words decreased significantly in this time. 
Other studies have examined whether the memories for the critical lure differ 
substantially from memories for presented words. Norman and Schacter (1997) analysed 
participants' explanations for why they believed that they had seen both types of word 
before. They found that participants were more likely to make associative explanations 
(i. e. what thoughts were triggered by the word) than sensory or contextual (i. e. what the 
word sounds like, where it was placed on the list) for both types of words. There were 
some differences in explanations given for the recollection of the different types of 
words. Presented words were more likely to be remembered because of their sound, 
their list position and the participants' reaction when they heard the word. Additionally, 
participants were more likely to describe the thoughts triggered by the word for 
presented words. Overall, Norman and Schacter conclude that false memories for 
critical lures were characterised by less auditory detail and fewer recollections of 
feelings and reactions. Mather, Henkel and Johnson (1997) performed a similar 
comparison and also indicated that false memories for critical lures were typified by less 
recollection of feelings and reactions and less auditory detail. 
A related area of study is that of investigating memories for perceived and imagined 
events. Goff and Roediger (1998) played participants a number of different action 
statements (such as "Break the toothpick"), and asked them to perform some of the 
events and imagine others. At a later session they were asked to imagine performing 
some of the previously heard statements and some completely novel statements. At a 
final test stage, participants were asked to state whether they had heard, performed or 
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imagined the statements. Goff and Roediger found that the act of having imagined an 
event caused participants to believe that they had actually performed it. Henkel and 
Franklin (1998) found a similar confusion between items that had been imagined and 
perceived. They found that when participants were asked to imagine items that were in 
some way linked to perceived items, they were significantly more likely to confuse the 
source of the image. For instance, participants who were asked to imagine a line 
drawing of a lollipop, and were presented with a line drawing of a magnifying glass 
would later remember having seen the lollipop. This effect was evident when the paired 
items resembled each other (such as the magnifying glass and lollipop) and when paired 
items were conceptually related (e. g. knife and fork). 
Garry, Manning, Loftus and Sherman (1996) asked participants to complete a 
questionnaire listing various life events, indicating the likelihood that they had 
experienced each of the events. Two weeks later, they were asked to imagine certain 
events and answer questions about their images. The experimenters then asked them to 
complete the life events questionnaire again and found that participants were more likely 
to rate the imagined events as having happened. 
The idea of imagination inflation has implications for the manner in which police 
investigations, psychotherapy and court cases are conducted. Ofshe and Watters (1994) 
indicate that investigations into child abuse, for example, are frequently conducted with 
police and therapists asking the alleged victims and alleged perpetrators to imagine what 
had taken place. They suggest that this form of imagination inflation is an active factor 
in miscarriages of justice, as it encourages false accusations of abuse and false 
confessions. Ceci, Bruck and Battin (2000) also make this point, stating that 
visualisation techniques used in vulnerable groups, such as children, who have low 
levels of reality and source monitoring, create memories for traumatic events that never 
happened. 
Studies have also found that imagination inflation can be used to alter memories so that 
events that did happen are remembered as not having taken place. Loftus and Polage 
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(1999, cited in Tsai, Loftus & Polage, 2000) asked a group of participants to keep a 
journal recording the events of each day for a week. For every day, participants were 
asked to give specific examples of events during the day, events that happened to their 
partners, a wish that they had for that day, an event that they wished had not happened 
and a preferred outcome for that event. Participants were then asked to imagine several 
events recorded in the journals and summarise their images. Later on they filled out 
questionnaires asking them whether the events had actually taken place. When 
considering the data for the events that the participants wished had not taken place, 
Loftus and Polage found that imagining the preferred outcome of the event caused 
participants to believe that the actual situation had occurred that way. For example, they 
cite the case of a woman who was dieting and wished that she had not eaten some cake 
on a particular day. After imagining a scenario where she declined the food, the 
participant rated the real event as false, and her preferred outcome as that which had 
actually happened. 
The research into imagination inflation (particularly for autobiographical events) is still 
very new, and few theories have been suggested as an explanation for the effect. 
However, it is probable that there is a source monitoring error involved, as participants 
mistake a familiar imagined event for an actual experience (Tsai, Loftus & Polage, 
2000). 
Theories of how false memory develops 
Brainerd, Reyna and Poole (2000) proposed some minimum criteria that a theory of 
false memory development should meet. Firstly, they indicate that its principles should 
include all the paradigms in which false memories have been developed. Secondly, the 
principles should explain both spontaneous and implanted false memories. Thirdly, the 
principles should explain developmental variability in false memories. Finally, the 
principles should allow novel predictions for the phenomenon of false memory. Few 
theories have been proposed that incorporate all these criteria. 
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There have been a large number of theories forwarded to explain the false memory 
effect in general, and the misinformation effect in particular. This section aims to 
summarise some of the theories which have been influential in shaping the research in 
the field, and also which are accepted as providing the most compelling explanations of 
false memory development. 
Strategic effects 
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) suggested that the results obtained in misinformation 
studies up to that point were obtained by factors other than false memory. They 
indicated that data suggestive of false memory development were actually created by 
task demands. For instance, if an individual never encoded the original information in a 
suggestion study, they are not developing false memories by reporting the 
misinformation at a later date. Instead, they are reporting their actual memories for the 
misinformation. Additionally, participants' responses may be affected by what they 
believe the experimenter wants them to write, or a confusion as to which response to 
make. The strategic effects debate was extremely useful as it caused experimenters to 
refine the paradigms used in false memory research. Ayers and Reder (1998), in a 
review of subsequent literature, comment that, although the effect is not as large as 
originally thought, even after controlling for task demands there is still a significant 
effect of false memory. 
Single-trace theories 
The term `single-trace' refers to the idea that only one memory trace for each possible 
event exists. Therefore, in order to develop a false memory for an original event, it is 
necessary to alter that trace so that it represents a new event. 
Overwriting 
Loftus, Miller and Burns (1978) forwarded the `overwriting' or `trace alteration' 
account of how false memories are developed in misinformation studies. They suggested 
that witnessing the original event would produce a single memory trace that is 
overwritten by subsequent inconsistent information. Loftus et al. indicated that after 
receiving misleading information, the memory trace could no longer exist in its original 
form. However, studies such as the reversed suggestion design (Lindsay & Johnson, 
1989b), in which the misinformation is presented before the correct information and 
false memories are still produced, have demonstrated that the overwriting hypothesis is 
not a viable description of false memory formation. 
Blended memories 
The concept of blended memories was suggested by Melcalfe (1990), who used 
CHARM (composite holographic associative recall model) to explain false memory 
development. In this theory, the memory traces for the original memory and the 
misinformation are blended in order to create a single memory trace which is an 
`average' of the previous two events. Pohl and Gawlick (1995) also investigated the idea 
of blended memories. They found some evidence for blended memories in very specific 
situations. For instance, in situations where participants in misinformation studies have a 
very strong memory for the original information (because of repeated exposure), the 
likelihood of developing false memory is low. However, when participants do develop 
false memories, they may blend together memories for the misinformation and original 
information to form some sort of composite memory. When original memory traces are 
weaker, participants accept misinformation as the sole source of recollection. Ayers and 
Reder (1998) criticise this model as it does not account for the fact that memory 
impairment in misinformation studies tends to diminish over time. 
Studies examining laboratory implanted false memories tend to replace existing 
memories with new ones, whilst autobiographical false memories generally involve 
creation of false memories where a memory did not previously exist. Given this 
information, there is doubt as to whether the alteration or impairment theories could 
adequately explain the effect of false autobiographical memories. One possible way of 
fitting the data to a single-trace theory would be by taking the position that the lack of 
previous memory has been altered or impaired by the creation of a new memory. 
However, it is generally agreed that single-trace theories are no longer able to 
adequately explain the creation of false memories (Ayers & Reder, 1998). 
12 
Multiple-trace theories 
The term `multiple-trace' describes the idea that each memory may be represented by 
more than one memory trace. False memories are, therefore, developed when there is 
confusion as to which of the memory traces are accurate. 
Blocking 
The `blocking' account of false memory development was suggested by Bekerian and 
Bowers (1983). Although it is a multiple-trace theory, it is closely related to single-trace 
theories. The account suggests that traces for the original event and misleading 
information exist in the memory, but the misleading information `blocks' access to the 
original memory trace. Bekerian and Bowers (1983) suggest that the most recent 
information encountered blocks the earlier traces. Ayers and Reder (1998) indicate that 
this account was originally supported by some studies; however, the blocking theory is 
unable to account for the results of the reversed suggestion designs in which memory 
traces are affected by previously presented information. 
Source monitoring 
Lindsay and Johnson (1987) proposed that false memories occur as a result of low 
source monitoring (i. e. the ability to identify sources of information). They suggest that 
source confusion is caused by not being able to access the original source of information 
(either because it has not been encoded, or it has been forgotten) or because participants 
respond to familiar items. Koriat, Goldsmith and Pansky (2000) summarise other 
mechanisms that may contribute to source confusions. These include the original 
information being ambiguous or incomplete; lack of focus when attributing items to 
sources (due to emotional responses and divided attention, for example); similarity 
between sources; repeated retrieval of imagined events; and distraction during the 
testing procedure. This concept was supported by Lindsay and Johnson's (1989b) study 
in which participants were asked to actively try and retrieve the source of their memory 
before responding to test items. They found that this technique caused an increase in 
accuracy, with fewer false memories being reported. Tomes and Katz (1997) also 
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subscribe to this explanation of false memory development. They state that separate 
memories are stored for the original event and misinformation, and that false memories 
occur when there is confusion between the two memory traces. 
The source monitoring hypothesis is directly related to a field of research concerning 
reality monitoring. Johnson and Raye (1981) describe the term of `reality monitoring' as 
referring to "the process of distinguishing a past perception from a past act of 
imagination, both of which resulted in memories" (p. 67). They suggest that false 
memories occur as a result of an inability to monitor reality adequately, and therefore 
being unable to distinguish between reality and imagination. Johnson, Foley, Suengas 
and Raye (1988) indicated that reality monitoring may fail for two possible reasons. 
Firstly, a memory may not have the usual characteristics that would indicate its source 
(for instance, if an imagination was particularly vivid). Secondly, the individual may not 
employ the usual process of reasoning on the basis of prior knowledge, or that reasoning 
may be faulty. 
Ayers and Reder (1998) comment that source monitoring was not forwarded as a 
structural model of memory. Rather, it is a description of memory and behaviour in 
some cases according to the particular task demands, and therefore complements other 
theories of false memory development. 
Hyman and Kleinknecht's three processes theory (1999) 
Hyman and Kleinknecht (1999) proposed a theory of false memory development centred 
around the interaction between three processes. The first of these processes is 
plausibility judgments made about new information being received. Individuals are 
more inclined to judge events as plausible if they are both generally likely and 
personally likely. Hyman and Kleinknecht suggest that people will assess the overall 
frequency of particular events taking place, and the likelihood that they will experience 
them. Additionally, if an individual belongs to a group of people reporting a particular 
event, the event will seem more plausible. Another factor which increases plausibility is 
imagining a particular event. The idea that plausibility is influential in false memory 
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development is supported by Loftus, Levidow and Duensing's (1992) discrepancy 
detection hypothesis. In this, they suggest that the likelihood of a false memory being 
developed (in misinformation studies) is negatively correlated with the likelihood of 
detecting a discrepancy between the misinformation and the original event. In addition, 
Pedzek, Finger and Hodge (1997) report that although false memories can be developed 
for implausible events, the implantation of memories is more successful when the events 
are plausible. 
The second process involved in the theory of false memory development is memory 
construction. Hyman and Kleinknecht (1999) indicate that memory is constructed by 
integrating schematic knowledge of situations with a combination of personal 
experiences, suggestion and current situational demands. They suggest that construction 
of new memories can be assisted by tying the event to existing self-knowledge, and 
encouraging individuals to describe the event. 
The final process involved in Hyman and Kleinknecht's theory is that of source 
monitoring errors. They report that these are created by situational demands, and can be 
increased over time, and memory for the source of information fades faster than the 
content of the information. Hyman and Kleinknecht (1999) suggest that the three factors 
work together to produce false memory, and this may be a linear or interactive process. 
Source activation confusion model (SAC) 
The SAC model was developed by Reder and Schunn (1996) and used by Ayers and 
Reder (1998) as a model to explain the development of false memories in 
misinformation studies. It seems possible that the functions described in the SAC model 
could also generalise to describe the development of false memory by imagination 
inflation. The model assumes that the memory exists as a network of connected pieces 
of information. Each new concept is represented as an individual item in the memory, 
and the representation of that concept becomes weaker or stronger according to how 
often it is encountered. Concepts that are encountered relatively rarely will have weak 
representations in the memory, while frequently encountered concepts will be strongly 
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represented. In addition, as concepts are encountered and stored, associations to 
contextual features are automatically created. Concepts become active in the memory 
through direct encounters and if related contextual features are activated. Memories and 
actions are affected by whether particular concepts are active, regardless of how the 
concepts were activated and whether the individual is aware of the activation. Ayers and 
Reder (1998) posit that memory errors are produced when the source of a concept's 
activation is misattributed. For example (using the stop/yield sign study of Loftus, 
Miller & Bums, 1978) a concept of a traffic sign would exist in the memory. During the 
course of the misinformation study, two separate memory traces would be formed - one 
for a `stop' sign, and one for a `yield' sign. The response that would be provided by 
participants would be the trace with the greater activation at the time of testing. Given 
that the `yield' trace has been produced more recently, that trace would be expected to 
be more active, and participants will therefore remember that as the correct sign. 
Mitchell and Zaragoza (1996 a, b) and Roediger et al. (1996) demonstrated that 
repeating the misleading suggestions in misinformation studies increases the likelihood 
of developing false memories. This is consistent with the SAC model, as repeating the 
misinformation would make the memory trace to the misinformation more active, and 
therefore more accessible, than the original information trace. 
Ayers and Reder (1998) point out that the SAC model is consistent with both the source 
monitoring and the strategic effects accounts of false memory development. Both of 
these accounts indicate that false memories are produced when the original memory 
source is, in some way, inaccessible and the false memory source is dominant. 
Fuzzy trace theory (FTT) 
A final proposed explanation for false memory development is the fuzzy trace theory 
(Brainerd, Reyna, & Poole, 2000). This theory has been proposed to account for both 
spontaneous false memories and implanted false memories. Brainerd et al. indicate that 
two specific memory traces are stored after any event. The first of these is a verbatim 
trace that exactly represents the main features of the situation. The second trace is a gist 
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trace which incorporates a summary of the events without any specific information. 
These two traces are stored in parallel in the memory. When individuals attempt to 
access information about the primary action in an event, the verbatim trace will be 
accessed. However, the gist trace will be consulted when information is needed about 
peripheral details of the situation. Gist traces tend to rely more on schematic information 
about events, rather than the specific information of one individual event. 
When tested on items in memory, Brainerd et al. report that participants will have two 
subjective responses. Either they will have a feeling of remembering an event, which 
involves strong recollection, or they will have a general feeling of familiarity for the 
circumstances, and a feeling that they know the response without remembering the 
specific situation. The former feeling is associated with retrieval of verbatim traces from 
memory, and the latter is associated with retrieval of gist traces. False memories and 
memory errors occur when participants mistakenly attribute a feeling of remembering an 
event to a gist trace. This problem is compounded because verbatim traces become 
inaccessible more rapidly than gist traces, so individuals increasingly rely on gist traces 
for specific event information. 
It can be seen that the final four accounts of false memory development described 
(source monitoring, Hyman and Kleinknecht (1999), SAC and FTT) are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Instead, they each describe different aspects of a similar model. It 
can, perhaps, be concluded that false memories develop as a result of source confusion 
and inaccessibility of original memory traces. 
False memory over time 
It is now commonly accepted that memory is not a process in which events are 
reproduced perfectly without elaboration or distortion. Barclay (1986) describes 
memory as a reconstructive process, in which recollections are formed according to 
schema which exist to facilitate storage of routine and mundane events. Therefore, 
although the main themes of an event will be remembered, the exact details will be 
distorted over time and according to the situation in which they are being remembered. 
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Barclay states that the schema developed to aid memory storage are dependent upon 
past processing of similar situations, and thus schemata are heavily influenced by the 
attitude which the percipient has towards the events. McClelland (1995) suggests that 
remembering is a constructive process which is simultaneously affected by traces of the 
event being remembered, by background knowledge of material which may be related to 
the event and also by the influences of the situation in which the event is being 
retrieved. 
Several examples of situations in which the current situation affects memory for an 
event are provided by Dawes (2001). He describes various studies which demonstrate 
that recollections are made from the perspective of the time of recollection, rather than 
the time of experiencing the event. For example, participants who are asked to evaluate 
the behaviour of a child that has previously been observed will alter their evaluations on 
the basis of new information provided after the observation period. The current situation 
not only affects recall of the behaviour of others but also of self. Dawes (2001) describes 
a study (Lewinsohn & Rosenbaum, 1987) in which participants' memories of their 
childhood were collected over a substantial period of time. When participants in the 
study were going through periods of depression, they rated their childhoods as 
significantly less happy than when they were not depressed. Dawes cites further studies 
indicating that current status affects memories of drinking behaviour, political attitudes, 
child rearing and stress. These findings are congruent with those of Mineka and Nugent 
(1995) who report the effect of several mood states on memory accuracy. This 
phenomena is known as `hindsight bias' and Pohl and Gawlick (1995) suggest that it is 
closely related to misinformation, as both occurrences involve impaired recollection of 
events as a result of subsequent information. 
Thus, memory has been seen to be dependent on the situation in which it is being tested. 
However, it is interesting to consider whether distortions of memory have a long-term 
effect on the accuracy of the memory, if the accuracy is entirely dependent on current 
mood state. Wiseman and Lamont (1996) examined several descriptions of the Indian 
Rope Trick published with a variety of time gaps between viewing and publication. 
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They found that descriptions of the event become systematically more impressive with 
the passage of time. The effect of memory distortion becoming larger over time has 
been explained to some extent as being due to repeated retrieval from memory 
(Roediger, Jacoby, & McDermott, 1996). They presented participants with a series of 
slides depicting a crime, then a misleading narrative about the events. Participants were 
then repeatedly tested on the event. Over time they produced more wrong details and 
were confident of their answers. Roediger et al. state that each time an event is retrieved 
from memory it is elaborated upon, and repeated retrieval causes greater distortion. 
They also suggest that each time a memory is recalled, the recollection is for the most 
recent account provided, rather than for the original event. Additionally, there is 
evidence to suggest that the time delay between the event and recollection is key in 
determining the level of distortion that occurs. Schmolck, Buffalo and Squire (2000), 
reviewing the literature, indicate that serious distortion of memory starts to occur after at 
least one year. Three days after the verdict in the O. J. Simpson murder trial, Schmolck 
et al. asked participants to record how they had heard the news. They found that after a 
period of 15 months, the majority of memories were generally accurate. However, after 
32 months over two thirds of recollections were inaccurate in varying degrees, with 
people distorting where they were, what they were doing and who told them the news. It 
is worth noting that memories for extraordinary events (flashbulb memories) are 
commonly believed to be more accurate and durable than those for mundane events 
(Bohannon & Symons, 1992). Certainly this would be predicted given the notion of a 
schema-driven constructive memory that recreates situations based, to some extent, on 
their familiarity and similarity to previous experiences. However, Schmolck et al. (2000) 
state that up to forty percent of flashbulb memories contain major inaccuracies. This is 
due, in part, to source confusion created by media reports (in the case of events such as 
the Challenger disaster and the Kennedy assassination) and also the emotional impact of 
the situation. Therefore, it appears that both mundane and extraordinary events are 
equally susceptible to false memory development and memory distortion over time. 
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Individual differences in false memory development 
A number of studies have been conducted concerning the cognitive differences between 
participants who are and are not susceptible to false memory generation. Loftus, 
Levidow and Duensing (1992) found that artists and architects were more susceptible to 
suggestion than the general population. They speculated that this distinction may be 
caused by the imagery ability of artistic people. If a person can imagine very clearly an 
image which is being suggested to them, confusion will result as to the source of the 
remembered image. Dobson and Markham (1993) measured vividness of visual imagery 
in participants in a misinformation study, and found that individuals with high levels of 
visual imagery were poorer at discriminating the source of misinformation than those 
with low levels of visual imagery. 
The extent to which an individual is hypnotisable has been found to correlate with false 
memory in a number of studies. For example, Barnier and McConkey (1992) presented 
participants with a series of slides and then hypnotised participants and gave misleading 
suggestions about the images in the slides. Participants who were highly hypnotisable 
were more accepting of the misinformation than those with low levels of 
hypnotisability. Barnier and McConkey (1992) also considered whether the factor of 
absorption (the extent to which an individual becomes involved in thought processes and 
experiences) is related to false memory susceptibility, but found no correlation. 
Tomes and Katz (1997) presented participants with three separate events involving 
misinformation, in order to identify people with an habitual susceptibility to 
misinformation and suggestibility. This is, perhaps, a more reliable means of assessing 
the individual differences of those susceptible to false memory than relying on their 
performance in one particular study. They found that habitual susceptibility to 
misinformation is correlated with poor memory for items not affected by 
misinformation, vivid visual imagery, spatial dexterity and emotional empathy for 
others. In addition, Oakes and Hyman (2000) report work by Hyman that found that an 
individual's susceptibility to false memory could be predicted by responses in their 
initial interviews. People who talked about related self-knowledge were more likely to 
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develop false memories. Oakes and Hyman construe this to mean that false memories 
are constructed by combining false ideas with actual events from the past. 
Hyman and Billings (1998) examined the relationship between a number of cognitive 
variables and susceptibility to false memory. They hypothesised that creative 
imagination, absorption, and dissociation should all correlate with false memory 
generation because they are all linked to hypnotisability and mental imagery, which 
have previously been demonstrated to predict susceptibility to false memory. They also 
predicted that social desirability (willingness to provide a socially acceptable response 
and win approval) would be related to false memory. The measure of false memory used 
by Hyman and Billings was that of false memory created as a result of source confusion, 
rather than misinformation. This is an interesting distinction because most studies 
examining the individual differences of false memory creators tend to use memories 
created as a result of misinformation. The results showed support for the notion that 
creative imagination and dissociation are correlated with false memory, but there was no 
relationship between false memory and either absorption or social desirability. Hyman 
and Billings suggest that the relationship between false memory and dissociation is 
indicative of the tendency of dissociative people to integrate external information into 
their memories. They further conclude that people with dissociative tendencies may use 
less stringent means to monitor reality, thereby creating confusion as to the nature of 
their memories. The creative imagination scale used by Hyman and Billings measures 
both imagery and hypnotisability, and the authors conclude that the correlation with 
false memory may be caused by either of these factors, or a combination of the two. 
Platt, Lacey, lobst and Finkleman (1998) also assessed the possible relationships 
between false memory, absorption and dissociation. They also considered whether 
fantasy proneness was a factor in determining susceptibility to false memory. They 
suggested that this might be the case as high scorers on fantasy proneness measures 
typically have difficulty differentiating between real and fantasy events. The authors 
considered two types of false memory - errors in autobiographical memory as a result of 
source confusion, and susceptibility to false memories generated using the word list 
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procedure of Roediger and McDermott (1995). Platt et al. report that autobiographical 
memory error is significantly correlated with absorption, as participants with higher 
absorption levels were less accurate. However, autobiographical memory error was not 
correlated with either dissociation or absorption, and word list error did not correlate 
with any of the three individual differences measures. 
The use of the word list paradigm to assess individual differences in false memory was 
initiated by Winograd, Peluso and Glover (1998; cited in Platt et al., 1998). Winograd et 
al. predicted and found a correlation between false memory and dissociative experiences 
scores. 
Therefore, it appears that there is a reasonably strong case for visual imagery and 
hypnotisability being more evident in individuals susceptible to false memory 
generation. There is also some evidence that dissociation is linked to false memory 
susceptibility, and also perhaps absorption. 
BELIEF IN THE PARANORMAL 
Differing cognitive processes 
A great deal of research has been conducted examining the possible cognitive 
differences between paranormal believers and disbelievers. This work has resulted in a 
wide variety of possible differences being examined, and a compelling case exists for 
the view that the two groups are cognitively distinct. Irwin (1993) suggested that this 
research is due to an underlying assumption by (mainly sceptical) researchers that 
believers are not just cognitively different from disbelievers, but are actually cognitively 
deficient. Irwin dubs this the `cognitive deficits hypothesis' and continues "Under this 
collective view, the believer in the paranormal is held variously to be illogical, 
irrational, credulous, uncritical, and foolish" (p. 16). 
Snel, van der Sijde, and Wiegant (1995) investigated whether a relationship exists 
between belief in the paranormal and field dependency. Field dependency is manifested 
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in a need for structure in information being presented. People with high field 
dependency find it difficult to separate unimportant and important information and 
require context to interpret data. In contrast, field independent people can structure 
information by themselves, do not need context to make sense of information and are 
analytical. Snel et al. found the predicted positive correlation between paranormal belief 
and field dependency, and concluded that paranormal believers will, therefore, interpret 
anomalous phenomena in terms of the context in which it is presented. Disbelievers will 
look at phenomena as independent items separate from the context, and assess the data 
accordingly. 
Thalbourne, Dunbar and Delin (1995) conducted a large survey investigating the 
cognitive and personality characteristics of paranormal believers. They found a strong 
correlation between paranormal belief and magical ideation, which they define as "a 
broad term defined negatively as a kind of thinking that conceives of various cause- 
effect relationships in terms that are at variance with, or contradict, naturalistic 
materialistic science" (p. 216). Examples of magical ideation include superstitious 
thinking and belief in concepts such as astrology and luckiness. Thalbourne et al. also 
found that belief correlated positively with neuroticism and dogmatism. This suggests 
that believers are both more emotionally unstable than disbelievers, and less likely to 
adjust their views in the face of persuasive evidence. This, however, contradicts the 
findings of Lester, Thinschmidt and Trautman (1987). They compared paranormal belief 
to results on a Jungian personality measure and found that believers were more likely to 
score highly on feeling, perceiving and intuiting, while disbelievers' scores were for 
thinking, judging and sensing. Lester et al. conclude that believers are less logical but 
more open-minded than disbelievers. Finally, Thalbourne et al. (1995) replicated earlier 
findings that believers showed more of an external locus of control than disbelievers. 
Although believers have been shown to have external loci of control and believe that 
events are largely controlled by external forces, they are also subject to the illusion of 
control. This was defined by French (1992b) as "a tendency for subjects to perceive 
random processes as being potentially under their control" (p. 296). A number of 
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researchers (e. g. Benassi, Sweeeney, & Drevno, 1979; Jones, Russell, & Nickell, 1977) 
have demonstrated a strong interaction between illusion of control and belief in the 
paranormal. Blackmore and Troscianko (1985) tested this using a task which required 
subjects to attempt to influence the toss of a coin. This study revealed that participants 
who believed in the paranormal felt that they had far more control over the coin tosses 
than disbelievers did. Blackmore and Troscianko (1985) also found that believers were 
worse than disbelievers at probability judgment tasks and misjudged chance scoring by 
underestimating the level of scoring required by chance in ESP tasks. Blackmore and 
Troscianko suggested that this lack of understanding of chance may be the cause of the 
illusion of control - believers feel that they are performing well because they do not 
understand what would constitute a good performance. Additionally, Blackmore and 
Troscianko suggested that if believers do not understand the likelihood of coincidences, 
they will misinterpret entirely probable events as extraordinary. 
Wierzbicki (1985) indicated that, in addition to a lack of understanding of probabalistic 
reasoning, believers also underperformed on syllogistic reasoning. However, Irwin 
(1991b) replicated this study and found no support for his hypothesis that the reasoning 
skills of paranormal believers are defective. He suggested that previous findings 
indicating that this is the case may be due to studies being conducted by sceptics. In 
particular, Irwin suggests that the scepticism of the investigator may have inhibited 
participants and prevented them from revealing the extent of their belief in the 
paranormal. This idea is disputed by Smith, Foster and Stovin (1998) who found no 
effect of context on intelligence scores of believers and disbelievers; however, the 
believers did score lower than the disbelievers in the intelligence test. 
Roberts and Seager (1999) found a correlation between syllogistic reasoning and 
paranormal belief, but not between probabilistic reasoning and belief. Similarly, 
Blackmore (1997) conducted a newspaper survey with a large number of respondents 
and found no evidence of probability misjudgment on the part of believers. 
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Thalbourne and Nofi (1997) examined the possible relationship between paranormal 
belief and intelligence. They found no correlations between paranormal belief and 
intellectual or statistical ability. Believers were no more or less intelligent or statistically 
able than disbelievers. 
Roe (1999) challenged the cognitive deficits hypothesis. He found no differences 
between believers and disbelievers on a critical thinking task. He suggested that (in line 
with Irwin, 1991b, 1993) previous studies suggesting cognitive deficits may have been 
affected by the scepticism of the experimenter. He also indicated that paranormal belief 
may have a social, rather than cognitive, foundation. This was supported by Irwin 
(1993) who proposed a model to describe the origins and functions of belief in 
paranormal phenomena. He suggested firstly that either encouragement of fantasy in 
childhood or traumatic childhood experiences, resulting in a need for a sense of control, 
may result in a strong level of fantasy proneness. This leads to paranormal belief, which 
allows an illusion of control over events. However, the degree of paranormal belief and 
the specific form that it takes will depend on the social context in which the belief is 
formed. Irwin proposes that there is an interaction between paranormal belief and 
experiences, as belief will cause ambiguous stimuli to be interpreted as paranormal, and 
the experiencing of unusual events will foster belief. 
The literature reviewed thus far seems to suggest that, while there is support for Irwin's 
(1993) suggestion that sceptics conduct experiments in order to test the cognitive 
deficits hypothesis, there is considerable uncertainty as to whether believers are, in a 
variety of ways, cognitively inferior to disbelievers. However, work has been conducted 
that supports the idea that believers and disbelievers differ in terms of knowledge and 
cognitive processes. This literature appears to suggest that believers may actually benefit 
from more creativity, a richer imagination and a stronger sense of fantasy. 
Haraldsson (1981) conducted a series of surveys examining the relationship between 
paranormal belief and various factors. He found strong and consistent correlations 
between level of paranormal belief and both recollection of dreams and the likelihood of 
25 
attempting to interpret the dreams. Haraldsson suggests that this reflects the greater 
tendency of believers to pay attention to their inner processes and also to attend to 
purely subjective experiences. Haraldsson's findings were supported by Irwin (1985) 
who also found correlations between belief and dream recall and interpretation. He 
further reported that believers in the paranormal were more likely to read about 
paranormal events and report personal experiences of psychic phenomena. 
Irwin (1993) reports that paranormal believers have an external locus of control, while 
disbelievers tend to have an internal locus of control. This means that the believers 
attribute events to external forces such as other people, fate and luck, rather than 
believing that they have control over a situation. This reflects the work of (for example) 
Scheidt (1973), who found a strong correlation between belief in parapsychological and 
occult phenomena and external locus of control. This was also found by Allen and 
Lester (1994) in a survey of undergraduates. It is not clear, however, whether having an 
external locus of control is a consequence of paranormal belief, or whether the locus of 
control determines paranormal belief. It may be true that having an external locus of 
control is, in some cases, an advantage. For example, Dudley (1999a) reports that when 
participants were presented with an unsolvable puzzle, those with high belief in 
superstition and the paranormal were more able to recover and solve subsequent 
problems. Dudley suggests that in the situation of experiencing the unsolvable problem, 
the believers attributed the difficulty to external forces and this allowed them to move 
on without their performance being impaired. Disbelievers, however, would internalise 
the cause of the failure to solve the problem, causing disruption when attempting later 
questions. 
Thalbourne (1995) conducted a survey examining different elements of belief. In this 
survey, he reports that belief in the paranormal correlated positively with scores on the 
Conceivability Scale, which measures the ability of participants to imagine specific 
unusual scenarios. Furthermore, the data indicated strong positive correlations between 
belief and creativity and belief and fantasy proneness. The latter finding supports 
research by Irwin (1990,1991 a) which has also demonstrated a link between paranormal 
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belief and fantasy proneness. Indeed, Irwin (1993) suggests that fantasy proneness is a 
vital component in the formation and maintenance of paranormal belief 
Similarly, Wiseman & Smith (1994) considered whether the differing reactions of 
believers and disbelievers to phenomena were caused by motivational factors (i. e. they 
interpret events in such a way as to confirm their existing beliefs) or cognitive factors 
(i. e their interpretation of events is dependent on their cognitive capacity). Two studies 
were carried out in which participants were asked to assess a situation which may or 
may not have demonstrated evidence of paranormal or anomalous phenomena. In both 
cases, the believers made attributions of paranormal activity, and in both cases these 
attributions were caused by cognitive rather than motivational factors. The cognitive 
factor assessed by Wiseman and Smith was creativity, the implication being that 
believers are either more creative than disbelievers (this is also suggested by 
Thalbourne, 1995), or that they use their creativity differently than disbelievers. 
Irwin (1993) conducted a wide-ranging review of the literature considering the 
differences between believers and disbelievers. He indicates that there is strong evidence 
that people with an existing belief in the paranormal will be more likely than 
disbelievers to actively seek out paranormal events and become involved in activities 
related to the paranormal. Examples of these are given as reading and watching 
television programmes about the paranormal, participating in parapsychology courses 
and attempting to have paranormal experiences. Sparks, Nelson and Campbell (1997) 
reported that exposure to particular programmes regularly depicting paranormal activity 
will result in an increased tendency to hold paranormal beliefs. Therefore, paranormal 
belief may be viewed as a circular process in which information which will strengthen 
and perpetuate the belief is actively sought. This view is supported by Clarke (1995) 
who conducted a survey considering the causes of belief and disbelief in the paranormal. 
He found that the single most persuasive factor in determining belief is personal 
experience, followed by the experiences of others and media reporting. Disbelief was 
determined by insufficient or unpersuasive evidence and by not having had anomalous 
experiences. 
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One area in which seeking out paranormal information may not increase existing 
paranormal belief is through attending parapsychology courses. Wesp and Montgomery 
(1998) indicate that being taught about the paranormal, and how to assess reports of 
paranormal experiences, increases critical thinking and scepticism. This was also found 
by Gray (1985) who found that a taught course in parapsychology reduces belief at the 
time, and this belief reduction is still evident up to a year later. Gray concludes that a 
determining factor in paranormal belief is basic ignorance concerning what constitutes 
reliable evidence. Gray and Mill (1990) extended this line of research by presenting 
graduate students with abstracts of scientific studies that were inadequate in terms of 
explaining how the studies were conducted, or that described studies which did not 
adequately test their hypotheses. The students' ability to recognise the flaws in the 
abstracts was assessed. The authors found that students with strong paranormal belief 
were significantly less likely to find errors than participants with little belief in the 
paranormal. Gray and Mill suggest that endorsement of paranormal phenomena may 
take place because individuals are not equipped with the knowledge to properly assess 
the situation. 
It has therefore been demonstrated that, although believers in paranormal phenomena 
are not necessarily cognitively inferior to disbelievers, there is a strong case suggesting 
that cognitive differences do exist and these may affect the knowledge and behaviour of 
believers. Given that believers do demonstrate these cognitive differences, it is 
interesting to consider whether their behaviour is specific to belief in paranormal 
phenomena, or whether they are generally susceptible to believing unusual things. 
Standing and Keays (1987) developed a measure of general gullibility, which involved 
assessing levels of belief in a variety of statements not related to the paranormal. They 
found that paranormal belief was positively correlated with this gullibility factor, 
suggesting that believers are simply more susceptible to accepting odd or unusual 
information. This finding is supported by Thalbourne and French's (1997) survey into 
the general beliefs of paranormal believers. They found that belief in ESP was correlated 
with belief in a number of non-paranormal extraordinary concepts, such as astrology and 
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UFOs. Roig, Bridges, Renner and Jackson (1998) also support this view, as they 
investigated whether there was a connection between paranormal belief and irrational 
thinking. In their measures, believers scored significantly higher than disbelievers on a 
global measure of irrational thinking. Additionally, the believers scored significantly 
higher than disbelievers on two specific subscales of the irrational thinking measure - 
worrying and rigidity. 
This seeming tendency of believers in the paranormal to also believe in other unusual 
phenomena may be explained by Heard and Vyse's (1998-1999) finding. In a 
comparison of paranormal belief scores and authoritarianism/rebelliousness scores, they 
found a significant positive correlation. People that believe in the paranormal are more 
likely to yield to authority than disbelievers. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that 
believers will be more likely than disbelievers to believe what they are told without 
questioning it. 
PARANORMAL BELIEF AND FALSE MEMORY 
A small amount of research has been conducted examining the possible relationship 
between paranormal belief and various kinds of suggestibility. Haraldsson (1985) 
predicted and found a significant correlation between paranormal belief scores and 
scores on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS) (Gudjonsson, 1984). The GSS 
assesses participants' tendency to respond to leading questions and change accounts of 
events as a response to pressure from an authority figure. Dafinoiu (1995) also found 
that paranormal belief was significantly correlated with suggestibility. This was 
measured in two ways; firstly a suggestibility questionnaire was administered, and 
secondly, participants were placed in a situation where they received a misleading 
suggestion about an event. Both forms of suggestibility were affected by paranormal 
belief, with believers showing more tendency to be suggestible than disbelievers. 
With regard to hypnotic suggestibility, Saucer, Cahoon and Edmonds (1992) found no 
relationship between it and belief in the paranormal. However, Wagner and Ratzeburg 
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(1987) found a correlation between this factor and paranormal belief. They queried 
whether this would necessarily predict a correlation between waking-state suggestibility 
and belief, as there was no research indicating a relationship between the two forms of 
suggestibility. Despite this, they concluded that both types of suggestibility involve 
imagination and acceptance of phenomena suggested by other people, so a correlation 
between suggestibility and paranormal belief may exist. Atkinson (1994) found 
correlations between hypnotic susceptibility and both paranormal belief and reported 
paranormal experiences. He suggested that the correlation of hypnotic susceptibility and 
paranormal belief may be influenced by the fact that both variables are associated with 
absorption. Irwin (1989) reported that people who experience anomalous events exhibit 
a higher need for absorption than those not reporting anomalous experiences. Irwin 
suggests that the need for absorption may even cause the unusual experiences. Pekala, 
Kumar and Marcano (1995) also found a correlation between hypnotic susceptibility and 
paranormal belief and experiences. Additionally, they reported a relationship between 
experiencing of unusual phenomena and dissociative tendencies, and suggested that 
levels of dissociation are more predictive of anomalous experiences than hypnotic 
susceptibility. 
The relationship between dissociation and paranormal belief and experience has been 
reasonably well documented in the literature. Richards (1991) found that subjective 
accounts of psychic and anomalous experiences are strongly correlated with dissociation 
scores. Irwin (1994) found that dissociative experience scores correlated with a global 
measure of paranormal belief and also the subscales of belief in psi and precognition. 
Makasovski and Irwin (1999) and Rattet and Bursik (2001) also report significant 
interactions between dissociative experiences scores and paranormal belief. Wolfradt 
(1997) extended the investigation using the Dissociative Experiences Scale (Carlson & 
Putnam, 1993). He identified two main factors on the scale and named these 
depersonalization/derealization and absorption/amnesia. The first factor concerns 
experiences such as a feeling of disconnection from the body, or lack of reality in the 
rest of the world. The second factor is connected with being unsure about whether 
certain events actually happened, and forgetting that actions have been performed. There 
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was no overall correlation between belief scores and dissociation, but individual 
paranormal belief subscales correlated with different factors on the DES. Specifically, 
Wolfradt found that the depersonalization/derealization factor correlated with 
paranormal belief subscales of witchcraft, precognition, spiritualism, superstition and 
religious belief. The absorption/amnesia factor was correlated with the psi belief, 
precognition and superstition subscales. Thus, the dissociative factor specifically 
associated with false memory development has been correlated with belief in psi. 
A possible explanation for the relationships between paranormal belief and dissociation, 
absorption and suggestibility has been suggested by Thalbourne and Delin (1994). They 
identify a factor called transliminality which links paranormal belief, creativity, mystical 
experience and psychopathology. Thalbourne, Bartemucci, Delin, Fox and Nofi (1997) 
define transliminality as "susceptibility to, and awareness of, large volumes of imagery, 
ideation and affect - these phenomena being generated by subliminal, supraliminal 
and/or external input" (p. 327). It is suggested that there is a threshold between 
subliminal processes and supraliminal (conscious) processes which becomes blurred and 
allows more subliminal information than usual to enter the conscious mind. Certain 
personality types have more interaction between the subliminal and supraliminal 
processes, and thus exhibit higher levels of transliminality (Thalbourne & Delin, 1994). 
Transliminality has been shown to be correlated with dissociation (Thalbourne, 1998) 
and paranormal belief (Thalbourne, & Houran, 2000; cited in Lange, Thalbourne, 
Houran, & Storm, 2000). Although the relationship between transliminality and 
susceptibility to false memory has not previously been tested it is also anticipated that 
transliminality would correlate with the false memories as this is also affected by a 
blurring of subliminal and supraliminal processes. 
There is, therefore, a certain amount of literature that would support the hypothesis of a 
link between paranormal belief and false memory. The concept that believers in the 
paranormal would be more susceptible to false memory than disbelievers was first tested 
comprehensively by Blackmore and Rose (1997). They suggested that situations in 
which psychic or paranormal experiences tend to occur are situations in which reality 
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and imagination may become confused. They suggest that such confusions cause people 
to misinterpret events as being paranormal and therefore develop false memories for 
what has taken place. Given that people experiencing and reporting paranormal events 
typically tend to be believers, Blackmore and Rose (1997) suggested that believers 
should show more of a tendency to generate false memory than disbelievers. Studies 
published by Blackmore and Rose (1997, and Rose & Blackmore, 2001) have 
consistently failed to show such an effect. However, the existing literature on the 
cognitive and behavioural differences between believers and disbelievers gives 
indications that such an effect should be present. 
Blackmore and Rose (1997) proposed the link between the paranormal belief and 
susceptibility to false memory as a possible explanation for reports of paranormal 
events. Their suggestion is supported by the work of Russell and Jones (1980). They 
presented participants with articles that either validated the existence of ESP or 
suggested that it did not exist. Disbelievers in the paranormal did not show a bias in 
their recollection of the articles, remembering both types of article equally well. 
Participants with a belief in the paranormal had a tendency to remember the articles 
which supported ESP (and, therefore, their existing views) and have inaccurate 
memories of the articles that did not support ESP. This finding was also evident in the 
work of French (1992a), who found that participants with belief in the paranormal 
reported that ESP had been present in a study concerned with stereotypical responses. 
This belief persisted despite the fact that the participants had been informed of the true 
nature of the study. These studies show that paranormal believers appear to misinterpret 
data as it is being presented to them, and continue to hold a false memory of what they 
have seen. However, despite the fact that their memories of the events are false, the 
memories are not necessarily `false memories' in the typical sense of the phrase, given 
that no distortion of memory has taken place. Instead, the believers are holding accurate 
memories of inaccurate perceptions. 
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FALSE MEMORY VERSUS FALSE PERCEPTION 
Research has indicated that misleading information has the ability to affect recollections 
of events. Studies have shown that this is true whether the misinformation is given 
before or after an event (Rantzen & Markham, 1992). It is interesting to consider 
whether suggestion only affects recollection of an event, or whether it can be used to 
influence perception of an event as it is taking place. If suggestion is given post-event, 
its effect will be in influencing the memory of that event. If a suggestion is given pre- 
event or during the event, it may influence perception of, and attention to, the event. 
Perception is known to be a constructive process, whereby stimuli are interpreted not 
only by using sensory information but also by unconscious inferences determined by 
pre-existing knowledge and biases (Eysenck & Keane, 1995). Eysenck and Keane 
(1995) list the three main assumptions underlying constructivist theory. Firstly, 
perception is viewed as a constructive process, consisting of more than a simple 
pathway between stimulus and reception. Secondly, the sensory information received is 
used as a stimulus, which is then interpreted using existing knowledge, expectations and 
motivations. Finally, given the subjective nature of this processing, the resulting 
perception may occasionally be incorrect. 
The effect of constructive processing influences the way that small stimuli are 
interpreted, but also affects the experiencing of major events and judgment of self and 
others. Fazio and Williams (1986) found that perceptions of candidate performance in 
televised debates during an election campaign were largely guided by pre-existing 
affiliations. Participants regarded their chosen candidate as having outperformed their 
opponent. This reflects work by Duck, Terry and Hogg (1998) which was also 
conducted during an election campaign and demonstrated that pre-existing political 
affliations caused participants whose party lost an election to perceive the media as 
biased against their party, and other voters as gullible. Similarly, Vallone, Ross and 
Lepper (1986) found that, when viewing media reports of a massacre in Beirut, both 
pro-Israeli and pro-Arab participants rated the coverage as being biased against their 
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sides. The authors found that participants arrived at this view using two separate 
mechanisms. Firstly, they evaluated the overall fairness of the coverage badly because 
they disagreed with comments reflecting the other sides' views. Secondly, they 
misperceived and misremembered specific instances of the content of the footage, 
recalling more coverage being afforded to the opposing side. The authors also noted that 
the more knowledge the participant had, the more biased their perception was. 
Walton and McKeown (2001) found that drivers who habitually speed tended to 
overestimate the speed of other drivers. The authors concluded that this instance of 
constructive perception was used to justify behaviour which may not otherwise be 
deemed acceptable. This is an example of constructive perception working as a defence 
mechanism, selectively interpreting stimuli in order to support a worldview 
(GinerSorolla & Chaiken, 1997). Another example of constructive perception working 
as a defence is found when people are asked to examine evidence that may or may not 
support their views. Chambliss and Garner (1996) report that, rather than neutrally 
reading a text and considering their beliefs afterwards, participants will use the 
information selectively as a means to construct an argument that maintains their 
opinions. This finding was supported by Biek, Wood and Chaiken (1996) who found 
that participants showing a strong fear of AIDS were likely to interpret data as 
supporting their views, and also rate information congruent with their attitudes as more 
acceptable than information that was not attitude-congruent. Their data also reflect those 
of Vallone et al. (1986), as they found that participants with less knowledge of the 
situation were less likely to be biased. 
Perception is also affected by the cognitive state of the percipient at the time. Brown 
(1986) reports that a participant's mood at the time of completing a task will influence 
the attributions they make about their success on the task. Lucock, White, Peake and 
Morley (1998) found that participants who are in a state of high anxiety about their 
health are likely to perceive doctors as less reassuring than those in lower states of 
anxiety. This perceived difference continues over time, with reports one month later still 
reflecting the initial attitudes. Another example of cognitive bias in the health field was 
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found by Williamson, Gleaves and Lawson (1992). They reported that bulimic patients 
incorrectly rated their daily intake of calories as higher than the intakes of both normal 
eaters and clinically obese people. 
An alternative explanation for the differing recollections of believers and disbelievers 
with regard to paranormal phenomena is that the error occurs at perception, rather than 
at recollection. There is a strong literature suggesting that believers in the paranormal 
may be subject to biases in perception as a result of constructive processing. Jones and 
Russell (1980) asked participants to watch a demonstration of an ESP test after first 
measuring their belief in the paranormal. When the test appeared to be successful (i. e. 
showed above-chance levels of card guessing), both the believers and the disbelievers 
reported it as such. However, when the test yielded results at chance, the believers 
continued to report that ESP had been demonstrated. Despite the fact that the concept of 
chance had been explained to them, the believers consistently perceived the test as 
having shown ESP. It is interesting to note that the reverse is not true - the disbelievers 
did not regard the successful trials as having been at chance levels. Thus, it appears that 
the effects of bias on perception are stronger for believers than disbelievers. The 
participants were also tested on their own ESP ability. Although there was no overall 
difference in ESP scores, after the demonstration the believers were more likely than the 
disbelievers to indicate that their trials had shown evidence of ESP. Again, their beliefs 
had influenced their perceptions of the events. 
These findings are supported by Wiseman, Seager and Smith (1997), in a study 
involving the differing perceptions of believers and disbelievers in a seance room. They 
noted that the believers who attended the seances were more likely than disbelievers to 
report that objects had moved when they had, in fact, remained stationary; to report 
experiencing unusual phenomena in addition to those which the experimenters had 
arranged; and to rate the phenomena as being of a paranormal origin. 
Blackmore and Moore (1994) suggested that a possible explanation for the greater 
number of paranormal experiences reported by believers is a tendency for them to 
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misinterpret neutral or noisy stimuli, and construct a perception of an anomalous event. 
They tested this idea by presenting believers and disbelievers with a series of images in 
progressive stages of degraded quality. In accordance with their hypothesis, they found 
that participants who believed in the paranormal were more likely than disbelievers to 
report seeing images in the stimuli, and their identifications were incorrect more often. 
This suggests that, in real-world situations, believers have a greater tendency to 
misinterpret events as being paranormal and also to experience events differently from 
how they actually happen. 
Hines (1988) reports that this bias of paranormal believers towards unusual phenomena 
is not unusual, as it reflects the fact that anyone with a strong level of belief about a 
particular topic will construct their perception accordingly. He cites Glick and Snyder's 
(1986) study into astrology as an example of this. Participants were provided with an 
astrological reading for a particular individual and were asked to question him in order 
to establish whether or not the reading was accurate. Although there was no difference 
between believers and disbelievers in astrology in the questions that they asked (most 
tended to ask questions that would confirm the reading as accurate), they were affected 
differently by the answers received. After questioning the individual, disbelievers tended 
to modify their previous views on astrology and perceive the reading as being accurate. 
Believers rated the reading as accurate regardless of how many answers they had heard 
confirming facts about the reading. Hines (1988) interprets this result as showing that, in 
most situations, disbelievers are open-minded and prepared to change their views whilst 
believers are inclined to interpret all events as being congruent with their beliefs. 
The tendency of people to selectively interpret data, and construct perceptions that are 
congruent with their world views is explained by Sanbonmatsu, Posvac, Kardes and 
Mantel (1998) as being due to selective hypothesis testing. They suggest that in 
situations where people have to make decisions about certain pieces of 
information, they 
will naturally be inclined to interpret the information as 
in accordance with their beliefs. 
This is achieved in two ways. Firstly, people will be selective about the hypotheses that 
they choose to test. Sanbonmatsu et al. (1998) indicate that it is common to avoid 
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situations in which beliefs and assumptions are challenged, therefore it is possible to 
retain attitudes that are incorrect or inconsistent. More hypotheses are generated that are 
consistent with existing attitudes and, therefore, more of these hypotheses are 
confirmed. Secondly, people will be selective in how they test attitudes and interpret 
findings. Sanbonmatsu et al. report that ambiguous or neutral stimuli are often perceived 
to be congruent with existing beliefs. Additionally, hypotheses are expanded or adjusted 
to accommodate information. When people are particularly motivated to support a 
particular hypothesis, they may lower their standards of confirmation in order to 
maintain their opinions. Hypotheses that are generated as a result of pre-existing ideas 
are often confirmed very quickly, as they are considered to be very credible and 
consistent with beliefs that have already been confirmed. Thus, in the situation of a 
strong believer in paranormal phenomena, the possibility of a ghost having been seen 
will be accepted relatively easily, because it is a concept that that is in accordance with 
previous beliefs and possibly similar to previous events that have been experienced. In 
the case of a non-believer, the probability that the event was a ghost sighting would be 
tested much more rigorously, with alternative explanations being considered before the 
idea was accepted. Similarly, even if an hypothesis is not consistent with previous 
belief, acceptance will be much faster if the event takes place in a context where the 
hypothesis is plausible, and when there is encouragement from others for the hypothesis 
to be accepted. Given the higher likelihood of attitude-congruent hypotheses to be both 
tested and confirmed, it is also true that there is a higher likelihood that the confirmation 
will be false. Pre-existing beliefs cause an acceptance of ideas that would otherwise not 
be supported. In the field of the paranormal, it appears that believers have more of a 
tendency to selectively test hypotheses than disbelievers, causing misperceptions and 
misinterpretations of stimuli. 
Given this information with regard to the constructive nature of perception, it seems 
probable that perception of an event will be affected by receiving misleading 
information before the event is viewed, or as the event is taking place. It also seems 
probable that acceptance of that information will be greater the more it corresponds to 
existing beliefs. This thesis, therefore, aims to test the effects of misleading information 
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before and during the viewing of an event on the perceptions of percipients. It also 
considers whether the acceptance of misleading information varies according to 
paranormal belief, and the correspondence between the information and existing beliefs. 
STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The first chapter has reviewed the existing literature on belief in the paranormal 
focusing particularly on the possible cognitive differences between believers and 
disbelievers. The literature on false memory has also been reviewed, and the theories of 
why false memories may develop have been considered. The individual differences 
between false memory developers and non-developers have been considered. The 
reasons for hypothesising a correlation between paranormal belief and development of 
false memory have been explained. It has also been suggested that differences in 
recollection between believers and disbelievers may be caused by error at the encoding 
stage, rather than the storage or retrieval stages. 
Chapter 2 contains details of three studies examining false memory developed as a result 
of imagination inflation. This draws on work by Blackmore and Rose (1997, and Rose 
& Blackmore, 2001), and extends the concept to examine the correlations between false 
memory, paranormal belief, visual imagery, dissociation and transliminality. The studies 
were successful in generating false memories, but suggest that development of false 
memories through source confusion is not related to paranormal belief. 
Chapter 3 examines whether pre-existing beliefs and expectations can affect the way in 
which participants experience unusual events. The studies found that participants with 
belief in ghosts were more likely to experience unusual phenomena in neutral situations 
than were participants with no belief in ghosts. The second study described in Chapter 3 
also considers whether misleading suggestion before an event will influence perception 
of it, and whether believers will be more susceptible to the suggestion than disbelievers. 
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Chapter 4 considers the impact of pre-existing beliefs and misleading suggestion upon 
perceptions of events in a seance room. The study includes the unusual technique of 
negative suggestions (indicating that an event which is taking place is not happening) as 
well as suggestion that an event is taking place, and considers whether believers and 
disbelievers are equally susceptible to selective processing of information which 
challenges beliefs. 
Chapter 5 details four studies examining false perception and false memories developed 
as a result of suggestion. These studies tested the notion that perceptions can be altered 
during the course of experiencing an event, and that suggestion does not simply rely on 
post-event misinformation. This implies that reports of paranormal phenomena may be 
reliant on factors other than the events that actually take place. The four studies indicate 
that perceptions of events can be influenced by preconceptions and beliefs; however, 
there is ambiguity about the interaction between belief and suggestion. The final two 
studies also consider the role of precise question wording in gaining accurate 
representations of participants' views. 
Chapter 6 summarises the findings within the thesis and examines whether there is 
evidence for a relationship between paranormal belief and susceptibility to either false 
memory development or false perception. The chapter concludes by detailing potential 
areas for further study and considering the implications of the findings. 
39 
CHAPTER 2: ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PARANORMAL 
BELIEF, DISSOCIA TION, IMA GER Y AND IMA GINA TION INFLA TION 
INTRODUCTION 
False memory research 
Researchers have demonstrated that it is possible to produce false memories using a variety 
of methods. For instance, some researchers have generated false memories in participants by 
implanting misleading post-event information (e. g., Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 
1989). An alternative approach is to produce false memories by confusing the source of the 
memories. Roediger and McDermott (1995) demonstrated that when exposed to a series of 
related words, participants will develop `memories' for words that were not presented, but 
which are connected to the presented words. For example, when shown a list containing the 
words `seat, arm, cushion, rest' participants will remember being shown the word `chair'. 
Source confusion was also tested by Goff and Roediger (1998), who examined whether the 
act of imagining an event could cause a false memory of having actually performed it. They 
reported that after being asked to perform a series of simple actions and imagine performing 
some actions, participants are unable to recall which actions were performed or imagined. It 
is suggested that the action of imagining an event leads to great familiarity with that event, 
and the participants confuse the source of this familiarity, leading them to believe that they 
have actually performed the action. 
Lane and Zaragoza (1995) tested whether participants would confuse memories for printed 
words and pictures. They presented participants with a series of cards depicting individual 
words or a simple picture. The next day they were given a list of the cards viewed and were 
asked to indicate whether they had seen a picture or a word. They were also asked to state 
whether they remembered seeing the item, or if they just had a feeling of knowing that they 
had seen it. Lane and Zaragoza found that, although the majority of judgments were correct, 
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a significant number of participants made confusion errors as to the source of the memory. 
They concluded that participants who misremembered words as pictures often based their 
judgments on a conscious `recollection' of what the picture looked like. They also found no 
difference between correct memories and source confusions with regard to remember/know 
judgments. Participants were unable to distinguish between the two forms of memory. 
Interaction between false memory and paranormal belief 
Blackmore and Rose (1997) predicted a relationship between paranormal belief and the 
number of false memories generated through source confusion. This prediction was based on 
what they refer to as the `misinterpretation hypothesis', suggesting that people who believe 
in the paranormal are more likely to confuse reality and imagination, and therefore 
misinterpret imagined events as real. This prediction is supported by several strands of 
research. 
Within memory research it has been demonstrated that there is a strong correlation between 
development of false memories and dissociation (for example, Hyman, & isillings, 19A). 
Pekala, Kumar and Marcano (1995) report that definitions of dissociation range from the 
somewhat specific "disconnection, independence, or separateness of one part of memory 
from another" to the broader "disconnectedness or lack of integration of knowledge, 
identity, memory, and control" (p. 314). Hyman and Billings (1998) suggest that the 
correlation between dissociation and false memory may be explained by the fact that people 
who are highly dissociative are less able to monitor reality and are more likely to 
incorporate outside information into their own experiences. 
There is also an established link between paranormal belief and proneness to dissociation. 
Irwin (1994) demonstrated that dissociation is positively and significantly correlated with 
global paranormal belief and also several individual subscales of the Paranormal Belief Scale. 
This is supported by both Makasovski and Irwin (1999) and Rattet and Bursik (2001) who 
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also report a correlation between paranormal belief and dissociation. Irwin (1994) suggests 
that this connection may actually be a consequence of the relationship between both factors 
and fantasy proneness, and that these are defence mechanisms used to cope with 
uncontrollable life events. 
The relationship between paranormal belief and mental imagery has also been well explored. 
Irwin (1993) reports a positive correlation between mental imagery and paranormal belief, 
and Thalbourne (1995) found that those with strong paranormal belief score highly on the 
Conceivability Scale. This scale measures an individual's ability to imagine a certain object 
or scenario. Marks (1988) even states that `many sincere believers in paranormal 
phenomena appear to base their beliefs on autonomous, vivid, hallucinatory images of a 
non-lucid kind. ' (p. 333) 
This information is particularly interesting in light of the fact that there is also an 
established connection between development of false memory and mental imagery. Hyman 
and Pentiand (1996) demonstrated that guided imagery can increase the construction of false 
memories for childhood events and, in 1998, Hyman and Billings found a significant 
correlation between generation of false memory and scores on the Creative Imagination 
Scale, which measures the vividness of mental imagery. Tomes and Katz (1997) investigated 
the cognitive differences between participants who are and are not susceptible to false 
memory generation as a result of misinformation. They found a strong correlation between 
false memory susceptibility and scores on the vividness of visual imagery questionnaire 
(VVIQ) (Marks, 1973). This supports Dobson and Markham's (1993) finding that high 
scorers on the VVIQ are more likely to develop false memories after misinformation has 
been presented. Goff and Roediger (1998) provide an explanation for these findings, stating 
that good imagers make more source monitoring errors than poor imagers, thus leading to 
greater potential for false memory development. 
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One theoretical explanation for these relationships has been suggested by Thalbourne and 
Delin (1994). They report that there is a `common thread' linking paranormal belief, 
creativity, mystical experience and psychopathology, and assign this factor the name 
'transliminality'. It is suggested that there is a threshold between subliminal processes and 
supraliminal (conscious) processes which may become blurred in certain cases. In these 
instances, more subliminal information is allowed to enter the conscious mind. Thalbourne 
and Delin suggest that personality types that exhibit high levels of creativity, paranormal 
belief and certain forms of psychopathology (such as mania and schizophrenia) have more 
interaction between the subliminal and supraliminal processes, and thus exhibit higher levels 
of transliminality. This theory is directly applicable to the current study, supporting the 
hypothesis that there will be correlations between paranormal belief, visual imagery, 
dissociation and false memory. Each of these factors is associated with high levels of 
interaction between the subliminal and supraliminal processes. 
Blackmore and Rose (1997) chose to concentrate on false memories generated as a result of 
confusing the source of the memory. In this research, participants were shown simple ime 
drawings of various objects and asked to imagine others. Over several weeks, the 
participants were questioned about details of the pictures (e. g. `Did the shoes have laces? '), 
although they were not asked whether the pictures were real or imagined until the final 
session. At the end of the study it was shown that participants had developed false 
memories for some of the pictures. That is, they incorrectly recalled that they had seen 
some pictures that had simply been imagined. However, Blackmore and Rose (1997) failed 
to find the predicted correlation between false memory and paranormal belief, and Rose and 
Blackmore (2001) detail three more, similar, studies which also carried the same prediction 
and again failed to find a relationship. 
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ESP testing 
Blackmore and Rose tested a second hypothesis within the course of their studies - the 
`reality-imagination psi hypothesis'. They suggested that creating a situation where reality 
and imagination are somehow confused may be psi-conducive. This is proposed as a 
possible alternative or complementary explanation for a link between paranormal belief and 
false memory, as they suggest that people who confuse reality and imagination may have 
more psychic experiences than other people as the confusion is somehow creating an 
opportunity for psi to occur. This hypothesis is linked to the `sheep-goat' effect which has 
often been considered in parapsychology studies. This term refers to the fact that 
participants who demonstrate strong belief in the paranormal have a tendency to score 
higher than disbelievers in tests of ESP (Palmer, 1986a). Lawrence (1993) performed a 
meta-analysis of studies examining the sheep-goat effect between 1947 and 1993, and found 
that the effect was small but consistent. This indicates that, if ESP exists, participants who 
believe are more likely to experience it than those who do not believe. Thus, participants 
also completed a covert ESP test in the course of Blackmore and Rose's studies. 
ESP testing can be classified into two distinct forms - forced-choice tests and free-response 
tests (Broughton, 1991). In forced-choice testing, participants are aware of a specific 
number of pre-determined targets and they must attempt to identify which of those targets 
a particular stimulus corresponds to. For example, in card-guessing tasks participants are 
aware that each card must depict one of five possible symbols and they must guess which 
of those symbols is on the card. In free-response tasks, participants generate a description 
of a possible target, and then must decide which of a number of targets most closely 
corresponds to their description (Palmer, 1986b). The participants in Blackmore and Rose's 
study were not aware that they were participating in an ESP test, and therefore could not 
consciously select targets. However, the task was more related to a forced-choice test than a 
free-response test. Blackmore and Rose indicated that if the participants experienced ESP 
during the studies, they would be more likely to develop false memories for pre-selected 
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target labels. Each participant was assigned a pack of ESP targets comprising three of the 
labels that they had been asked to imagine. A `hit' was recorded when the participant 
reported a false memory that corresponded with one of the target pictures. A `miss' was 
recorded when a false memory corresponded with one of the non-target pictures. Blackmore 
and Rose found in their 1997 study, but not the three 2001 studies, that participants 
developed significantly more false memories for objects that had been selected as ESP 
targets. 
Confidence 
There is a consistent effect in false memory research that participants are significantly less 
confident in their false memories than their real memories. Pezdek and Taylor (2000) 
reviewed the existing research and found no studies within the false memory literature that 
indicated that participants were more confident in their false memories. This effect may be 
due to the fact that false memories are generally less vivid, less detailed and have less clarity 
(Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999). However, Blackmore and Rose (1997) did not report this 
efi ct - they found that participants were as confident of their false memories as their 
actual memories. 
The present studies 
The present studies build upon the work of Blackmore and Rose (1997) in four major ways. 
Firstly, the studies are designed to allow more false memories to develop and this has been 
achieved by increasing the number of pictures that the participants are asked to imagine 
from six to twelve. The presented pictures are complex photographs of familiar situations 
(such as an elephant in a zoo, a seal on a bed of ice) and the participants were therefore 
encouraged to imagine similar scenes that would also feel familiar. Research has shown that 
participants commonly distort memories of photographs such that they remember and 
describe more of a scene than is actually shown (Intraub, Gottesman, Willey, & Zuk, 1996). 
This phenomenon is known as `boundary extension' and Intraub et al. (1996) explain its 
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occurrence as being caused by the natural tendency of participants to place scenes in a larger 
and familiar context. It was therefore anticipated that, by using complex images that the 
participants would naturally elaborate upon, the distinction between the actual photographs 
and imagined images would be blurred. The pictures presented are also linked conceptually, 
as they all involve photographs of animals. It has been shown that in situations where 
participants are asked to imagine some articles and view pictures of others, source 
confusion develops most often when the articles are linked around a conceptual theme 
(Henkel & Franklin, 1998). 
Secondly, in a change to the Blackmore and Rose (1997) design, the participants were asked 
to provide a verbal description of each false memory that they developed as opposed to the 
Blackmore and Rose study where participants were asked to draw simple pictures. This 
allows collection of quantitative data and encourages the participants to think carefully 
about their responses. Thirdly, for reasons of time and practicality, participants were not 
tested on their recall between the first and last sessions. The fourth major change to the 
Blacknnore and Rose paradigm is that participants dissociative experiences and visual 
imagery were assessed, in order to explore the possible connection between these variables 
and development of false memories. 
In addition to measuring the false memories developed by participants, the number of 
memory errors made in the opposite direction was also recorded. Instances where 
participants wrongly stated that they imagined a picture, rather than seeing it, were 
registered as `forgetting' scores. Such instances are clearly source monitoring errors along 
the same lines as development of false memory, as participants are able to retrieve part of a 
picture but do not remember the origin of it (Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 2000). Both 
forms of memory error could be classed as either constructive (in that they involve 
generating a new memory for the source of a picture) or destructive (as the participant has 
forgotten the original source of the picture). However, it is unclear whether forgetting 
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information is the exact equivalent of false memory generation, or whether it is the 
opposite. Consequently, it was predicted that forgetting scores would also correlate with 
the individual differences measures, but the direction of the correlations was not predicted. 
In addition, a general measure of memory inaccuracy was formed from adding together the 
number of false memory and forgetting scores, and it was also expected that this would 
correlate with the individual differences measures. 
STUDY 2.1 
METHOD 
Design 
The study was a correlational design, in which the dependent variables were: number of 
false memories developed, forgetting scores, total memory inaccuracy, paranormal belief 
scores, vividness of visual imagery scores and dissociative experiences scores. 
It was hypothesised that belief in the paranormal would significantly correlate with the 
number of false memories developed, forgetting scores and the total number of inaccurate 
responses. Furthermore, it was predicted that the number of false memories developed, 
forgetting scores, total inaccuracy, belief in the paranormal, dissociative experiences scores 
and vividness of visual imagery would all correlate with each other. Finally, following 
Blackmore and Rose (1997), it was predicted that participants would develop significantly 
more false memories for ESP targets than non-targets. 
Participants 
This study involved 16 University of Hertfordshire undergraduate students with a mean age 
of 22.4 years (std. dev. 4.83). 3 males and 13 females participated in the study, all of whom 
obtained course credits for doing so. All participants completed the task individually. 
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Materials 
Stimuli 
The stimulus materials used were 24 slides presented on the Slideshow option of 
Microsoft's PowerPoint package. Two sets of 24 slides were prepared, each containing 12 
slides showing a colour photograph of an animal with the name printed underneath, and 12 
slides showing only the name of an animal. The sets were counterbalanced such that each 
`photograph and label' slide in Set 1 corresponded to a `label only' slide in Set 2, and vice 
versa. Each slide was presented for 10 seconds, with a 2-second break between slides. The 
slides were presented so that every pair of slides contained a `photograph and label' slide 
and a `label only' slide; however the order of these pairs was randomly selected. 
Practice Stimuli 
The Practice Stimuli consisted of 2 `photograph and label' slides and 2 `label only' slides 
which were randomly ordered. 
Questionnaires 
Paranormal Belief Scale (see Appendix A) 
The Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS) (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983) consists of 25 statements 
covering seven subscales of paranormal belief. Participants are asked to record their level of 
agreement with each statement using a scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 
(Strongly Agree). The scale is scored by summing the ratings, taking note of the fact that 
two items on the scale are reverse scored. The mean score for the PBS is reported by the 
authors as 76.87 (std. dev. 11.97). An example of the statements is: `A person's thoughts 
can influence the movement of a physical object'. 
Dissociative Experiences Scale (see Appendix B) 
The Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) (Carlson & Putnam, 1993) consists of 28 
scenarios demonstrating various levels of dissociation. Participants are asked to circle a 
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number from 0% to 100% (in increments of 10%) to show how often they experience each 
scenario. The scale is scored by generating a mean of all the responses. The median score for 
`normal' participants (i. e. those without clinical diagnoses of psychiatric disorders) on the 
DES is reported by the authors as 4.38. A sample scenario is: `Some people find that 
sometimes they are listening to someone talk and they suddenly realise that they did not 
hear part or all of what was said. Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this 
happens to you'. 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (see Appendix C) 
The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) (Marks, 1973) presents 
participants with 4 different scenes and asks them to imagine 4 specific details of each 
scene. Participants are asked to record the vividness of their imagery on a scale ranging from 
1 (Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision) to 5 (No image at all, you only 'know' you 
are thinking of the object). The scale is scored by generating a mean of all the responses. The 
mean score for the VVIQ is reported by the author as 3.01 (standard deviation not 
provided). An example of an item on this scale is: 
Think of the front of a shop which you often go to. Consider the picture that comes before 
your mind's eye. 
a. The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite side of the 
road 
b. A window display including colors, shapes and details of 
individual items for sale 
c. You are near the entrance. The colour, shapes and details of 
the door 
d. You enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter assistant 
serves you. Money changes hands 
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The VVIQ is reverse scored - high scores on the scale indicate a poor level of imagery, while 
low scores indicate extremely good imagery. 
Response Questionnaire (see Appendix D) 
This was presented one week after viewing the stimuli and consisted of a list of the 24 
labels. Participants are asked for each label to record whether the corresponding photograph 
had been Seen or Imagined. For each answer the participant rated their confidence on a 1-7 
scale, ranging from Not at all Confident to Very Confident. 
ESP Target Pack 
Four ESP target packs were prepared by two people unconnected with the study. For each 
participant, six of the twelve `label only' slides that they had seen acted as ESP targets. 
Colour photographs corresponding to the labels were printed with 6 targets on each sheet of 
paper. Each sheet of paper was then folded in half and wrapped in foil. These were then 
placed into separate envelopes, then wrapped in `Keepsafe' bags (secure, tamperproof bags 
that cannot be opened without leaving evidence). The bags were labelled according to 
whether they contained the target pictures for Slide Set One or Slide Set Two. The author 
had no knowledge of which targets were in the envelopes. Participants were assigned one of 
the two envelopes corresponding to the set of stimuli that they viewed, and it was attached 
to the response questionnaire during the second session. 
As with Blackmore and Rose (1997), a `hit' was recorded when the participant reported a 
false memory that corresponded to one of the target pictures. A `miss' was recorded when a 
false memory corresponded to one of the non-target pictures. At no time were the 
participants told that they were completing an ESP test. 
50 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited via a poster offering course credits for completion of the study. 
All participants were run by the author in both sessions. In the initial session, they were 
shown the 24 stimuli on a computer monitor. Before viewing the stimuli, the participants 
were instructed that when presented with `photograph and label' slides they should 
concentrate on the photograph and take in as much detail as possible, and when presented 
with `label only' slides they should imagine a photograph of the appropriate animal. Prior 
to seeing the slides, participants were shown the Practice Stimuli, to ensure that they 
understood the task. After viewing the Practice Stimuli and indicating that they understood, 
participants were shown the actual stimuli. After viewing the slides, participants completed 
the PBS, the DES and the VVIQ. There were no time restrictions. 
Participants returned a week later for a second session. They were presented with the 
Response Questionnaire and asked to complete it; there was no time limit for this. 
Participants were deemed to have generated a false memory when they incorrectly stated 
that they had seen a photograph which had actually been imagined. For each false memory 
recorded, the experimenter tape-recorded the participant giving a verbal description of the 
photograph that they believed they had seen. In addition, participants were asked to 
describe a corresponding number of actual memories (i. e. memories for photographs that 
had actually been presented and that they recalled seeing). 
RESULTS 
False memory 
The procedure was successful in terms of producing false memories. In total, 47 false 
memories were generated (mean of 2.9 per participant). Additionally, there were 33 
occasions (mean of 2.06) in which participants `forgot' that they had seen a photograph, 
and recorded it as an imagined event. 
51 
Correlations with individual differences measures 
As predicted, there was a significant correlation between the number of false memories 
generated and scores on the PBS. However, the number of false memories generated did not 
correlate with forgetting scores, or participants' performance on the DES or the VVIQ. 
Neither forgetting scores nor total inaccuracy scores correlated significantly with any of the 
variables. 
There was no correlation between scores on the PBS and the DES or the VVIQ. As 
predicted, there was a correlation between scores on the VVIQ and the DES. The 
correlations between individual differences measures are shown in table 2.1. 
FM FORGET TOTAL VVIQ DES 
INACCURATE 
FORGET r =. 14 
p =. 6 
VVIQ r=. 16 r=. 19 r=. 18 
p=. 54 p=. 47 p=. 48 
DES r-. 39 r=-17 r=-. 30 r 5: 
p=. 14 p=. 51 p=. 24 p=. 05 
PBS r=. 52 r=. 09 r=. 44 r=-. 34 r=-. 13 
p=. 05 p=. 72 p=. 09 p=. 19 p=. 60 
Table 2.1: Spearman's Correlation Coetticients between mdiviuuai airrerences measures aria memory, snowing z tauen 
significance. 
ESP 
There were no significant differences between the number of false memories created by ESP 
and non-ESP targets (t (15df) = -1.52, p (2t) = . 15). 
Confidence 
The participant's confidence in their false memories (rated on a 7-point scale) gave a mean 
score of 4.66 (std. dev. 1.23) against a mean score of 5.63 (std. dev . 95) when rating their 
actual memories. These means were compared using Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks 
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Test and were shown to be significantly different (z = -2.84, p (2t) = . 
004). Participants 
were significantly less confident in their false memories than in their actual memories. 
DISCUSSION OF STUDY 2.1 
This study proved to be successful both in terms of generating a good number of false 
memories, and in finding the correlation between false memory and belief in the paranormal. 
Whilst this was suggested by the literature, Blackmore and Rose (1997) did not find this 
correlation. The expected correlations between false memory and scores on the DES and 
VVIQ were not found, and there was also no significant relationship between PBS scores 
and scores on the DES and VVIQ. Unlike Blackmore and Rose, the participants were 
significantly less confident with their false memories than they were with their real 
memories. These results were unexpected, but could possibly be explained by the fact that 
the participant sample was very small. In view of this, a replication was attempted with a 
larger number of participants. 
An interesting finding in Study 2.1 was that the two sets of target slides were not generating 
equal numbers of false memories. Target set one generated a mean of 3.88 false memories 
(std. dev. 1.13) per participant, and set two generated a mean of 2 false memories (std. dev. 
1.77). These means were significantly different (t (14df) = 2.53, p (2t) _ . 02). 
Consequently, it was decided to re-order the target sets into two new sets, each containing 
half of the slides with high numbers of false memories associated with them, and half of the 
slides associated with low numbers of false memories. 
53 
STUDY 2.2 
The aim of Study 2.2 was to produce a replication of Study 2.1 using a higher number of 
participants and more equally balanced sets of slides. 
METHOD 
Design 
The study was a correlational design, in which the dependent variables were: number of 
false memories developed, forgetting scores, total inaccuracy scores, paranormal belief 
scores, vividness of visual imagery scores and dissociative experiences scores. 
It was hypothesised that, as with Study 2.1, belief in the paranormal would significantly 
correlate with the number of false memories developed, forgetting scores and total 
inaccuracy scores. Furthermore, it was predicted that the number of false memories 
developed, forgetting scores, total inaccuracy scores, belief in the paranormal, dissoeiativc 
experiences scores and vividness of visual imagery would all correlate with each other. 
Finally, following Blackmore and Rose (1997), it was predicted that participants would 
develop significantly more false memories for ESP targets than non-targets. 
Participants 
The second study involved 52 University of Hertfordshire undergraduate students with a 
mean age of 25.4 years (std. dev. 7.66). 11 males and 41 females participated in the study, 
all of whom obtained course credits. 
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Materials 
The materials used in Study 2.1 were also used in this study; however the two sets of slides 
were re-ordered to ensure that they contained equal numbers of slides which produced high 
numbers of false memories, and the ESP target packs were recreated accordingly. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that used in Study 2.1. 
RESULTS 
False memory 
175 false memories were generated (a mean of 3.4 false memories per participant). 123 
forgetting errors were made (a mean of 2.37 per participant). Set One of the slides generated 
a mean of 3.42 false memories (std. dev. 1.82) and Set Two generated a mean of 3.31 (std. 
dev. 2.49). There was no significant difference between the two means (t (5Odf) = . 19, p 
(2t) = . 
85). 
Correlations with individual differences measures 
The number of false memories generated did not correlate with forgetting scores or 
performance on the PBS, the VVIQ or the DES. There was, however, a significant 
correlation between paranormal belief and VVIQ and DES. Additionally, there were 
correlations approaching significance between false memory and DES, and forgetting scores 
and PBS scores. These data are shown in table 2.2. 
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FM FORGET TOTAL VVIQ DF5 
INACCURATE 
FORGET r= . -. 
O1 
p=. 96 
VVIQ r. 08 r=. 03 r=. 14 
p=. 56 p=. 81 p=. 31 
DES r=-. 25 r=-. 09 r=-. 22 r=-. 13 
p=. 08 p=. 49 p=. 12 p=. 36 
PBS r=. 19 r=-. 24 r=. 01 r=. 37 r=. 31 
p=. 17 p=. 09 p=. 93 p=. 01 p=. 02 
I able 2.2: Spearman's Correlation Coefficients between individual differences measures and memory, showing 2 tailed 
significance. 
ESP 
There was no significant difference between the number of false memories created by ESP 
and non-ESP targets (t (53df) = -1.56, p (2t) = . 12). 
Confidence 
The participants' confidence in their false memories (rated on a 7-point scale) was given a 
mean rating of 4.38 (std. dev. 1.29), and the confidence for real memories received a mean 
rating of 5.43 (std. dev. 1.37). These two rating were compared using a Wilcoxon Matched- 
Pairs Signed-Ranks Test and this was shown to be significantly different (z = -4.37, p (2t) 
= . 001). 
Participants were significantly less confident in their false memories than in their 
actual memories. 
DISCUSSION OF STUDY 2 
As with Study 2.1, Study 2.2 demonstrated that the technique is successful in terms of 
generating false memories. However, whilst these memories score in the top half of the 
confidence ratings (slightly above `uncertain'), they are significantly less confidently held 
than the participants' actual memories. The number of false memories generated did not 
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correlate with belief in the paranormal, although paranormal belief was correlated with the 
other individual differences measures. It is worth mentioning that, as the VVIQ is reverse 
scored (high scores indicate low levels of visual imagery), this correlation is in the opposite 
direction to the predicted correlation. The correlation approaching significance between false 
memory and dissociation is also in the opposite direction to that predicted. It is worth 
noting that the participant sample for both Studies 2.1 and 2.2 consisted of a very narrow 
range of individuals - all were undergraduate psychology students. It is possible that this 
may have contributed to the uncertain results as their performance may not generalise to 
that of the general population. 
The results from Studies 2.1 and 2.2 fail to provide clear support for Blackmore and Rose's 
(1997) misinterpretation hypothesis which suggests that those who believe in the 
paranormal will experience more false memories than those who do not. The data concerning 
links between the various individual differences measures are also somewhat confused. As a 
result of this uncertainty, a third study using the same method of producing false memories 
was carried out. This study introduced a further individual differences measure - the revised 
Transliminality Scale (Lange, Thalbourne, Houran, & Storm, 2000). This scale measures a 
number of factors including absorption, fantasy-proneness, magical ideation, and creativity. 
It is hoped that the introduction of this scale will assist in clarifying the various interactions 
being investigated, and will provide support for the use of transliminality as a justification 
for Blackmore and Rose's misinterpretation hypothesis. 
STUDY 2.3 
The aim of Study 2.3 was to attempt to clarify the results previously obtained in Studies 
2.1 and 2.2, by use of the Transliminality Scale. Thalbourne, Bartemucci, Delin, Fox and 
Nofi (1997) defined the construct of transliminality as "susceptibility to, and awareness of, 
large volumes of imagery, ideation and affect - these phenomena being generated by 
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subliminal, supraliminal and/or external input" (p. 327). People with high transliminality 
scores will experience a large amount of material moving between conscious and 
unconscious awareness. Transliminality has been shown to be correlated with dissociation 
(Thalbourne, 1998), paranormal belief (Thalbourne, & Houran, 2000; cited in Lange et al. 
2000), and imagery (Lange et al. 2000), and, as such, it was anticipated that scores on the 
Transliminality Scale would significantly correlate with scores on the PBS, the DES and the 
VVIQ. It was also anticipated that transliminality would correlate with the number of false 
memories generated, although the relationship between transliminality and susceptibility to 
false memory has not previously been tested. 
In addition to the introduction of the Transliminality Scale, Study 2.3 differed from the 
previous two studies in two key areas. Firstly, no ESP test was conducted. This was for 
two reasons; on a practical level, participation in the study was carried out in large groups, 
which would have made distribution and separation of the ESP targets difficult; and, given 
the lack of ESP success evident in the previous studies, it was decided that the ESP task 
was not a productive avenue to explore. The second key difference in the present study was 
that participants were not undergraduate psychology students. It was hoped that using 
participants who were not accustomed to participating in psychology experiments, and had 
more life experience, would provide data that gave clearer results and was more generalisable 
to the population. 
METHOD 
Design 
The study was a correlational design, in which the dependent variables were: number of 
false memories developed, forgetting scores, total inaccuracy scores, paranormal belief 
scores, vividness of visual imagery scores, transliminality scores and 
dissociative 
experiences scores. 
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As with the previous two studies, it was hypothesised that there would be a significant 
correlation between belief in the paranormal and the number of false memories developed, 
total inaccuracy scores and forgetting scores. It was also predicted that belief in the 
paranormal, the number of false memories developed, forgetting scores, dissociative 
experiences scores, transliminality scores and vividness of visual imagery would all correlate 
with each other. 
Participants 
64 people attending adult education classes participated in the first session. 53 returned to 
complete the study (return rate of 83%). The mean age of those who returned was 56.3 
years (std. dev. 8.55). Eleven males and 42 females returned. 
Materials 
The materials used in Studies 2.1 and 2.2 were also used in this study. However, no ESP 
test was conducted. In addition, 'the Reviscu Transliminality Scale was administered. 
Revised Transliminality Scale (see Appendix E) 
The Revised Transliminality Scale (RTS) (Lange et al., 2000) consists of 17 statements 
covering items such as dream interpretation, fantasy-proneness and absorption. Participants 
are asked to record whether each statement is true or false in relation to themselves. The 
scale is scored by assigning a score of `1' to each item marked `true'. The total number of 
true items is then converted into a Rasch scaled score, which is used in statistical analysis. 
The mean Rasch score is given as 25.0 (std. dev. 5.0). An example of the statements is: `I 
can clearly feel again in my imagination such things as: the feeling of a gentle breeze, warm 
sand under bare feet; the softness of fur, cool grass, the warmth of the sun and the smell of 
freshly cut grass'. 
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Procedure 
The participants were recruited from 5 adult education classes and were run in their class 
groups. In the initial session, the classes were shown the 24 stimuli on a computer monitor. 
Before viewing the stimuli, the participants were instructed that when presented with 
`photograph and label' slides they should concentrate on the photograph and take in as 
much detail as possible, and when presented with `label only' slides they should imagine a 
photograph of the appropriate animal. Prior to seeing the slides, participants were shown 
the Practice Stimuli, to ensure that they understood the task. After viewing the Practice 
Stimuli and indicating that they understood, participants were shown the actual stimuli. 
After viewing the slides, participants completed the PBS, the DES, the RTS and the VVIQ. 
There were no time restrictions, but participants were asked to fill out the questionnaires 
individually, and not to discuss the slides that they saw. 
The following week, participants were again run in their class groups. They were presented 
with the Response Questionnaire and asked to complete it; there was no time limit for this. 
They were asked to ensure that they uornpleted the questionnaires individually and did not 
discuss their answers with anyone else. After the questionnaires were collected, the aims of 
the study were explained. 
RESULTS 
False memory 
167 false memories were generated (a mean of 3.2 false memories per participant). 175 
forgetting errors were made (a mean of 3.3 per participant). Set One of the slides generated a 
mean of 3 false memories (std. dev. 2.05) and Set Two generated a mean of 3.24 (std. dev. 
2.12). There was no significant difference between the two means (t (51 df) = -. 41, p (2t) _ 
. 
68). 
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Correlations with individual differences measures 
The number of false memories generated did not correlate with performance on the PBS, the 
VVIQ, the RTS or the DES. Paranormal belief did significantly correlate with VVIQ and 
transliminality scores. Transliminality also correlated with VVIQ and DES. There were, 
additionally, correlations approaching significance between PBS and DES, and PBS and 
forgetting scores. All significant correlations are in the expected direction. These results are 
shown in table 2.3. 
FM FORGET TOTAL VVlQ DES RTS 
INACCURATE 
FORGF, T r=. 02 
p=. 9 
VVIQ r=. 02 r=-. 02 r=-. 01 
p=. 91 p=. 91 p=. 98 
DES r=-. 03 r=. 1 r=. 08 r=-. 22 
p=. 84 p=. 49 p=. 56 p=. 11 
RTS. r=-. 1 r=-. 14 r= - 16 r=-. 53 r=. 64 
p=. 45 p=. 32 p=. 26 p=. 0001 p=. 0001 
PBS r-. 07 r-. 24 r=-. 24 r=-. 35 r=. 24 r. 45 
p62 p -= r)A p= 08 p=. 01 p=. 08 _( 1 
Table 2.3: Spearman's Correlation Coefficients between individual differences measures and memory, showing 2 tailed 
significance. 
Confidence 
The participants' confidence in their false memories (rated on a 7-point scale) was given a 
mean rating of 4.41 (std. dev. 1.34), and the confidence for real memories received a mean 
rating of 4.88 (std. dev. 1.74). These two rating were compared using a Wilcoxon Matched- 
Pairs Signed-Ranks Test and were shown to be significantly different (z = -2.75, p (2t) = 
. 
006). Participants were significantly less confident in their false memories than in their 
actual memories. 
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DISCUSSION OF STUDY 2.3 
In keeping with the previous two studies, Study 2.3 demonstrated the effectiveness of the 
procedure in generating false memories. In each of the studies, participants have developed 
false memories for approximately a quarter of the slides that they were asked to imagine. 
This supports the multiple-trace theories of false memory, which indicate that memory 
distortions are produced, to some extent, by source confusion. However, the results do not 
show any significant correlations between the number of false memories developed and 
scores on the individual differences measures. This corresponds to the results obtained 
previously, but contradicts the hypothesis that participants who have high paranormal 
belief, visual imagery, dissociation and transliminality will be more susceptible to false 
memories. As with Study 2.2, there is a correlation approaching significance between 
paranormal belief and forgetting scores. In keeping with the results from Studies 2.1 and 2.2, 
participants were significantly less confident in their false memories than their actual 
memories. 
The findings concerning the four individual differences measures are closer to the predicted 
results. Transliminality correlates strongly with dissociation, visual imagery and paranormal 
belief. Paranormal belief also correlates with visual imagery and has a correlation 
approaching significance with dissociation. The only expected correlation not present is 
between visual imagery and dissociation. The strength of the individual differences data 
appears to justify the use of mature participants in the study. The results are far more 
persuasive than those obtained using undergraduate psychology students because they 
correspond with the previous research. However, in accepting that the data produced in this 
study support the notion of correlation between the individual differences measures, it is 
also necessary to accept the indication that there is no relationship between susceptibility 
to false memory and paranormal belief. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents the results of three studies investigating the possible correlation 
between false memory and belief in the paranormal, building on the four similar studies 
conducted by Blackmore and Rose. Only one of these seven studies has successfully found 
this correlation (Study 2.1), and this was conducted with few participants and showed a 
correlation that was only just significant. This leads to the inevitable question of whether 
the hypothesised correlation does actually exist, and, if it does, why it is not more evident 
in these studies? 
In both Studies 2.2 and 2.3, there was a correlation approaching significance between 
paranormal belief and forgetting scores, and no correlation between forgetting and false 
memory. This is interesting from two respects. Firstly, it suggests that forgetting and false 
memory development are two separate effects, rather than sharing the same mechanism. 
Secondly, it supports the idea that general memory error may be related to belief in the 
paranormal, although the development of false memories in these studies is not. 
The confidence data from all three studies contradict that of Blackmore and Rose (1997), as 
participants were less confident of their false memories than their actual memories. 
However, this is in concordance with the results analysed by Pezdek and Taylor (2000), 
when they reviewed the area. They reported that every false memory study which 
examined confidence indicated less confidence in false memories than actual memories, 
although this was not always significant. 
One possible explanation for the lack of significant correlations between false memory and 
paranormal belief is that the method used for generating false memories is not producing the 
type of memories that would correlate with paranormal belief. What the participants are 
actually reporting is a source error (confusing imaginings for photographs) rather than a 
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memory for an event that never actually happened, or a distortion involving specific items. 
Whilst the participants are reporting seeing a photograph that was only imagined, the image 
that they are recalling is a real image. It may be, therefore, that the use of a different 
technique for the generation of false memories, such as using post-event misinformation 
(Loftus et al., 1989), or implanting false memories for childhood events (Porter, Yuille, & 
Lehman, 1999) would produce the expected correlation between false memory and 
paranormal belief. The false memories generated as a result of these techniques have been 
shown to be confidently held and reliable over time, and are `memories' for events that have 
actually never happened -a much clearer distinction than the memories for imaginings, 
rather than photographs, generated in the present study. 
This possibility is supported by Platt, Lacey, lobst and Finkleman (1998), who indicate 
that the correlation between false memory generation and dissociation may be specific to 
certain types of false memory development. In particular, they suggest that while false 
memories developed as a result of suggestion may correlate with dissociation, false 
memories developed naturally over time may not. Platt et al. (1998) point out that the two 
types of false memory involve very different cognitive processes, and a correlation between 
a particular individual differences measure and one form of false memory cannot indicate a 
similar correlation between the individual differences measure and a different form of false 
memory. Their views are also supported by Marks (1973). He indicates that participants 
with very strong visual imagery demonstrate better recall of pictures than those with low 
visual imagery. This is contrary to the established view that visual imagery increases false 
memory (e. g. Loftus, Levidow & Duensing, 1992). Therefore, although individuals with 
high visual imagery may be more susceptible to false memory in general, they may 
overperform on tasks examining memory for pictures. 
However, if this explanation for the lack of correlation between paranormal belief and false 
memory were accepted, it would cast doubt on the argument of Blackmore and Rose (1997). 
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They suggested that it was the confusion between imagination and reality that would cause 
believers to misremember events as being paranormal. The findings of the present study 
would indicate that simply imagining a paranormal event is not sufficient to cause believers 
to feel that they experienced it. 
However, an alternative explanation for the lack of observable correlation between false 
memory and paranormal belief may be concerned with the material for which false memories 
are being developed. Blackmore and Rose's (1997) original hypothesis stated that that 
people who believe in the paranormal are more likely to confuse reality and imagination, and 
therefore misinterpret imagined events as real. The suggestion is that this would be an 
explanation for apparently psychic experiences - that people misinterpret imaginings as an 
actual paranormal events and this either contributes to, or is caused by, their belief in the 
paranormal. There is a great deal of literature suggesting that people will interpret events in 
a manner that is congruent with their existing beliefs (e. g. Gilovich, 1991), thus it is 
plausible that people who believe in the paranormal will misinterpret certain confusions as 
being indicative of paranormal activity, and, conversely, that non-believers will disregard 
such possibilities. The data presented from the present series of studies suggest that there is 
no such link between paranormal belief and events that are unrelated to paranormal activity. 
Materials that are not suggestive of psychic ability are no more likely to provoke false 
memories in believers than non-believers. However, there is little research thus far 
conducted which examines whether the effect would be present when using psi-related 
materials. It was decided, therefore to conduct a series of studies examining whether 
paranormal believers are more likely to be affected by misleading suggestions regarding 
anomalous events. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECTS OF PRE-EVENT SUGGESTION AND BELIEF ON 
THE EXPERIENCING OF UNUSUAL PHENOMENA' 
INTRODUCTION 
Study 3.1 was carried out as a pilot study, to test the effectiveness of the materials and 
procedure to be used in a subsequent more extensive study. The present studies took place 
at Hampton Court Palace, which has a well-established reputation for being haunted 
(Guiley, 1994). In particular, the Palace is reputed to be haunted by the ghost of Catherine 
Howard, the fifth wife of Henry VIII. Catherine was sentenced to death for adultery, and is 
commonly believed to have been dragged to her death along what is now known as the 
Haunted Gallery. There has been a long history of unusual phenomena experienced in and 
around the Haunted Gallery (Guiley, 1994), and the most recent of these have been 
collected by staff at Hampton Court. The experiences typically involve sudden temperature 
changes, feelings of dizziness and a sense of presence (Franklin, 1998). The phenomena are 
not solely experienced in the Haunted Gallery; sightings are reported around the Palace, but 
another area particularly associated with unusual experiences is an trey close to the 
Haunted Gallery known as the Georgian Rooms (Franklin, 1998). 
Participants in the studies were given a lecture describing the history of Hampton Court 
Palace which mentioned some specific stories about the hauntings. They were sent to either 
the Haunted Gallery or the Georgian Rooms, and asked to note down any unusual 
phenomena they experienced. Participants were allowed to wander around freely and were 
encouraged to record experiences whether or not they attributed the experience to a ghost. It 
was expected that participants who believed in ghosts, and those with prior expectation of 
having an unusual experience, would record more experiences than disbelievers and those 
with low prior expectation. It was further expected that the experiences would be rated as 
more intense and more likely to be due to a ghost. 
' The work described within this chapter was conducted within the context of a larger study involving a several researchers, investigating 
the effect of a number of variables on the experiencing of unusual events. The author was highly involved in the design, planning and data 
collection for the study. 
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Effect of belief 
It has been widely established that there is a strong correlation between paranormal belief 
and anomalous experiences (Irwin, 1993). For instance, Glicksohn (1990) surveyed a large 
number of people and found that degree of belief in the paranormal was positively 
correlated with subjective paranormal experiences. With specific regard to haunting 
experiences, Houran and Thalbourne (2001) reported a positive relationship between 
paranormal belief and experiencing of ghostly phenomena. Houran and Wiseman (in press) 
also reported this relationship. They propose that, further to Irwin (1985b), participants who 
believe in the paranormal have a psychological need to experience unusual phenomena. 
The hypothesis that believers will experience more anomalous experiences than 
disbelievers in the present study is supported by two theories that may operate separately or 
interact. Houran and Wiseman (in press) suggest that there may be an expectation effect, in 
which participants who believe in the paranormal have higher anticipation that an event 
may occur. Additionally, they indicate that experiencing of anomalous events may be 
related to an unusual sensitivity to environmental features. Therefore believers attend to 
situations differently than disbelievers, and therefore are more aware of any tinuus'ral events 
that may occur. Within the context of the Hampton Court studies, it would be expected that 
the believers would experience more unusual phenomena because they are better prepared 
than disbelievers to attend to, and accept, anomalous events. 
An alternative explanation is that, whilst believers will experience more events that they 
consider paranormal, they are actually misinterpreting neutral stimuli. There is a strong 
literature indicating that perception of an event is heavily affected by the existing beliefs of 
the percipient. Situations and people will be regarded differently according to what is 
already known or assumed (Gilovich, 1991). Sanbonmatsu et al. (1998) attribute this to 
selective hypothesis testing, which is effective for two different reasons. Firstly, individuals 
tend to avoid situations in which beliefs and assumptions are challenged, allowing them to 
maintain attitudes that are incorrect or inconsistent. Secondly, people will be selective in 
how they test attitudes and interpret findings, often perceiving ambiguous or neutral stimuli 
as congruent with existing beliefs. Therefore, it may be inferred that pre-existing beliefs 
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will not only affect the way a paranormal believer views an event, but may actually cause 
them to experience more phenomena that they could interpret as paranormal. The effect of 
pre-existing belief on experience of an event was demonstrated by Benoit and Thomas 
(1992). They found that participants who believed in subliminal perception were more 
likely than disbelievers to report hearing subliminal messages on recordings. Further, 
believers who had been told that a subliminal message would change their mood positively 
showed a significant increase in mood after hearing a recording, despite the fact that no 
message was present. The reverse is true of believers who were expecting a negative effect 
on mood - their moods significantly declined. Participants who did not express a belief in 
subliminal perception were not affected by the instructions. This study demonstrates that it 
is not necessary for an item to be present to affect perception - it is only necessary for a 
person to believe it is. It has been widely demonstrated that participants who believe in the 
paranormal may selectively attend to evidence, or even distort it, in order to maintain their 
beliefs (e. g. French, 1992b). However, it is also possible that believers genuinely do 
experience more events that they can interpret as paranormal, because they attend to 
situations differently and have different expectations about what might occur. Applying this 
theory to the present studies, it co0d be expected firstly that believers will he more aware 
of any small environmental changes than disbelievers, because they will be more alert to the 
possibility of them. Secondly, the believers will be more likely to misinterpret any noticed 
changes as being due to a ghost, rather than considering alternative explanations. 
Given the established link between paranormal belief and unusual experiences, participants 
in the present study were asked to record whether they had experienced any of a list of eight 
unusual experiences. These experiences were selected as being commonly associated with 
the presence of a ghost (e. g. Haining, 1987). The participants that had experienced the 
phenomena were then asked to say whether or not they felt that these experiences were due 
to a ghost. It was predicted that participants with belief in ghosts would record having 
experienced unusual phenomena more frequently than those who did not express a belief in 
ghosts, and that believers would be more inclined to attribute their experiences as being due 
to a ghost. 
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STUDY3.1 
METHOD 
Design 
The study examined the effect of belief in ghosts on experiences in the study, and this was a 
between-subjects variable. Participants were split into three groups - believers, those who 
were uncertain, and disbelievers - according to their responses to the ghost belief question 
on the Prior Experiences and Belief Questionnaire. 
Four dependent variables (DV) were collected from the participants. The first DV measured 
the number of unusual experiences reported by the participants prior to entering the study, 
as recorded on the Prior Experiences and Belief Questionnaire. It was hypothesised that 
participants who believed in ghosts would report more prior experiences than others, and 
would be more likely to rate these experiences as being due to a ghost. 
The second DV measured how many >>n»sual experiences the participants had duurino the 
study. This was recorded by marking the location of the experience on the Location Map. 
The hypothesis was that participants who believed in ghosts and those who had higher prior 
expectation would have more unusual experiences. 
The third DV assessed the intensity of participants' experiences. This was measured on a 
seven-point scale (1 = `Not at all intense' and 7= `Very intense'). It was hypothesised that 
participants who believed in ghosts would have more intense experiences. 
The fourth DV measured the degree to which participants believed that their experiences 
were due to a ghost. This was recorded on a five-point scale (1 = `Definitely Yes', 5= 
`Definitely No'). It was hypothesised that participants who believed in ghosts would be 
more likely to say their experience was due to a ghost. 
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Participants 
The participants were a self-selecting sample, consisting of members of the public who 
chose to attend a lecture on ghosts at Hampton Court Palace. 98 participants were run over 
2 days, but data from 21 of these were discarded, due to incorrect completion of forms. This 
left 77 participants, comprising 30 males and 47 females with a mean age of 33.6 years (std. 
dev. 14.33) (ages ranged from 10 to 69 years). These participants were split into two groups 
- 41 (53.3%) visited the Haunted Gallery and 36 (46.7%) visited the Georgian Rooms. 
Materials 
Prior Experiences and Belief Questionnaire (see Appendices F and G) 
Each participant was provided with a questionnaire asking for details about their previous 
anomalous experiences and their belief in ghosts. Belief was measured by the question `Do 
you believe that ghosts exist? '. Participants responded on a five-point scale where 1 was 
`Definitely Yes' and 5 was `Definitely No'. Previous anomalous experiences were 
measured by presenting the participants with a list of eight unusual experiences (such as 
change of temperature, sense of presence, sounds or noises) and asking them to record on a 
five-point scale (1 = `Never', 5= `Very Frequently') how often these occurred. The 
participants that reported experiencing these phenomena were then asked to record whether 
they believed the experience could be due to a ghost. Again, this was recorded on a five- 
point scale, where I was `Definitely Yes' and 5 was `Definitely No'. 
This questionnaire also asked if the participants had any prior knowledge of possible 
haunted locations in Hampton Court from the media or acquaintances. Their responses were 
entered on a five-point scale, where 1 was `Definitely Yes' and 5 was `Definitely No'. 
Finally, the participants were asked whether they expected to have an anomalous 
experience during the study. This too was measured on a five-point scale where 1 was 
`Definitely Yes' and 5 was `Definitely No'. 
Location Map (see Appendices H and I) 
Participants were also given an A4 map of the location that they were to visit (Haunted 
Gallery or Georgian Rooms). They were asked to record the location of any anomalies they 
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might experience by placing a cross on the relevant section of the map, and to provide brief 
written details of the experience. The intensity of the experience was recorded on a seven- 
point scale where 1 was `Not at all intense' and 7 was `Very intense'. Participants also rated 
whether or not they thought the experience was due to a ghost. This was on a five-point 
scale where 1 was `Definitely Yes' and 5 was `Definitely No'. 
A final section of the form asked participants to give their name and address if they wished 
to receive a more detailed follow-up questionnaire. 
Procedure 
Participants were run in groups of 30 - 40,3 times a day for 1 day. The study was 
advertised as a special event taking place at Hampton Court Palace, and places were 
allocated on a first-come, first-served basis. As participants entered the room, they were 
randomly assigned places in either the Haunted Gallery group or the Georgian Rooms 
group. 
The participants were then asked to fill in the Prior Experiences and Belief Questionnaire. 
with the exception of the final question regarding their expectation of experiences during 
the study. When all the participants had completed the form, they were given a 15 minute 
lecture about the history of investigating ghosts, including information about specific 
hauntings at Hampton Court Palace. During this lecture, both groups were told about 
possible hauntings in the location that they were to visit. After the lecture had finished, the 
participants were told that they would shortly be taken to the locations and allowed to walk 
around by themselves. If they felt anything unusual, they were asked to mark it on their 
map and give a brief written description of the experience. After the participants received 
these instructions, they filled in the final question on the Prior Experiences and Belief 
Questionnaire, recording whether or not they expected to have an unusual experience 
during the study. 
At this point, the two groups were separated and led to the two locations. They were briefly 
shown where they were on the map, and told where the experimenters would be waiting 
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should they have any questions. At this point it was emphasised that there was no time limit 
involved, and that they should make a note of any experiences that they had. The 
participants then spent some time walking around the locations, recording whether or not 
they experienced anything. They then returned their maps and questionnaires to the 
experimenters and were free to leave. 
RESULTS 
Participants' belief in ghosts was recorded on the Prior Experiences and Belief 
Questionnaire, and participants were classified as either believers, uncertain or disbelievers 
on the basis of their responses. 48 participants gave responses of 'I' or `2' on the belief 
question, and were classified as believers (mean response = 1.67, std. dev. = . 48). 16 
participants gave a response of `3' and were classified as uncertain (mean response = 3, std. 
dev. = 0). 13 were classified as disbelievers (mean = 4.15, std. dev. = . 38) as they gave 
responses of `4' or `5' on the belief question. 
The data concerning prior expectation and the number of experiences were analysed usinc 
the data of all participants. The data for intensity and ghost ratings was analysed using only 
the data of those participants reporting unusual experiences during the study. 
Previous experiences 
Participants were asked to record whether they had previously experienced eight examples 
of anomalous phenomena, and if so, how frequently. These were rated on five-point scales 
(1 = `Never', 2= `Very Infrequently', 3= `Infrequently', 4= `Frequently', 5= `Very 
Frequently'). The participants that reported experiencing these phenomena were then asked 
to record whether they believed the experience could be due to a ghost. Again, this was 
recorded on a five-point scale, where 1 was `Definitely Yes' and 5 was `Definitely No'. 
The mean rating given to all eight experiences combined was 1.95, suggesting that the 
majority of participants very rarely experienced any of the phenomena listed. A factorial 
ANOVA demonstrated that the mean rating for the eight prior experiences was not affected 
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by belief (F (2,76) = 1.76, p= . 18). Table 3.1 shows the mean ratings for prior experiences, 
separated by belief. 
BELIEVERS UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
2.02 1.94 1.68 1.95 
(. 62) (. 59) (. 34) (. 58) 
N=48 N=16 N=13 N=77 
i awe 3.1: Overall mean ratings for prior experiences (and standard deviations), separated by belief. 
Of the eight anomalous experiences listed, participants most commonly experienced an 
unusual sense of presence and emotional feelings. Factorial Anovas were conducted on the 
ratings for each of the experiences, in order to examine whether the experience reports were 
affected by belief. Only an unusual sense of presence showed a significant effect of belief 
on ratings. The mean difference in sense of presence scores between believers and uncertain 
participants was . 54, and Fisher's Least Significant Difference 
(FLSD) test demonstrated 
that this was not significant (FLSD = . 55, p> . 
05). The difference between believers and 
disbelievers was . 77 and this was significant 
(FLSD = . 6, p< . 05). The 
difference between 
uncertain participants and disbelievers was . 23, which was not significant 
(FLSD = . 71, p> 
, 
0511 
Table 3.2 gives the mean ratings and F- and p- values for the eight anomalous experiences. 
Table 3.3 shows the mean differences between the three belief groups for each of the 
experiences. 
Participants also rated whether they felt that these experiences were due to a ghost. A 
factorial Anova showed a significant effect of belief on these ratings, with participants who 
believed in the paranormal giving the highest ratings, and disbelievers giving the lowest 
ratings. The mean difference in ghost ratings between believers and uncertain participants 
was -. 25, and Fisher's Least Significant 
Difference (FLSD) test demonstrated that this was 
not significant (FLSD = . 54, p> . 
05). The difference between believers and disbelievers 
was -1.26 and this was significant 
(FLSD = . 59, p< . 
05). The difference between uncertain 
participants and disbelievers was -1.01, which was also significant 
(FLSD = . 7, p< . 
05). 
The ghost ratings are also shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
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BELIEVERS UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVERS MEAN F-value p-value 
(N = 48) (N = 16) (N = 13) (N = 77) (2 tailed) 
TEMP 2.06 2.13 1.54 1.99 1.65 .2 
CHANGE (. 95) (1.2) (. 78) (. 99) (2,76 df) 
SENSE OF 2.54 2 1.77 2.3 4.29 
. 
02 
PRESENCE (. 97) (. 82) (1.09) (1.01) (2,76 df) 
UNUSUAL 2.46 2.06 1.85 2.27 2.29 . 
11 
SOUND (1.03) (1.06) (9) (1.03) (2,76 df) 
UNUSUAL 1.56 1.5 1.54 1.55 
. 
05 
. 
96 
SIGHT (8) (. 63) (. 52) (. 72) (2,76 df) 
UNUSUAL 1.38 1.38 1.23 1.35 
. 
27 
. 
77 
TASTE (. 67) (. 72) (. 44) (. 64) (2,76 df) 
UNUSUAL 1.69 1.88 1.69 1.73 
. 
21 
. 
81 
SMELL (. 97) (1.26) (. 95) (1.02) (2,76 dO 
DIZZINESS 1.85 2.19 1.77 1.91 . 
81 . 
45 
(1.03) (1.05) (. 83) (1) (2,76 dO 
EMOTIONAL 2.63 2.38 2.08 2.48 1.27 . 
29 
FEELING (1.18) (1.26) (. 76) (1.14) (2,76 df) 
DUE TO A 2.81 3.06 4.08 3.08 9.29 . 
0003 
GHOST? (. 96) (. 85) (. 95) (1.04) (2,76 do 
Table 3.2: Mean ratings for the eight prior experiences, ghost ratings, F-values and p-values (2 tailed) for differences between belief 
groups. 
BELIEVER VS 
UNCERTAIN 
BELIEVER VS 
DISBELIEVER 
UNCERTAIN VS 
DISBELIEVER 
TEMPERATURE MEAN DIFFERENCE -. 06 . 
52 . 
59 
SENSE OF PRESENCE MEAN DIFFERENCE . 
54 . 
77 . 
23 
SOUND MEAN DIFFERENCE .4 . 
61 . 
22 
SIGHT MEAN DIFFERENCE . 
06 . 
02 -. 04 
TASTE MEAN DIFFERENCE 0 . 
14 . 
14 
SMELL MEAN DIFFERENCE -. 19 -. 01 . 
18 
DIZZINESS MEAN DIFFERENCE -. 33 . 
09 . 
42 
EMOTIONAL FEELING MEAN DIFFERENCE . 
25 . 
55 .3 
DUE TO A GHOST? MEAN DIFFERENCE -. 25 -1.26 -1.01 
Table 3.3: Mean differences for belief group comparisons. 
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Prior expectation 
Participants' expectation of experiencing something unusual, prior to entering the location, 
was rated on a five-point scale, in which 1 indicated `Definitely Yes' and 5 indicated 
`Definitely No'. A factorial Anova showed this to be significantly influenced by belief (F 
(1,76) = 6.29, p= . 003), with 
disbelievers having less expectation than both believers and 
those who were uncertain; however uncertain participants had more expectation than 
believers. Table 3.4 shows the mean prior expectation ratings. 
BELIEVERS UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
3.63 3.56 4.46 3.75 
(. 82) (. 81) (. 66) (. 85) 
N=48 N= 16 N= 13 N=77 
'l able 3.4: Mean prior expectation ratings (and standard deviations), separated by belief. 
The mean difference in expectation scores between believers and uncertain participants was 
. 06, and Fisher's Least Significant Difference 
(FLSD) test demonstrated that this was not 
significant (FLSD = . 46, p> . 05). The 
difference between believers and disbelievers was - 
. 84 and this was significant 
(FLSD = . 49, p< . 05). The 
difference between uncertain 
participants and disbelievers was -. 9, which was also significant (FLED - . 59, p< . 
05). 
Experiences 
The total number of unusual experiences reported during the course of the study was 57, a 
mean of . 74 (std. 
dev. 1.13) per participant. Table 3.5 presents the number and percentage 
of participants in each group reporting experiences. 
BELIEVERS UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVERS TOTAL 
MEAN NO. OF . 
75 . 
56 . 
92 . 
74 
EXPERIENCES (1.04) (. 89) (1.66) (1.13) 
.......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... % REPORTING EXP 47.92% 37.5% 46.15% 45.45% 
...... ................... ................ .... ............... .... ................... ................ .... _.................... 
NO. REPORTING N 23 
_ N6 N6 N 35 
.................... .......................................... ................... _..................... ................ .... _ ..................... 
NO. IN GROUP N 48 N= 16 N 13 N 77 
Table 3.5: The mean number (and standard deviation) of experiences, number ana percentage or participants reporung expcricnccs, 
separated by belief. 
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A factorial Anova showed that the number of experiences reported was not affected by 
belief (F (1,76) = . 
37, p= . 7). 
Believers, disbelievers and uncertain participants 
experienced approximately equal numbers of experiences. 
Intensity of experiences 
Intensity ratings were given on a seven-point scale where 1 indicated `Not at all intense' 
and 7 indicated `Very intense'. A factorial Anova demonstrated that the intensity of 
experiences was not affected by belief (F (1,34) = . 4, p= . 67). Believers, uncertain 
participants and disbelievers were equally likely to rate their experiences as being intense. 
These data are shown in Table 3.6. 
BELIEVERS UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
3.74 4.33 4.33 3.94 
(1.89) (1.63) (1.97) (1.83) 
N=23 N=6 N=6 N=35 
Fable 3.6: Mean intensity ratings (and standard deviations), separated by bellet. 
Ghost ratings 
Participants rated their belief that their experience was due to a ghost on a five-point scale, 
in which 1 indicated `Definitely Yes' and 5 indicated `Definitely No'. 
A factorial Anova was conducted on the ghost ratings, and they were shown to be affected 
by belief (F (1,34) = 4.56, p= . 02). The mean 
difference in ghost ratings between believers 
and uncertain participants was -. 29, and this was shown by the FLSD test not to be 
significant (FLSD = . 76, p> . 
05). The difference between believers and disbelievers was - 
. 
1.12 and this was significant (FLSD = . 76, p< . 
05). The difference between uncertain 
participants and disbelievers was -. 83, which was not significant (FLSD = . 96, p> . 
05). 
Table 3.7 shows these data. 
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BLLIEVERS UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
3.04 3.33 4.17 3.29 
(. 77) (. 52) (1.17) (. 89) 
N=23 N=6 N=6 N=35 
i aoie s. i: mean ghost ratings (and standard deviations), separated by beriet. 
DISCUSSION OF STUDY 3.1 
It was hypothesised that participants who recorded a belief in ghosts would report having 
had more unusual experiences in everyday life than disbelievers. This hypothesis was not 
supported, as there was no overall effect of belief on the number of previous experiences 
reported. There was, however, an effect of belief on the number of times an unusual sense 
of presence was reported. Additionally, there was an extremely significant effect of whether 
the participants rated these previous experiences as being due to a ghost, with believers 
showing more conviction than disbelievers. 
Prior to entering the locations, there was a significant effect of belief on the amount of 
expectation of having an unusual experience. The disbelievers had less expectation of 
having an unusual experience than both the believers and the uncertain participants. This 
was in accordance with the hypothesis. 
Contrary to expectation, there was no significant effect of belief on the number of unusual 
experiences reported during the study. Although a greater percentage of the believers 
reported more unusual experiences than both the disbelievers and the uncertain participants, 
the disbelievers reported a higher mean number of experiences. Although fewer 
disbelievers had experiences, those that did tended to have a greater number of them. These 
differences were not significant. 
There was also no effect of belief on the intensity ratings. The believers rated their 
experiences as less intense than both the disbelievers and the uncertains, but this difference 
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was not significant. This was contrary to the hypothesis that belief in ghosts would affect 
intensity ratings. 
Belief in ghosts did, in accordance with the hypothesis, have a significant effect on ghost 
ratings. The participants who indicated a belief in ghosts gave higher ghost ratings than the 
uncertain participants and the disbelievers. The difference in ghost ratings between the 
believers and disbelievers was significant. 
There is, therefore, some support for the prediction that interpretation of an event will be 
dependent on existing beliefs, and this is in accordance with the theory of selective 
hypothesis testing. This supports the notion that believers in the paranormal will have a 
tendency to misinterpret neutral stimuli as being paranormal in origin. The idea that 
believers will be more alert to environmental changes than disbelievers, and therefore 
experience more events, was not supported. The study also demonstrated that, within the 
experimental situation, participants experienced a high number of unusual phenomena 
which they found reasonably intense. This first study was intended as a pilot study in order 
to assess the practicalities of the experimental protocol, and the usefulness of the maferiaJc. 
It was determined that the study provided an effective and practical way to assess the 
impact of prior biases on exceptional experiences, and consequently the study was 
replicated and extended. 
STUDY3.2 
INTRODUCTION TO STUDY 3.2 
Study 3.1 was successful in eliciting from participants a high number of unusual 
phenomena, and there was some suggestion that prior expectation would 
influence 
phenomena experienced within the location visited. It was decided to test this concept 
further by exposing participants to misleading suggestion prior to entering the location. 
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Effect of suggestion 
Few studies have been conducted to assess the impact of misleading suggestion before an 
event has taken place. Lindsay and Johnson (1989b) designed a procedure which slightly 
adapted the standard misinformation studies. Their design involved presenting participants 
with misleading information about a series of slides that they were about to see. The results 
of this research showed that misinformation was still effective even when presented in 
advance of the stimuli being shown. This procedure was replicated by Rantzen and 
Markham (1992), and they also reported that the misleading suggestion had an effect when 
given before the stimuli. Rantzen and Markham (1992) suggested that when participants 
were asked to recall the information when tested later, they had source monitoring problems 
which made it difficult for them to assess whether the misleading details came from the 
actual stimuli or the preceding information. Thus, although the memories of the participants 
were affected, if was not clear whether or not their perception was altered at the time of 
viewing the stimuli. 
Thorne and Himelstein (1984) examined whether misleading information given before a 
stimuliic could. actually alter the perception of a percipient. They suggested to participant-, 
that a record played backwards contained satanic messages, and then asked participants to 
listen to reverse-played records. They found that the suggestion did have a significant effect 
- participants who received the suggestion were more likely to report hearing satanic 
messages. Additionally, the effect could be manipulated further, so that participants who 
were told that they would hear satanic words reported a greater number of words than other 
participants, and those who were told that they would hear satanic messages reported 
hearing more messages than other groups. 
There is also some indication that giving misleading information about the difficulty of a 
tongue-twister can influence a participant's ability to read it. Hulit (1987) presented 
participants with a series of tongue-twisters which had gradations of difficulty randomly 
attached to them. He reported that participants failed to recite the tongue-twisters rated as 
`difficult' more often than those rated as `easy'. However, this effect is not consistent 
(Hulit, 1989). Therefore, there is a small amount of research to indicate that misleading pre- 
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event suggestion may affect perception of, behaviour during, and recollection of, an event. 
However, this has not been widely investigated. 
The technique of giving misleading pre-event suggestion is perhaps closer to the persuasion 
literature than the classical suggestion literature, as it involves attempting to influence a 
person's behaviour by altering their attitudes towards a particular event. Myers (1994) 
summarises research describing the two main routes to changing a person's attitudes by 
means of persuasion. The first route is the central route to persuasion, which involves use of 
systematic argument in order to demonstrate a point. The second route, and that used in the 
present study, is the peripheral route, in which cues that will appeal to the listener are used 
to enhance the attractiveness of the suggestion. In the study, participants in the Suggestion 
condition were informed briefly, in the context of a lecture about hauntings at Hampton 
Court Palace, that the location that they were to visit had a particular reputation for being 
haunted, and this was illustrated with a brief anecdote. It was expected that, as participants 
were in the situation of attending a study where they would attempt to experience unusual 
phenomena, the idea that they were visiting a haunted location would be attractive and, 
thus, they would be motivated to accept the suggestion. However, participants with little 
inclination to have an experience, such as those who were sceptical about ghosts, would be 
more likely to reject the suggestion, as it disagrees with their prior expectations. This is 
predicted by the persuasion literature, which indicates that a person who is already likely to 
agree with a message will be persuaded by a simple, one-sided statement, whilst a person 
with a tendency to disagree will require a more complex, two-sided argument (Chaiken & 
Stangor, 1987). It is noted that persuasion using peripheral cues tends to be less enduring 
and is less likely to influence subsequent behaviour (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). However, 
for the purposes of the present study, the attitudes of participants needed to be influenced 
only for the length of time necessary to complete the study. 
In addition to the method of suggestion, prior research also indicates that the person making 
the argument is important to the degree of acceptance. People are more likely to be 
persuaded by a person who appears trustworthy and knowledgeable about the subject 
(Stroebe & Jonas, 1988). This is particularly important when persuasion is taking place by 
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the peripheral route, and participants are more interested in the heuristics surrounding the 
message, rather than the content of the message. In this study, participants were listening to 
a well-known scientist (Richard Wiseman) give an objective lecture about the possibility of 
hauntings at Hampton Court, and would have had little reason to question the reliability of 
the statements being made. It was, therefore, expected that participants receiving a 
suggestion that their location was haunted would be more likely to report unusual 
phenomena than those who did not receive the suggestion. 
Interaction between belief and suggestion 
In addition to predicting individual effects of belief and suggestion on anomalous 
experiences within the study, it was also expected that there would be an interaction 
between belief and suggestion. There has been a small amount of research indicating that 
paranormal believers may be more suggestible than disbelievers. For instance, Haraldsson 
(1985) found a significant correlation between paranormal belief scores and scores on a 
general measure of suggestibility. However, even if believers are not more susceptible to 
global suggestion than disbelievers, it could still be expected that there will an interaction 
between belief and suggestion. Within the context of the present study. This is becauusp 
paranormal believers have a tendency to accept information congruent with their existing 
beliefs and to interpret neutral stimuli as being of paranormal origin (Russell & Jones, 
1980). Therefore, the believers who have previously accepted the suggestion will be more 
inclined to interpret any neutral events as being paranormal. It is the case, therefore, that an 
interaction between suggestion and belief does not necessarily indicate a general 
relationship between susceptibility to suggestion and paranormal belief. 
METHOD 
Design 
The study used a2x3 design. Factor One examined the effect of prior-event suggestion on 
the experiences of participants. This was a between-subjects variable with 
two levels: 
participants were either in the `Suggestion' condition - where 
they received a suggestion 
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that the location they were to visit was haunted - or the `No Suggestion' condition - where 
they were not told that the location they were to visit was haunted 
Factor Two examined the effect of belief in ghosts on experiences in the study, and was a 
between-subjects variable. Participants were split into three groups - believers, those who 
were uncertain about the existence of ghosts, and disbelievers - according to their responses 
to the ghost belief question on the Prior Experiences and Belief Questionnaire. 
Four dependent variables (DV) were collected from the participants. The first DV measured 
the number of unusual experiences reported by the participants prior to entering the study, 
as recorded on the Prior Experiences and Belief Questionnaire. It was hypothesised that 
participants who believed in ghosts would report more prior experiences than others, and 
would be more likely to rate these experiences as being due to a ghost. 
The second DV measured how many unusual experiences the participants had. This was 
recorded by marking the location of the experience on the Location Map. The hypothesis 
was that participants who believed in ghosts and those in the Suggestion condition would 
have more unusual experiences. 
The third DV assessed the intensity of participants' experiences. This was measured on a 
seven-point scale (1 = `Not at all intense' and 7= `Very intense'). It was hypothesised that 
participants who believed in ghosts would have more intense experiences. 
The fourth DV measured the degree to which participants believed that their experiences 
were due to a ghost. This was recorded on a five-point scale (1 = `Definitely Yes', 5= 
`Definitely No'). It was hypothesised that participants who believed in ghosts and those in 
the Suggestion condition would be more likely to say their experience was due to a ghost. 
Participants 
Again, the participants were members of the public who chose to attend the ghost lecture at 
Hampton Court Palace. 931 participants were run over 7 days, but data from two of these 
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days (222 participants) were discarded due to media intrusion. Additionally, 247 
participants were excluded due to incorrect completion of forms, leaving 462 participants. 
The remaining participants comprised 163 males and 299 females with a mean age of 35 
years (std. dev. 16.27) (ages ranged from 7 to 82 years). These participants were split into 
two groups - 220 (47.6%) visited the Haunted Gallery and 242 (52.4%) visited the 
Georgian Rooms. 
Materials 
Participants were provided with the same materials used in Study 3.1. 
Procedure 
A similar procedure to that of Study 3.1 was employed. Study 3.2 took place over seven 
days but again used groups of 30-40 people. The main difference in this study occurred 
during the 15 minute lecture. During the lecture, the participants received a discreet 
suggestion that one of the two locations was haunted whilst the other was not. This took the 
form of the lecturer discounting traditional stories about hauntings in one of the locations 
(No Suggestion condition) and indicating to the participants that there were a number of 
anomalous experiences reported in the other location (Suggestion condition). The 
suggestions for the two locations were counter-balanced. After receiving the lecture, the 
participants then completed the experiment as described in Study 3.1. 
RESULTS 
Participants' belief in ghosts was recorded on the Prior Experiences and Belief 
Questionnaire, and participants were classified as either believers, uncertain or disbelievers 
on the basis of their responses to the ghost question. 237 participants were classified as 
believers (mean = 1.61, std. dev. = . 
49) as they recorded responses of `1' or `2' on the belief 
question. 136 participants gave a response of `3' and were classified as uncertain (mean 
response = 3, std. dev. = 0). 89 were classified as disbelievers (mean = 4.24, std. dev. = . 43) 
as they gave responses of `4' or `5' on the belief question. 
83 
The data concerning prior expectation and the number of experiences were analysed using 
the data of all participants. The data for intensity and ghost ratings were analysed using 
only the data of those participants reporting unusual experiences. 
Previous experiences 
Participants were asked to record whether they had previously experienced eight examples 
of anomalous phenomena, and if so, how frequently. These were rated on five-point scales 
(1 = `Never', 2= `Very Infrequently', 3= `Infrequently', 4= `Frequently', 5= `Very 
Frequently'). The participants that reported experiencing these phenomena were then asked 
to record whether they believed the experience could be due to a ghost. Again, this was 
recorded on a five-point scale, where 1 was `Definitely Yes' and 5 was `Definitely No'. 
The mean rating given to all eight experiences was 2.12, suggesting that the majority of 
participants very rarely experienced any of the phenomena listed. A factorial Anova 
demonstrated that the mean rating of the eight prior experiences was significantly affected 
by belief (F (2,461) = 29.09, p =. 0001). The mean difference in experience scores between 
believers and uncertain participants was . 35, and Fisher's Least Significant Difference 
(FLSD) test demonstrated that this was significant (FLSD = . 14, p< . 05). The difference 
between believers and disbelievers was . 57 and this was significant (FLSD = . 16, p< . 05). 
The difference between uncertain participants and disbelievers was . 22, which was also 
significant (FLSD = . 17, p< . 05). Believers had significantly more experiences than both 
uncertain participants and disbelievers. The uncertain participants had significantly more 
prior experiences than disbelievers. Table 3.8 shows the mean ratings for previous 
experiences, separated by belief. 
BELIEVERS UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
2.33 1.98 1.76 2.12 
(. 73) (. 56) (. 55) (. 69) 
N=237 N= 136 N=89 N=462 
Table 3.8: Overall mean ratings for prior experiences (and standard deviations), separated by belief. 
Of the eight anomalous experiences listed, participants most commonly experienced 
unusual sounds and emotional feelings. Factorial Anovas were conducted on the ratings for 
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each of the experiences, in order to examine whether the experience reports were affected 
by belief. There was a significant effect of belief on frequency reports for each of the 
experiences, with believers reporting more experiences than the disbelievers. Table 3.9 
gives the mean ratings and F- and p- values for the eight anomalous experiences. Table 3.10 
shows the mean differences between the three belief groups and FLSD values for each of 
the experiences. 
BELIEVERS UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVERS MEAN F-value p-value 
(N = 237) (N = 136) (N = 89) (N = 462) (2 tailed) 
TEMP 2.46 2.2 1.8 2.26 12.43 
. 
0001 
CHANGE (1.16) (1.02) (. 99) (1.11) (2,461 dt) 
SENSE OF 2.87 2.01 1.67 2.41 61.44 
. 
0001 
PRESENCE (1.05) (. 92) (. 72) (1.08) (2,461 dt) 
UNUSUAL 2.68 2.21 2.19 2.45 11.12 
. 
0001 
SOUND (1.2) (. 98) (. 96) (1.12) (2,461 df) 
UNUSUAL 1.87 1.49 1.37 1.67 14.75 . 
0001 
SIGHT (. 95) (. 83) (. 65) (. 89) (2,461 df) 
UNUSUAL 1.59 1.38 1.29 1.47 5.52 . 
004 
TASTE (. 88) (. 75) (. 64) (. 81) (2,461 df) 
UNUSUAL 2.03 1.72 1.55 1.84 8.06 . 
0004 
SMELL (1.12) (. 96) (. 93) (1.06) (2,461 di) 
D1LLiNf S 2.22 2.22 185 2.1 5 4.2 . )1 
(1.16) (1) (. 86) (1.07) (2,461 df) 
EMOTIONAL 2.9 2.55 2.34 2.69 9.36 . 
0001 
FEELING (1.19) (1.08) (1.06) (1.15) (2,461 df) 
DUE TO A 2.64 3.58 4.43 3.26 158.04 . 
0001 
GHOST? (1.01) (. 67) (. 56) (1.1) (2,455 dl) 
N= 234 N= 134 N=88 N= 456 
Table 3.9: Mean ratings for the eight prior experiences, gnost ratings, r-values ana p-values kz taueu) gor u, ricrerixs uerwcru ucncr 
groups. 
Participants who reported at least one of the anomalous experiences also rated whether they 
felt that these experiences were due to a ghost. 456 of the participants reported at least one 
experience. A factorial Anova showed a significant effect of belief on these ratings, with 
participants who believed in the paranormal giving the highest ratings, and disbelievers 
giving the lowest ratings. There were significant differences in the ghost ratings 
between 
each group, with the believers giving higher ratings than both the uncertain participants and 
the disbelievers, and the uncertain participants giving higher ratings than the disbelievers. 
These ratings are also shown in Tables 3.9 and 3.10. 
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BELIEVER VS 
UNCERTAIN 
BELIEVER VS 
DISBELIEVER 
UNCERTAIN VS 
DISBELIEVER 
TEMPERATURE MEAN DIFFERENCE . 
27 
. 
67 
.4 
CHANGE FISHER PLSD . 
23* 
. 
27* 
. 
29* 
SENSE OF MEAN DIFFERENCE . 
79 1.2 
. 
41 
PRESENCE FISHER PLSD . 
2* 
. 
23* 
. 
26* 
UNUSUAL SOUND MEAN DIFFERENCE . 
47 
. 
49 
. 
02 
FISHER PLSD . 
23* 
. 
27* 
. 
29 
UNUSUAL SIGHT MEAN DIFFERENCE . 
38 
.5 . 
12 
FISHER PLSD . 
18* 
. 
21 * 
. 
23 
UNUSUAL TASTE MEAN DIFFERENCE .2 . 
29 
. 
09 
FISHER PLSD . 
17* 
. 
2* 
. 
21 
UNUSUAL SMELL MEAN DIFFERENCE 
. 
31 
. 
48 
. 
17 
FISHER PLSD 
. 
22* 
. 
26* 
. 
28 
DIZZINESS MEAN DIFFERENCE -. 001 . 
37 . 
37 
FISHER PLSD . 
22 
. 
26* 
. 
28* 
EMOTIONAL MEAN DIFFERENCE . 
35 
. 
56 . 
21 
FEELING FISHER PLSD . 
24* . 
28* 
.3 
DUE TO A GHOST? MEAN DIFFERENCE -. 98 -1.8 -. 84 
FISHER PLSD . 
18* . 
21* . 
23* 
Table 3.10: Mean differences and FLSt) values tor belief group comparisons. values signilicant at the u. uý, level are marKea with an 
asterisk (*). 
Prior expectation 
Participants' expectation of experiencing something unusual, prior to entering the location, 
was rated on a five-point scale, in which 1 indicated `Definitely Yes' and 5 indicated 
`Definitely No'. The mean scores for prior expectation are shown in Table 3.11. 
A2x2 factorial Anova showed prior expectation to be significantly influenced by belief (F 
(1,456) = 45.05, p= . 0001), 
but not whether participants had received a suggestion that the 
location was haunted (F (1,456) = 1.18, p= . 28). 
There was no interaction between the 
Suggestion conditions and belief (F (1, 456) = . 25, p= . 
78). Participants who were 
uncertain whether they believed in ghosts had less expectation of an unusual experience 
than believers. Disbelievers had lower expectations of experiencing something than both 
believers and uncertain participants. 
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BELIEVER UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVER MEAN 
SUGGESTION 3.5 3.77 4.4 3.79 
(. 86) (. 65) (7) (. 84) 
N= 126 N=77 N=62 N=265 
NO SUGGESTION 3.37 3.63 4.41 3.59 
(. 86) (. 74) (5) (. 86) 
N= 111 N=59 N=27 N= 197 
MEAN 3.44 3.71 4.4 3.7 
(. 86) (. 69) (. 64) (. 85) 
N=237 N=136 N=89 N=462 
"Table 3.11: Mean prior expectation ratings (and standard deviations), separated by belief and condition 
The mean difference in expectation scores between believers and uncertain participants was 
-. 27, and this was shown by the FLSD test to be significant (FLSD = . 16, p< . 05). The 
difference between believers and disbelievers was -. 96 and this was also significant (FLSD 
= . 19, p< . 05). The difference between uncertain participants and disbelievers was -. 69, 
which was also significant (FLSD = . 16, p< . 05). 
Experiences 
The total number of unusual experiences reported was 432, a mean of . 94 (std. dev. 1.41) 
per participant. Table 3.12 gives the number and percentage of participants in each group 
reporting unusual experiences. 
I BELIEVER I UNCERTAIN I DISBELIEVER TOTAL 
SUGGESTION % REPORT EXP 56.35% 40.26% 24.19% 44.15% 
................................... NO. REPORT ................................... N=71 ................................... N=31 ................................... N=15 ................................... N=117 
................................... NO. IN GROUP ............ N .... _. fig .......... ............ N .... _ .... 7 ............ 7 ............ N .... _ . 62 ............... ........... N ....... 2..... 65 ............ = 
NO % REPORT EXP 55.86% 49.15% 25.93% 49.75% 
.... .... .. SUGGESTION ...... N(OýýRFPORT... ........... N -ý62........... 
............ N 29......... ........... N. _.............. ............ N. _. 9R........... 
................................... NO. IN GROUP ................................... N= 111 ................................... N= 59 ................................... N= 27 ................................... N= 197 
MEAN % REPORT EXP 56.12% 44.12% 24.72% 46.54% 
................................... NO. REPORT ................................... N= 133 ................................... N= 60 ................................... N= 22 ................................... N= 215 
R67 0 GROUP . N= 237........ N= 136........ ......... w= 89 ......... ....... N = 462........ 
Table 3.12: The number and percentage of participants reporting experiences, separated by belief and condition 
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A2x2 factorial Anova conducted on the data showed no effect of suggestion (F (1,456) = 
. 
89, p= . 35) on the number of experiences reported, although the participants 
in the 
Suggestion condition reported slightly fewer experiences than those in the No Suggestion 
condition. However, there was a significant effect of belief (F (1,456) = 12.25, p= . 
0001). 
There was no significant interaction between belief and suggestion (F (1,456) = . 
18, p= 
. 
84). Believers reported significantly more unusual experiences than disbelievers and 
uncertain participants did. Disbelievers reported fewer experiences than uncertain 
participants. Table 3.13 shows the mean responses in each of the conditions. 
BELIEVER UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVER MEAN 
SUGGESTION 1.21 
. 
68 
. 
34 . 
85 
(1.75) (1.04) (. 65) (1.41) 
N=126 N=77 N=62 N=265 
NO SUGGESTION 1.27 . 
92 
. 
44 1.05 
(1.53) (1.28) (. 89) (1.41) 
N=1II N=59 N=27 N=197 
MEAN 1.24 . 
78 . 
37 . 
94 
(1.64) (1.15) (. 73) (. 14) 
N=237 N=136 N=89 N=462 
Table 3.13: The mean number of experiences (and standard (leviation), separatea ny neuer ana conaition. 
The mean difference in the number of unusual phenomena that believers and uncertain 
participants experienced was . 46, and this was shown 
by the FLSD test to be significant 
(FLSD = . 29, p< . 
05). The difference between believers and disbelievers was . 87 and this 
was also significant (FLSD = . 34, p< . 
05). The difference between uncertain participants 
and disbelievers was. 41, which was also significant (FLSD =. 37, p <. 05). 
Intensity of experiences 
Intensity ratings were given on a seven-point scale where 1 indicated `Not at all intense' 
and 7 indicated `Very intense'. A2x2 factorial Anova showed that the 
intensity of 
experience reported was significantly affected by belief (F (2,209) = 7.24, p= . 
001), but 
not by suggestion (F (1,209) = . 58, p= . 
45). There was no significant interaction between 
belief and suggestion (F (2,209) = . 63, p= . 
53). Disbelievers rated their experiences as less 
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intense than both uncertain participants and believers. The uncertain participants rated their 
experiences as less intense than the believers. These data are represented in Table 3.14. 
BELIEVER UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVER MEAN 
SUGGESTION 3.44 2.9 2.33 3.15 
(1.58) (1.64) (1.76) (1.65) 
N=71 N=31 N= 15 N= 117 
NO SUGGESTION 3.74 2.72 2.86 3.38 
(1.46) (1.49) (1.22) (1.52) 
N=62 N=29 N=7 N=98 
MEAN 3.58 2.82 2.5 3.26 
(1.53) (1.56) (1.6) (1.59) 
N= 133 N=60 N=22 N=215 
Table 3.14: The mean ratings (and standard deviation) given to intensity of experiences, separated by belief and condition 
The mean difference in the intensity ratings given by believers and uncertain participants 
was . 76, and this was shown by the FLSD test to be significant (FLSD = . 47, p< . 05). The 
difference between believers and disbelievers was 1.08 and this was also significant (FLSD 
= . 7, p< . 05). The 
difference between uncertain participants and disbelievers was . 32, 
which was not significant (FLSD =. 76, p >. 05). 
Ghost ratings 
Participants rated their belief that their experience was due to a ghost on a five-point scale, 
in which 1 indicated `Definitely Yes' and 5 indicated `Definitely No'. 
Participants' ghost ratings were shown by a2x2 factorial Anova to be significantly 
affected by belief (F (2,209) = 19.67, p= . 0001) 
but not by suggestion (F (1,209) = . 08, p 
_ . 77). 
There was no significant interaction between belief and suggestion (F (2,209) = . 27, 
p= . 77). 
The believers were most likely to attribute their experiences as being due to a 
ghost, followed by the uncertain participants and then the disbelievers. Table 3.15 shows 
the mean ghost ratings. 
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BELIEVER UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVER MEAN 
SUGGESTION 3.21 3.65 4.27 3.46 
(. 89) (. 61) (7) (. 88) 
N=71 N=31 N=15 N=117 
NO SUGGESTION 3.05 3.66 4.29 3.32 
(. 93) (. 86) (. 49) (. 96) 
N=62 N=29 N=7 N=98 
MEAN 3.14 3.65 4.27 3.4 
(. 91) (. 73) (. 63) (. 92) 
N= 133 N=60 N=22 N=215 
Table 3.15: The mean ghost ratings (and standard deviation), separated by belief and condition. 
The mean difference in the ghost ratings given by believers and uncertain participants was - 
. 52, and this was shown 
by the FLSD test to be significant (FLSD = . 26, p< . 
05). The 
difference between believers and disbelievers was -1.14 and this was also significant 
(FLSD = . 38, p< . 05). The 
difference between uncertain participants and disbelievers was - 
. 61, which was also significant 
(FLSD = . 41, p< . 
05). 
DISCUSSION OF STUDY 3.2 
Effect of belief 
The hypotheses that belief in ghosts would significantly affect reports of previous 
experiences, prior expectation, the number of experiences reported, the intensity of 
experiences and the ghost ratings were all supported. Responses to the questions concerning 
previous unusual experiences showed an overall significant effect of belief on the frequency 
of experiences reported. The believers reported significantly more anomalous experiences 
than both uncertain participants and disbelievers, and the uncertain participants reported 
more experiences than the disbelievers. When the eight experiences listed were examined 
individually, it was seen that the reporting of each experience was significantly affected by 
belief. Believers reported experiencing each phenomenon more frequently than 
disbelievers. In the majority of the experiences, the number of reports were staggered, with 
the believers reporting significantly more than the uncertain participants and disbelievers, 
and the uncertain participants reporting more than the 
disbelievers. Additionally, there was 
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also a significant effect of belief on the tendency to regard these experiences as being due to 
a ghost. The pattern here matched the previous pattern, with believers giving higher ratings 
than uncertains and disbelievers, and uncertain participants giving higher ratings than 
disbelievers. 
With regard to the prior expectation data, there was an overall significant effect of belief, 
and the believers showed significantly greater prior expectation than either the uncertain 
participants or the disbelievers, and the uncertains had more expectation than the 
disbelievers. Thus, the amount of prior expectation among the participants was directly 
related to how much belief they had in ghosts. This pattern was also found in the data 
relating to how many experiences the participants reported during the course of the study. 
Again, there was an overall significant effect, and the believers reported more experiences 
than either the uncertain participants or the disbelievers, and the uncertain participants also 
reported more experiences than the disbelievers. The intensity ratings reflected a similar 
trend; the overall effect of belief was significant, and the believers gave significantly higher 
intensity ratings than both the disbelievers and the uncertain participants. The only non- 
significant difference was between the uncertains and the disbelievers, However, this 
difference was in the right direction with the uncertains giving higher intensity ratings than 
the disbelievers. 
Finally, the ratings for whether participants thought their experience was due to a ghost 
showed the same effects of belief as the previous results. Overall, there was a significant 
effect of belief on the ghost ratings. The believers gave significantly higher ghost ratings 
than the uncertains and the disbelievers, and the uncertains gave higher ratings than the 
disbelievers. 
It can therefore be seen that belief in ghosts significantly affects how an individual 
approaches and experiences events. Not only does belief affect a person's prior expectation 
of having an experience; it also affects the probability that that person will experience 
unusual phenomena, the intensity of those phenomena, and the likelihood that the person 
will classify the phenomena as ghostly. This 
is clearly an interesting finding with 
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ramifications for the way that spontaneous cases are assessed in future. These findings 
indicate firstly that believers in the paranormal may attend to situations differently than 
disbelievers. They may experience more unusual events than disbelievers because they are 
more aware of changes in the environment and have an anticipation that these changes will 
occur. Secondly, the findings indicate that believers are prone to misinterpreting stimuli as 
being of paranormal origin. It appears that the two factors work in conjunction to ensure 
that believers in the paranormal are more likely to experience events that they could 
interpret as paranormal. 
Effect of suggestion 
The findings regarding the suggestion factor did not support the hypotheses. Participants 
who received the suggestion that the location they were to visit was haunted did not have 
higher prior expectation of having an unusual experience. They were also not more likely to 
actually have an unusual experience, give higher intensity ratings, or rate their experiences 
as being due to a ghost. 
One possible reason for the failure of the suggestion to have an effect is that the participants 
did not actually `receive' it. Stroebe and Jonas (1988) suggest that persuasive 
communications must go through two stages before they are effective. They must firstly be 
received by the percipient, then they must be accepted. Stroebe and Jonas (1988) state that 
the two main factors influencing the reception of a communication are motivation to attend 
to the communicator, and ability to understand them. Neither of these two factors should 
have adversely affected the participants in the present study - they had voluntarily attended 
the event and all fully understood other instructions given to them. Another possible 
hindrance to reception of the suggestion may have been that it was too subtle to adequately 
influence the participants. 
The factors which affect acceptance of a persuasive communication were considered by 
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) in the Elaboration Likelihood Model. They suggested that the 
amount that a person elaborates upon (i. e. thinks about) a message, and the type of thoughts 
that are generated, will affect acceptance of the message. A communication that elicits 
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favourable thoughts is more likely to succeed, whereas one that evokes negative thoughts 
may result in non-acceptance of the suggestion, or even an acceptance of the opposing 
view. In the present study, two specific forms of negative thought may have been provoked 
by the suggestion. Firstly, it is possible that being told they were to visit a particularly 
haunted location may have aroused feelings of worry, wariness or fear in the participants. 
This could have resulted in a non-acceptance of the suggestion, and a defensiveness while 
at the location that prevented them from experiencing anything unusual. The second 
possibility is that participants were aware of the suggestion and realised that their responses 
were being manipulated. This again may have resulted in defensiveness at the location 
resulting in fewer experiences, and participants may have been less motivated to record any 
unusual phenomena they did experience. 
Interaction between belief and suggestion 
No interaction was found between belief in the paranormal and acceptance of the 
suggestion. This was contrary to existing research suggesting that individuals with 
paranormal belief may be more suggestible than disbelievers (e. g. Haraldsson, 1985). It 
was also anticipated that an interaction between the two variables may be present even if 
believers are not more susceptible to global suggestion than disbelievers, as believers 
would be more inclined to accept the misinformation supplied in the present study. 
However, it is clear from the results that suggestion did not have an effect on the 
behaviour of either group. The believers consistently experienced more anomalous 
events than disbelievers, regardless of whether any misinformation had been received. It 
is possible that the lack of interaction between belief and suggestion may be the product 
of ceiling and floor effects. The believers were highly likely to experience unusual 
events regardless of the presence of suggestion, and the disbelievers were unlikely to 
experience them. This may be predicted from the existing correlation between 
paranormal belief and paranormal experiences (e. g. Irwin, 1985). It may be that the 
suggestion did not affect the believers because there was simply no opportunity to 
experience more unusual events than were already occurring. Similarly, the lack of 
suggestion may have failed to affect the disbelievers because there was little likelihood 
that they would have had an experience anyway. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
These studies were successful in demonstrating that belief can significantly influence the 
way a person experiences an unusual event. These findings are extremely helpful in 
interpreting spontaneous cases, as they suggest that reports of unusual phenomena cannot 
be viewed in isolation, but must be considered in conjunction with a number of other 
factors. These findings are in support of the selective hypothesis testing theory of 
Sanbonmatsu et al. (1998), which indicates that individuals with strong beliefs will attend to 
situations differently, and interpret them according to their existing attitudes. The failure of 
the suggestion to have an effect provides an interesting facet to this investigation, as it 
indicates that having a spontaneous unusual experience is not dependent on information 
provided by other people, but may be heavily dependent on pre-existing belief. This finding 
is supported by the results concerning previous experiences, as both the frequency of 
unusual experiences and the attributions accorded to them were both shown to be 
significantly influenced by belief in ghosts. 
It is worth noting that merely participating in the study caused qn increase it the number of 
experiences. As an informal control, 50 members of the public exiting the Haunted Gallery 
were asked if they had experienced anything unusual as they walked through. Only two 
replied that they had; one person had noticed a slight change in temperature, and the other 
reported a feeling of something brushing his arm. This small number of experiences is in 
contrast to the participants in the studies who reported a mean of nearly one experience per 
person. There are two possible explanations for this discrepancy, which are not necessarily 
independent. Firstly, the participants were spending more time in the locations than the 
members of the public, and were primed to be aware of any possible changes in the 
environment. Thus, they are simply more likely to have noticed any unusual phenomena. 
The second explanation is that the very act of participating in the study caused people to 
have a higher expectation of experiencing something unusual than the general public. It 
may be that participants in the study were, in a way, all in a suggestion group, as the 
possibility that something might happen had been implied while the other visitors to 
Hampton Court had not received this suggestion. Clearly some sort of priming effect caused 
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the participants in these studies to experience unusual events at a frequency that the general 
public do not, and it would be interesting to see whether members of the public who do 
experience unusual phenomena are themselves anticipating, or hoping for, an exceptional 
occurrence. 
There are some issues to be considered with regard to the treatment of data in the studies. 
Participants completed the Prior Experiences and Belief Questionnaire individually, before 
visiting the locations. However, the Location Maps on which participants recorded their 
experiences were filled in while other people were present. It is possible that participants' 
experiences may not have been independent, as they may have been affected by the 
experiences of other participants (see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). In addition, there may 
have been some social pressure to experience an event, given the situation and the fact that 
other people were having experiences. For practical reasons, participants had to be tested in 
large groups rather than individually, and this does reflect the situation in which ordinary 
visitors to Hampton Court experience unusual events. A potential way to counteract this 
problem would be to analyse the data for each group visiting the location, rather than for 
individual participants. However this would raise further issues with regard to the data, as 
the mean ratings for the group as a whole would not necessarily reflect the ratings given by 
the participants who actually experienced the events. For example, the number of events 
experienced was significantly affected by belief, thus within each group the participants 
with the most belief were having the most experiences. This important point would be lost 
if the comparison was of the mean belief for each group. For these reasons, it was decided 
to analyse the data according to individual scores. However, it is hoped that future work 
would overcome this problem by allowing participants to visit locations individually, and 
record their experiences without influence from others. 
There are several interesting avenues of research that could be further explored in future 
studies. One option would be a follow-up study after a period of time, which could consider 
the way that participants recalled their experiences, and whether their reports were still 
affected by belief. It would also be interesting to investigate the possibility that there may 
be a delayed effect of suggestion, with participants in the groups who were primed to 
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experience unusual phenomena recalling a greater amount than control groups. This might 
be predicted from the multiple-trace theories of misinformation, and also as a product of the 
reversed eyewitness suggestibility effect (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989b). These indicate that 
misinformation can affect recollection of an event even if it is received beforehand, as 
source confusion results. Another area of investigation would be whether participation in 
the study affected belief in ghosts afterwards. In Study 3.2, nearly a quarter of disbelievers 
reported some form of unusual phenomena, as did 40% of people who were uncertain of 
whether ghosts exist. There is a possibility that this may have affected their views on the 
paranormal. Additionally, nearly half the believers did not experience anything unusual and 
this also may have affected their opinions. 
The misleading pre-event suggestion in Study 3.2 failed to affect reports of unusual 
experiences. However, the data examining the differences between believers, uncertain 
participants and disbelievers did indicate that the groups approach events differently. Given 
this information, it was decided to investigate whether misleading suggestion as an event is 
taking place will affect experiences, and whether believers would be more affected than 
disbelievers. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECTS OF DURING-EVENT SUGGESTION AND BELIEF 
ON THE RECOLLECTION OF SEANCE ROOM PHENOMENA2 
INTRODUCTION 
The present study was an attempted replication and extension of two studies conducted 
by Wiseman and colleagues. In the first of these studies, Wiseman, Smith and Wiseman 
(1995) conducted a series of three `seances' in which objects were moved by non- 
paranormal means, while groups of participants sat in a circle around the seance table. 
The seances were conducted in a completely dark room and the objects on the table 
were marked with luminous dots that showed up in the dark. The study aimed to 
establish whether eyewitness testimony is reliable in such a situation, and whether 
testimony is affected by pre-existing beliefs. The results showed that, even when 
questioned immediately after the seance took place, participants were extremely 
unreliable witnesses. They showed memory errors about events that happened during the 
course of the seance, and about which objects they had inspected before the seance took 
place. The belief data also showed interesting differences between the disbelievers and 
believers. The believers were more inclined than disbelievers to attribute movement to 
objects that remained stationary, and to attribute the events to paranormal sources. Thus, 
the study demonstrated that testimony for the seances was unreliable, and that this was 
more the case for believers than disbelievers. Wiseman, Seager and Smith (1997) 
extended the previous seance study of Wiseman, Smith and Wiseman (1995) in order to 
test whether misleading suggestion as events were taking place would also affect 
testimony. Eight seances were conducted at a convention for people interested in the 
paranormal. During the course of these seances, participants witnessed some faked 
phenomena (such as a ball moving), and it was suggested to them by the medium that 
the seance table was levitating. The authors found that eyewitness testimony was 
generally unreliable and that there was a strong effect of suggestion, with participants 
incorrectly reporting the levitation of the table. 
Z The work described within this chapter was conducted in conjunction with the author's PhD supervisor, Dr Richard Wiseman. 
However, the author was extremely involved in the design and organisaion and data collection for the study. 
97 
Effect of positive suggestion 
The concept of creating false memories via misleading post-event suggestion has been 
widely investigated. Laboratory research typically involves participants being shown an 
event (generally on slides or on a videotape), then receiving false information about 
what they have witnessed. This can take the form of either a written narrative containing 
inaccurate details of the event (e. g. Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989), or in 
the form of questions that contain misleading details (Cassel & Bjorkland, 1995). 
Participants are then tested on their recollection of the events witnessed. During this 
testing, participants often report having seen details that were, in fact, suggested to them 
through post-event misinformation (Weingardt, Loftus, & Lindsay, 1995). The strength 
of the misinformation effect is such that memories of participants' childhood 
experiences can be altered (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995) or even confabulated completely 
(Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995). Indeed, it is not always even necessary for the 
misinformation to be plausible or logically possible; for example, Pezdek, Finger and 
Hodge (1997) managed to create false memories in Catholic participants of having 
engaged in Jewish religious practices in their childhood. Pezdek et al. did note, however, 
that these cases were rare, and that for maximum generation of false memory, the 
misinformation should correspond with the participants' schemas and pre-existing 
beliefs. In short, researchers have demonstrated that memories or reports can be 
fundamentally altered by supplying incorrect information about an event; and this holds 
true for both autobiographical memories and events witnessed in the laboratory. 
There has been some research to suggest that misinformation can affect recollection of 
events even when it is presented before viewing the event (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989b; 
Rantzen & Markham, 1992). However, few researchers have explored the impact of 
misleading suggestion as an event is taking place. There are two lines of research which 
are relevant to the issue. Work on social conformity has demonstrated that, when placed 
alone in a group of confederates, participants will agree with the group consensus on an 
issue (such as which of a series of lines is longer) even if it is wrong, rather than risk 
social exclusion by giving their true opinion (Asch, 1955). However, it is not evident 
that their perceptions of what has happened have been altered in any way; rather, they 
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have changed their responses to avoid social embarrassment. Secondly, researchers 
investigating the autokinetic effect have examined whether the presence of a misleading 
suggestion can lead a participant to falsely report the movement of a spot of light. This 
research is typically carried out by placing the participant in a darkened room and 
allowing them to become accustomed to the lack of light. They are then presented with a 
small point of light and asked to report whether or not the light moves. 
Sherif (1935, cited in van Avermaet, 1988) found that participants will typically 
describe seeing movement of the stationary light, and that the reports of movement can 
be affected by certain physical and social factors. He indicated that when participants 
were tested individually, they developed a fairly stable range of movement estimates. 
The range differed highly between participants, but the level of movement reported by 
each participant was consistent across a number of trials. However, when participants 
with a diverse range of movement estimates were tested in a group, their individual 
judgments converged into a stable group norm. When participants were tested in a group 
before being tested individually, the group norm estimates continued to affect their 
judgments of movement in sessions where the participants were alone. 
The work of both Asch (1955) and Sherif (1935) has demonstrated that it is possible that 
participants' reports of events will be affected within a group situation, if they are aware 
of the judgments of others in the group. It has also been demonstrated that individuals' 
reports can be susceptible to suggestion from one other individual. Luchins and Luchins 
(1969) also investigated the autokinetic effect and found that if movement is suggested 
to the participant at the time by an authority figure, an increased number of movements 
will be reported. This research customised situations for each participant and placed the 
participants under some pressure to agree with the suggestion. For example, after having 
failed to respond to the suggestion in the first trial, one participant was told that the test 
was of intelligence and that her low score was evidence that she was a `stupid person' 
(p. 234). After the initial suggestion by the authority figure, and the coercion to agree 
with the suggestion, the participants were further tested over a number of 
days. They 
continued to report movement of the light, even if the authority 
figure was no longer 
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present, implying that either the suggestion had altered the perception of participants, or 
that social pressure continued to exert an influence, despite the absence of the authority 
figure. 
The idea of suggesting to participants that objects were moving during the course of the 
seances leads directly on from the autokinetic effect research. Both areas of study test 
the ability of participants to accurately gauge the movement of points of light in a 
darkened room, and the effectiveness of suggestion in that situation. Participants in 
autokinetic effect research have responded positively to suggestions that the light 
movement was occurring very frequently (Cautela & Vitro, 1964), and have reported 
light movement corresponding to the direction of movement suggested by the 
experimenter (Rechtschaffen & Mednick, 1955). Ozeki, Takahashi and Tsuji (1991) 
conducted two studies which further investigated the autokinetic effect. They examined 
the effect of experimenter suggestion on the participants' reports, but also the effect of 
self-suggestion. Before the actual experiment was conducted, participants were given 
prior tests to assess whether they had a `dominant' direction of light movement (i. e. 
whether they consistently reported light movement in one particular direction). With 
regard to the experimenter's suggestion, participants were placed in two groups; half 
received a `facilitative' suggestion that the target light would move in a direction 
consistent with their dominant direction, while the other half received a `suppressive' 
suggestion that the light would move in the opposite direction to their dominant 
direction. In the self-suggestion area of the studies, participants were asked to cause the 
light to move in their dominant direction (facilitative suggestion); move the light away 
from their dominant direction (suppressive suggestion); or simply observe any 
movement of the light (control suggestion). The results of the studies were not 
conclusive; however, there was some implication that suggestion from the experimenter 
would affect the reports of participants who did not have a strong tendency towards an 
autokinetic effect, and that self-suggestion was effective for all participants, particularly 
in the suppressive suggestion condition. These results indicate that directions from an 
experimenter could sway reports of participants who are ambiguous 
in their response to 
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a stimulus, and that participants can influence the way that they view events if they 
approach the situation with a prior expectation of what will happen. 
Wiseman et al. (1997) reported a significant effect of during-event suggestion on reports 
of anomalous events within the seance room. The role of suggestion within the seance 
room was also examined in the present study. In the seances, participants received the 
misleading suggestion that a bell placed on the seance table was moving. The bell did, in 
fact, remain stationary throughout the seance. It was anticipated that participants would 
accept the suggestion that the bell moved. In order to assess this, the positive suggestion 
was paired with a `control' event, in which the movement was the same (i. e. the object 
remained stationary) but the verbal commentary was different (there was no suggestion 
of movement). The tambourine was selected as the paired object to the bell - it remained 
motionless throughout the seances and it was not referred to. This provides an 
opportunity to assess the reliability of reports of suggested events compared to observed 
events. If participants correctly reported that the tambourine remained stationary but 
incorrectly stated that the bell moved, it could be assumed that the suggestion had an 
effect in altering reports of the event. If the participants reported movement of both the 
bell and the tambourine, it could be assumed that they were simply reporting the events 
of the seance incorrectly. Reports indicating that neither the bell nor the tambourine 
moved would indicate that the participants were reliable witnesses and not suggestible. 
Effect of negative suggestion 
The area of `negative' suggestions - in which the lack of an event is suggested - has 
been little researched. In 1997, Miyashita and Monzen found that, under hypnosis, 
negative suggestions could significantly affect participants' physiological reactions and 
their ability to respond in tests of imagery. This research was supported by Miyashita 
(1988,1999) and Miyashita and Monzen (2001). These studies indicated that negative 
suggestions can affect physical behaviours, sensations and emotional 
feelings. However, 
they also indicated that negative suggestions can be limited in the extent of their 
success. Miyashita and Monzen (2001) concluded that, when 
investigating the influence 
of negative suggestion on body movement, the suggestions were more successful when 
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focused on a specific subject ('mono-dimensional behaviour') than when concerned 
with more general behaviour (`multi-dimensional behaviour'). For instance, a negative 
suggestion that "Your body does not move backward" would be more effective than the 
negative suggestion "Your body does not move" when body sway is measured. 
The present study expanded the investigation of the effect of suggestion in seances to 
include a consideration of negative suggestion. During the course of the seance, a 
writing slate was moved a small distance across the seance table. As this was happening, 
the medium suggested to the participants that the slate remained stationary. As with the 
positive suggestion event, the negative suggestion was also paired with another event 
that was visually the same but was not commented upon. In this case the candlestick 
also moved but this was not mentioned by the medium. If the participants incorrectly 
reported that the slate did not move, but correctly reported that the candlestick did, the 
negative suggestion could be regarded as successful. If they reported that both objects 
moved, their reports of the seance would be accurate. Reports that neither of the objects 
moved would indicate that the participants were not reliable witnesses of the events. It 
was anticipated that there would be an effect of the negative suggestion, and that 
participants would incorrectly report that the slate remained stationary. 
Effect of belief 
Gilovich (1991) reports that belief can bias expectations in two ways: firstly, people 
tend to attend to data that is consistent with their own views and ignore data that is not 
(selective attention); secondly, ambiguous data will be interpreted as being concordant 
with already held views (selective interpretation). Therefore, events will generally 
appear to confirm pre-existing views, and these views will rarely be challenged. 
Fiske 
and Taylor (1991) suggest, however, that the effects of selective attention are not as well 
established as those of selective interpretation. They report that some groups of people 
tend to be more selectively attentive than others, and that some stimuli arouse selective 
attention more than others. However, research appears to suggest that paranormal 
stimuli are successful in provoking selective attention, and that people who 
have strong 
beliefs about the paranormal will be selectively attentive to paranormal stimuli. 
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Wiseman and Morris (1995) showed participants films of apparently psychic 
demonstrations, and then asked them to complete a recall questionnaire. They found that 
participants who believed in the paranormal were less able than disbelievers to recall 
parts of the film which would indicate that the demonstration was not paranormal, 
although there was no difference in recall for `neutral' events on the video. Smith (1993) 
found that participants who were told that they were watching a film of genuine 
paranormal phenomena could recall significantly less information about the events than 
participants who were told that they were watching trickery. Thus, it has been shown 
that paranormal phenomena may provoke selective attention, and that people with strong 
paranormal belief may be inclined to attend selectively to such phenomena. 
Paranormal phenomena are also liable to selective interpretation. Marks (2000) suggests, 
for example, that people witnessing demonstrations of psychokinesis will interpret the 
cause (trickery or genuine powers) according to their existing beliefs. Another classic 
example of selective interpretation is shown in studies of astrology (e. g. Hines, 1988). 
These studies demonstrate that people will accept extremely general descriptions as 
being relevant to themselves, and that descriptions that are not concordant with a 
participant's personality are over-looked in favour of descriptions that match the 
personality. Jones, Russell and Nickell (1977) suggest that, beyond selectively attending 
to information and selectively interpreting it, people that believe in the paranormal will 
also attempt to create instances of paranormal phenomena, and thus misinterpret any 
events that coincide with these attempts as being paranormal. Zusne and Jones (1989) 
make the point that consistency in paranormal belief is important to people as that belief 
is not an isolated one. Often paranormal belief is part of a larger network of attitudes to 
factors such as religion and science and it is therefore advantageous to maintain an 
attitude to paranormal phenomena that is unchanging, and that conforms with other 
beliefs. It is, therefore, expected that belief in the paranormal will have an effect on the 
way in which individuals will attend to and remember apparently paranormal events. 
It has also been shown that believers and disbelievers process information differently. In 
particular. believers 
in the paranormal will interpret phenomena in terms of the context 
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in which it is being presented, while disbelievers will analyse it independently of the 
context (Snel, van der Sijde, & Wiegant, 1995). The events of the seance room provide 
an excellent opportunity to test this concept. It was hypothesised that participants with 
strong paranormal belief would interpret the seance events as being of paranormal 
origin, and also that they might report events in addition to those controlled by the 
experimenters. In contrast, it was expected that disbelievers would reject the possibility 
that the events were paranormal, and only report those events which actually took place. 
Interaction between suggestion and belief 
The seance study conducted by Wiseman, Seager and Smith (1997) found that that the 
believers were more likely to accept a misleading during-event suggestion than the 
disbelievers. This is consistent with the hypothesis that belief will influence the way that 
people experience events. In particular, it provides evidence for an interaction between 
belief in the paranormal and susceptibility to suggestion. However, there are two 
possible explanations for the tendency of believers to accept the information suggested 
by the medium. The first is that believers are generally more suggestible than 
disbelievers, and therefore will accept information that is presented without questioning 
it. The second explanation is that believers accepted the suggestion because it was 
congruent with their existing beliefs. Sanbonmatsu et al. 's (1998) selective hypothesis 
testing theory would predict that, in cases of misinformation about movement of objects 
in the seance room, believers' perceptions would be more susceptible to distortion than 
disbelievers because they would not feel the need to question or analyse the information 
being presented. The disbelievers would consider the information in detail because it 
challenges existing beliefs, and therefore would be more likely to reject the suggestion. 
Thus, acceptance of the suggestion does not necessarily demonstrate a general 
susceptibility to suggestion. It may, 
instead, be symptomatic of selective interpretation 
of information. These two explanations are tested within the present study through the 
introduction of the negative suggestion. 
The two previous seance studies conducted by Wiseman and colleagues tested the 
tendency of the 
believers to form opinions consistent with their beliefs but inconsistent 
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with what actually happened, and did not examine whether the same reaction is present 
with the disbelievers. This is generally true of the existing literature on self-confirming 
beliefs, which tends to focus on reporting errors made by believers. rather than by 
disbelievers. This may lead to conclusions that believers are more susceptible to 
suggestion than disbelievers. The present study sought to examine this by testing 
whether the disbelievers will also report a scenario consistent with their beliefs, even if 
it is discordant with what actually happened. The seance studies of Wiseman et al. 
(1995) and Wiseman et al. (1997) both examined suggestions that were likely to be 
accepted by the believers and rejected by the disbelievers, as they concerned apparently 
paranormal events. In this study, an additional factor was introduced -a suggestion that 
should be accepted by disbelievers and rejected by the believers. During the seances, an 
object was moved while it was suggested that the object was still stationary. It was 
hypothesised that the disbelievers would accept this suggestion, because it was 
concordant with their pre-existing belief that objects cannot move by paranormal means, 
whilst the believers would reject it. 
Thus, an interaction between suggestion and belief is predicted for both forms of 
suggestion - positive and negative. In the positive suggestion condition, it is expected 
that the believers will show more acceptance of the suggestion than disbelievers. In the 
negative suggestion condition, acceptance of the suggestion by the disbelievers would 
indicate that suggestion acceptance is determined by existing views, rather than a 
susceptibility to suggestion in general. If, however, the believers showed as much, or 
more, suggestion acceptance as the disbelievers, it could be concluded that individuals 
who believe in the paranormal are more susceptible to suggestion than disbelievers. 
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METHOD 
Design 
The study examined the effect of paranormal belief on memory for the seance. This was 
a between-subjects variable. The IV was the level of paranormal belief, and participants 
were split into three groups - disbelievers, uncertain and believers - according to their 
responses to the belief question on the Initial Questionnaire. 
Four dependent variables (DV) were measured. The first DV measured the extent to 
which participants accepted the `positive' suggestion that the bell had moved. This was 
assessed by participant agreement (given by ticking Yes, Uncertain or No) with the 
statement `During the seance the bell moved'. The hypothesis was that participants who 
believed in the paranormal would show more belief that the bell moved. 
The second DV assessed the extent to which participants accepted the `negative' 
suggestion that the slate had not moved. This was assessed by participant agreement 
(given by ticking Yes, Uncertain or No) with the statement `During the seance the slate 
moved'. It was hypothesised that participants who did not believe in the paranormal 
would show more acceptance of this suggestion. 
The third DV measured the degree to which participants experienced additional 
phenomena in the seance room. This was recorded by ticking Yes, Uncertain or No in 
response to the question `Did you experience any phenomena not mentioned above? ', 
then providing a brief written description of that phenomenon. It was hypothesised that 
participants who believed in the paranormal would provide more instances of additional 
phenomena. 
The final DV assessed whether participants believed that the phenomena experienced 
were paranormal. This was recorded by ticking Yes, Uncertain or No in response to the 
question `Do you think that any of the phenomena that you experienced during the 
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seance were paranormal? '. The hypothesis was that participants who believed in the 
paranormal would be more likely to believe that the phenomena were paranormal. 
Participants 
198 attendees of the Fortean Times UnConvention participated in 12 seances in groups 
of approximately 17, over the course of two days. Every participant was sent a follow- 
up questionnaire two weeks later, of which 125 returned the forms (a response rate of 
63.13%). The mean belief scores of participants who returned the forms was 4.09 (std. 
dev. 1.82) and the mean belief of participants who did not return the forms was 4.25 
(std. dev. 172). The non-returners were slightly more sceptical than participants that 
returned the forms, but this difference was not statistically significant (t (196df) = -. 63, p 
(2t) = . 53). 
Materials 
Seance Room 
The seances were conducted in a room that was completely blacked out. All windows 
were covered by black material, and after the participants had entered the room the door 
was sealed. Participants were seated around one large, central table, surrounded by the 
same number of chairs as participants. 
Luminous objects 
A handbell, a maraca, a bamboo ball, a tambourine, a candlestick and a child's drawing 
slate were all marked with small luminous dots (either luminous stickers or paint). These 
were placed on the seance table. The handbell was used for the positive suggestion, the 
tambourine was used as the positive suggestion control. The slate was used for the 
negative suggestion, the candlestick was used for the negative suggestion control. The 
ball was levitated during the course of the seance, but the maraca remained stationary 
throughout and was not referred to. 
107 
Questionnaires 
Initial Questionnaire (see Appendix J) 
This was distributed to participants at the start of the seances. It consisted of a brief 
definition of the term paranormal, and asked participants to answer the question "Do 
you believe that paranormal phenomena sometimes occur during seances? " on a seven- 
point scale, where 1 indicated `Definitely Yes' and 7 indicated `Definitely No'. It then 
left space for participants to provide their name and address. 
Follow-up Questionnaire (see Appendix K) 
This was sent to all participants two weeks after they attended the seances, along with a 
pre-paid reply envelope. The first section covered the events during the seance. Each of 
the objects on the table were listed in turn in the sentence "During the seance the xxx 
moved", and participants were asked to tick Yes, No or Uncertain, to indicate whether 
they believed that the statement was correct. For each object, participants were provided 
with a space to provide a written description of what they remembered seeing. The 
second section asked three further questions, the first two of which were again 
responded to by ticking Yes, No or Uncertain, with an additional space underneath to 
provide further information. The first question asked whether the participants 
experienced any other phenomena during the course of the seance, and the second asked 
whether the participants believed the phenomena experienced to be paranormal. The 
final question asked whether participants had attended any previous seances at the 
UnConvention. 
Procedure 
Participants gathered outside the seance room at an allotted time, and filed in around the 
table. They sat down and were asked to complete the initial questionnaire, which was 
then collected in. A brief introduction to the seance was then given by the 'medium'. It 
was explained that the seance would take place in complete darkness, and participants 
were given the opportunity to leave if they felt uneasy. The luminous objects were then 
passed around the table, and all participants examined them. The lights were turned off 
and participants were asked to hold hands. Atmospheric music was played throughout 
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the course of the seance. The medium first asked participants to concentrate on 
attempting to move the ball, which was then seen to levitate several inches above the 
table, before slowly returning. Participants were then encouraged to move the 
tambourine, but it did not move. Next, attention was turned to the bell. This did not 
move, but the medium suggested that it was moving and encouraged the participants to 
move it further. The medium then asked the participants to concentrate on moving the 
candlestick. This moved a small distance across the table, but the medium did not refer 
to this movement. The group then began to concentrate on the slate. This moved a small 
distance across the table, but the medium suggested that it did not. The objects that did 
move during the seance were moved by a hidden assistant of whom the participants 
were not aware. The study was designed so that each suggestion was paired with a 
similar movement of an object, with a different verbal commentary. Thus, while the 
slate moved and the medium suggested it did not, the candlestick also moved and was 
not commented on. Similarly, the bell did not move but it was suggested that it had, and 
the tambourine did not move and this was not mentioned. 
At the end of the seance, the lights were turned back on and the participants were 
thanked for attending. It was explained that they would be receiving the follow-up 
questionnaire in two weeks. Two weeks after the follow-up questionnaire was sent, all 
participants who attended the seance were sent a feedback report, explaining that the 
phenomena experienced were faked, and giving a summary of the findings of the study. 
RESULTS 
Due to technical problems with the first two seances, the data from those participants 
were not used in analyses (N = 20). Additionally, 5 participants indicated that they had 
attended the seances described in Wiseman et al. (1997) and their data were also 
excluded. 
Participants were classified as believers, uncertain or disbelievers according to their 
answer to the paranormal belief question on the initial questionnaire. Participants who 
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recorded a score of 1-3 were classified as believers (N = 37), those giving a score of 4 
were uncertain (N = 29) and 5-7 were disbelievers (N = 34). 
Positive Suggestion - Movement of Bell 
Participants responded to the statement "During the seance the bell moved" by ticking 
either Yes, No or Uncertain. The majority of participants did not respond to the 
suggestion that the bell had moved. 
A Chi Square showed that there was a significant interaction between paranormal belief 
and belief that the bell had moved (Chi Square (4df) = 9.1, p (2t) = . 05. Table 4.1 shows 
the breakdown of participant responses. 
BELL BELIEVER UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVER TOTAL 
YES 7 0 4 11 
(18.92%) (0%) (11.76%) (11%) 
UNCERTAIN 8 3 4 15 
(21.62%) (10.34%) (11.76%) (15%) 
NO 22 26 26 74 
J4 
(59.46%) (89.66%) (76.48%) (74%) 
TOTAL 37 29 34 100. -v--ý 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Table 4.1: Numbers (and percentages) of Believers, Uncertain and Disbelievers responding Yes, No and Uncertain to the statement 
"During the seance the bell moved". 
Positive Suggestion Control - Movement of Tambourine 
Participants responded to the statement "During the seance the tambourine moved" by 
ticking either Yes, No or Uncertain. The majority of participants was accurate in their 
responses and did not report that the tambourine had moved. 
A Chi Square showed that there was no significant interaction between paranormal 
belief and belief that the tambourine had moved (Chi Square (4df) = 4.11, p (2t) = . 
39. 
Table 4.2 shows the breakdown of participant responses. 
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TAMBOURINE BELIEVER UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVER TOTAL 
YES 2 4 4 10 
(5.4%) (13.79%) (11.76%) (10%) 
UNCERTAIN 4 4 8 16 
(10.8%) (13.79%) (23.53%) (16%) 
NO 31 21 22 74 
(83.8%) (72.42%) (64.8%) (74%) 
TOTAL 37 29 34 100 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
I able 4.1: Numbers (and percentages) of tielievers, Uncertain and Disbelievers responding Yes, No and Uncertain to the statement 
"During the seance the tambourine moved". 
Negative Suggestion - Movement of Slate 
Participants responded to the statement "During the seance the slate moved" by ticking 
either Yes, No or Uncertain. Despite the fact that the slate had moved, participants 
mostly reported that it did not. 
A Chi Square showed that there was no significant interaction between paranormal 
belief and belief that the slate had moved (Chi Square (4df) = . 95, p (2t) = . 92). Table 
4.3 shows the breakdown of participant responses. 
SLATE BELIEVER UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVER TOTAL 
YES 2 1 1 4 
(5.41%) (3.45%) (2.94%) (4%) 
UNCERTAIN 3 4 3 10 
(8.1%) (13.79%) (8.82%) (10%) 
NO 32 24 30 86 
(86.49%) (82.76%) (88.24%) (86%) 
TOTAL 37 29 34 100 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Table 4.3: Numbers (and percentages) of Believers, Uncertain and Disbelievers responding Yes, No and Uncertain to the statement 
"During the seance the slate moved". 
Negative Suggestion Control - Movement of Candlestick 
Participants responded to the statement "During the seance the candlestick moved" by 
ticking either Yes, No or Uncertain. Most participants accurately reported that the 
candlestick moved. 
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A Chi Square showed that there was no significant interaction between paranormal 
belief and belief that the candlestick had moved (Chi Square (4df) = 4.41, p (2t) = . 
35). 
Table 4.4 shows the breakdown of participant responses. 
CANDLESTICK BELIEVER UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVER TOTAL 
YES 27 26 30 83 
(73%) (89.65%) (88.24%) (83%) 
UNCERTAIN 5 1 2 8 
(13.5%) (3.45%) (5.88%) (8%) 
NO 5 2 2 9 
(13.5%) (6.9%) (5.88%) (9%) 
TOTAL 37 29 34 100 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
table 4.4: Numbers (and percentages) of Believers, Uncertain and Disbelievers responding Yes, No and Uncertain to the statement 
"During the seance the candlestick moved". 
Other phenomena experienced 
Participants were asked whether they experienced any other phenomena during the 
seance, and by ticking either Yes, No or Uncertain. The majority of participants did not 
record experiencing any additional phenomena. 
A Chi Square showed that there was an interaction approaching significance between 
paranormal belief and experiencing of other phenomena (Chi Square (4df) = 8.78, p (2t) 
= . 07). Table 4.5 shows the 
breakdown of participant responses. 
OTHER BELIEVER UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVER TOTAL 
YES 12 5 3 20 
(32.43%) (17.24%) (8.82%) (20%) 
UNCERTAIN 0 1 0 1 
(0%) (3.45%) (0%) (1 %) 
NO 25 23 31 79 
(67.57%) (79.31%) (91.18%) (79%) 
TOTAL 37 29 34 100 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Table 4.5: Numbers (and percentages) of Believers, Uncertain and Disbelievers responding Yes, No and Uncertain to the question of 
whether they experienced any other phenomena. 
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Were the phenomena paranormal? 
Participants were asked whether they believed that the phenomena experienced were 
paranormal, responding by ticking either Yes, No or Uncertain. The majority of 
participants did not believe that the phenomena were paranormal. 
A Chi Square showed that there was a significant interaction between paranormal belief 
and belief that the phenomena were paranormal (Chi Square (4df) = 24.32, p (2t) = 
. 0001). The 
believers were more inclined to accept the phenomena as paranormal, or be 
uncertain. Table 4.6 shows the breakdown of participant responses. 
PARANORMAL BELIEVER UNCERTAIN DISBELIEVER TOTAL 
YES 9 1 1 11 
(24.32%) (3.45%) (2.95%) (11%) 
UNCERTAIN 16 11 4 31 
(43.24%) (37.93%) (11.76%) (31%) 
NO 12 17 29 58 
(32.44%) (58.62%) (85.29%) (58%) 
TOTAL 37 29 34 100 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Table 4.6: Numbers (and percentages) of Believers, Uncertain and Disbelievers responding Yes, No and Uncertain to the question of 
whether the phenomena were paranormal. 
DISCUSSION 
The study was partially successful in terms of gaining the expected results. An 
examination of the belief data demonstrates that participants who expressed a prior 
belief in the paranormal were more likely to give a paranormal explanation, or record a 
level of uncertainty as to the cause of the phenomena experienced. The disbelievers 
rejected the paranormal explanation. This is in accordance with hypothesis, and 
demonstrates that participants will accept a rationale that is consistent with existing 
beliefs. Additionally, there was a difference approaching significance with regard to 
whether any additional phenomena were experienced. The majority of people who 
experienced additional phenomena were believers. This suggests that the expectations 
when entering the seance room were different for the two groups, with the believers 
showing, if not an expectation of phenomena, then a willingness to accept the possibility 
that phenomena might occur. There was also a significant effect in terms of acceptance 
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of suggestion that the bell moved. This also supports the idea that the believers were 
more open than the disbelievers to the idea of phenomena occurring in the seance room. 
However, there was no difference between the two groups in acceptance of the negative 
suggestion that the slate did not move. This may mean that the believers were equally 
likely to accept the suggestion as the disbelievers, implying, perhaps, that believers are 
generally more suggestible than disbelievers. 
Effect of positive suggestion 
The results from the positive suggestion section of this study were unexpected. Most 
participants failed to report that the bell moved following the suggestion; this differs 
from both the results reported in Wiseman et al. (1997) and what would be expected in 
other suggestion studies. In the comparison of the tambourine and bell, more 
participants actually reported that the tambourine had moved (26%) than reported that 
the bell moved (11%). Thus, not only did the suggestion fail to positively influence 
reports of events; it actually appeared to have had an inhibitory effect. This is in 
accordance with the findings of Chapter 3, which found that misleading pre-event 
suggestion either has no effect or inhibits the likelihood that participants will perceive 
anomalous events. It is possible that, as the suggestion directly contradicted what the 
participants could see, they immediately rejected the idea and remembered this rejection 
two weeks later. However, this contradicts the results of the negative suggestion, where 
participants had the opportunity to see the slate moving, yet were willing to report that it 
had not. 
One possible explanation for this lack of acceptance of the positive suggestion could be 
that there was a problem with visibility, and that participants were unable to establish 
whether objects were actually moving. However, examining participant responses to 
questions about the other objects present makes this unlikely. Most participants 
accurately report that the tambourine and maraca did not move (74% and 90% accuracy 
respectively), and that the candlestick and ball did move (83% and 71% accuracy). 
There were no differences in belief in any of these instances. Thus, in the case of objects 
where no suggestion was involved, participants were able to accurately assess the 
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movement of the object regardless of belief. This appears to rule out the notion that poor 
visibility may be responsible for both the lack of acceptance of suggestion that the bell 
moved and the widespread belief that the slate did not move. 
Perhaps the low acceptance of the suggestion that the handbell moved is related to 
plausibility. It is possible that the participants rejected the idea that the bell moved 
because they did not hear the bell ringing, and thus did not believe that there could have 
been any movement. It should be noted that the participants in the seance all had a pre- 
existing interest in parapsychology or the paranormal, as they had chosen to attend a 
convention exploring the subject. Therefore, they may have been alert to the possibility 
that they were being manipulated and this may have caused them to reject the 
suggestion. 
Effect of negative suggestion 
There appeared to be a strong effect of the negative suggestion, with most participants 
inaccurately stating that the slate had not moved. As mentioned previously, each 
suggestion event was matched to another in which the verbal commentary was different. 
Comparing the slate event to the candlestick event, it can be seen that the participants 
were far less accurate when considering the movement of the slate, as 86% incorrectly 
reported that it had not moved. This is compared to just 9% who said that the 
candlestick did not move (8% were uncertain). This would support the notion that the 
negative suggestion was effective in this study. The majority of suggestion studies are 
involved with examining whether participants respond to positive suggestion - that is, 
the suggestion that an event has taken place - with very little research considering 
suggestion that an event has not happened. There is clearly great potential for further 
research in this area. 
Effect of belief 
The study has supported the concept that paranormal belief causes participants to 
selectively interpret ambiguous phenomena in order to correspond to their expectations. 
This was evident in the tendency of believers to report additional phenomena during the 
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seance, and to attribute the events to paranormal causes. In common with the studies 
described in Chapter 3, this study was effective in establishing that a person's prior 
beliefs will affect the way that they experience an event. The participants who believed 
in the paranormal were significantly more likely to accept the suggestion that the bell 
moved; they reported more additional phenomena taking place (although this was not 
quite significant); and they were more likely to believe that the phenomena were 
paranormal. 
Interaction between suggestion and belief 
There was partial support for the selective attention hypothesis, which stated that a 
participant's belief in the paranormal (or lack thereof) would cause them to accept data 
that is consistent with their own views and reject data that is not. In the case of the 
positive suggestion, there was a significant interaction between suggestion and belief as 
participants with paranormal belief accepted the suggestion that the bell moved to a 
greater extent than participants who did not have paranormal belief. However, the case 
of the negative suggestion did not concur with this finding, as all belief levels accepted 
the suggestion equally. There are three possible explanations for this. Firstly, it may be 
that paranormal believers are globally more suggestible than disbelievers. Secondly, the 
selective attention hypothesis may be more relevant to participants with strong 
paranormal belief than those who do not believe in the paranormal. This view is 
supported by the findings of Russell and Jones (1980) that, when reporting apparently 
paranormal events, believers are likely to distort or reject information that is not 
congruent with their beliefs, whilst disbelievers report accurately, regardless of the 
content. 
A third possible explanation is that the disbelievers were no more motivated than the 
believers to accept the negative suggestion. In the case of the positive suggestion (bell 
moving) the believers accepted the suggestion that the bell moved because it agreed 
with their expectations for the seance. However, the non-movement of the slate would 
not have confirmed disbelievers' expectations. During the course of the seance the 
disbelievers viewed the movement of other objects, and thus they could not maintain 
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any pre-existing opinions that no unusual events occur at seances. In other words, they 
could not infer from the negative suggestion that the events at the seance were not 
paranormal, whilst the believers may have inferred that the events were paranormal 
from the positive suggestion. Similarly, the believers had no motivation not to accept the 
negative suggestion. Their opinions were not threatened by accepting that one object 
had not moved, given that other objects did move. A more appropriate negative 
suggestion in this case would be one that concurred with the disbelievers' expectations 
about the paranormality of the events and challenged the expectations of the believers, 
rather than a suggestion concerning the movement of one object. 
An interesting question is raised when studying during-event suggestion. Does the 
suggestion actually affect the perception of the event as it is happening, or is the 
suggestion effective in altering the memory of the event? Single-trace theories of 
misinformation effects preclude the possibility of suggestion affecting perception, as 
they work on the assumption that there must be an existing memory trace which is 
altered by the introduction of new information. However, multiple-trace theories which 
involve source confusion allow for the possibility of misinformation affecting 
perception. Participants are receiving two pieces of information at once - visual and 
audio. It is possible that one piece of information may alter the way the other piece of 
information is perceived; in effect, they experience source confusion between the two 
items. 
Due to the nature of the testing in this study (one questionnaire administered two weeks 
later) it is not possible to say whether participants that did accept (either of) the 
suggestions had their perceptions of the event altered, or if their memories were affected 
by the suggestion at a later date. In order to test this, a series of studies were conducted 
in which participants were tested twice - once immediately after the suggestion and then 
again two weeks later. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE EFFECTS OF D DRING-EVENT SUGGESTION AND BELIEF 
ON REPORTS OF A KEY BENDING DEMONS TRA TION 
INTRODUCTION 
Effect of suggestion 
The present experiments further explore the issue of suggestion taking place as an event 
is occurring. Participants were shown a videotape of a pseudo-psychic demonstration; in 
this case, a performer apparently using psychic ability to bend a key, then placing the 
key on the table in front of him where it lay stationary. Half of the participants then 
heard the performer suggest that the key was continuing to bend, whilst the other half 
saw the same scene but did not hear this suggestion. Participants were questioned about 
the event immediately afterwards, and two weeks later. Unlike studies in the existing 
literature examining during-event suggestion (e. g. Luchins & Luchins, 1969), there was 
no authority figure present (although one was viewed on the videotape) and no fear of 
social embarrassment which might influence answers - all responses were given on 
confidential and anonymous questionnaires. It was predicted that those who head the 
suggestion would be more likely to report that the key had continued to bend. This could 
be because the suggestion will cause participants to misinterpret the ambiguous stimulus 
that they are viewing and believe that they can see the key bending. Alternatively, the 
suggestion may not affect the perception of the participant, but may affect their 
recollection of the event. 
Effect of suggestion over time 
The studies described in the present chapter also seek to examine whether misleading 
suggestion can have long-term effects beyond the initial presentation. If a person's 
perception of an event has not been initially altered by misinformation, can that 
misinformation still serve to alter their memories of the event? Traditional theories of 
misinformation suggest that there is an interaction between factors which combine to 
generate false memories. First, the participants must comply with misinformation, 
despite the fact that it may contradict their memory, then, over time, the misinformation 
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becomes incorporated into the memory (Brown, Goldstein, & Bjorklund. 2000). 
However, it is unclear whether this model would be appropriate for misinformation 
given as an event occurs, as it requires compliance which contradicts what the 
participant is actually witnessing. In traditional misinformation studies, the participant 
has no means to verify whether their memories are reliable or not; however, in during- 
event misinformation studies the participants should have the ability to disregard the 
misinformation as it opposes what they can see. Thus, the participants should retain two 
versions of the event - what they have actually witnessed, and what they have been told 
occurred. At some point in the future these may be confused in the memory, in the same 
manner as with misinformation given after the event. This would create a false memory 
of the event, despite an initial lack of acceptance of the suggestion. However, it seems 
intuitively unlikely that a participant who has actively rejected a suggestion would later 
incorporate it into memory. Indeed, Hyman and Kleinknecht (1999) specify that 
misinformation must be plausible and be accepted by the participant before it can be 
incorporated into memory. Therefore, it appears that in order for during-event 
misinformation to have a long-term effect, the participant should, at the very least, be 
unsure as to whether the event is actually happening. It would seem likely that existing 
beliefs may affect this perception to some extent. 
Fuzzy trace theory (Brainerd, Reyna, & Poole, 2000) suggests that participants would 
form two distinct representations of the video - the verbatim trace and the gist trace. The 
verbatim trace would include the information that the key was bent by the performer and 
then placed on the table, and the performer said the key continued to bend. The gist trace 
would contain more general and vague information such as `the key was bent'. Brainerd 
et al. indicate that the verbatim trace fades faster than the gist trace, and after a period of 
time it is the gist trace that will be consulted when information is controlled. Given this 
information, it could be predicted that participants will have a less detailed memory of 
the video, and will be more likely to indicate that the key continued to bend, even if they 
did not originally see that happening. Hyman and Kleinknecht's (1999) three processes 
theory would also predict reports that the key continued to bend after two weeks - 
providing the participants did not reject suggestion outright as they heard it. Hyman and 
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Kleinknecht indicate that if a suggestion is plausible and the participants construct a 
memory for it, they may experience source confusion at recollection and provide the 
misleading information rather than the original information. The source activation 
confusion model (Ayers & Reder, 1998) suggests that participants will have two 
separate recollections of the video - one for what they saw and one for what the 
performer said. The recollection that is most active at the time of testing will determine 
the responses provided. 
However, there are other factors which may influence the way an occurrence is 
remembered. There is some evidence that repeating the false suggestion in the questions 
asked after seeing the video may serve to reinforce the false memory (Zaragoza & 
Mitchell, 1996). Also, Roediger, Meade and Bergman (2001) demonstrated that memory 
can be affected by statements from other people that erroneously describe scenes which 
participants have witnessed. They describe this as the `social contagion of memory' -a 
person's memory of an event can be influenced by even a brief discussion with another 
person. This idea was supported by Wright, Self and Justice (2000), who reported that 
after discussions between pairs of people who had been shown conflicting information, 
there was conformity between the pairs with regard to the sequence of events. This was 
true even when initial recollections of the stimulus were accurate. Wright et al. (2000) 
found that the most persuasive person in each pair was the person who showed most 
confidence that their memory was accurate, regardless of whether this was true. This 
finding has obvious ramifications for the present study, as most participants were in 
groups of friends, and had the opportunity to discuss their perceptions following the 
study. Additionally, Keuler and Safer (1998) demonstrated that recollection of an event 
is affected by the attitude of participants at the time that recall is taking place. For 
instance, participants awaiting examination results will recall being more anxious prior 
to the exam than participants who have already received their results. The current 
anxiety of the participants coloured their recall of their anxiety at the time. Thus, it is 
expected that the passage of time will have an effect on the degree to which participants 
believed the suggestion that the key continued to bend after being placed on the table. 
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Effect of belief 
It is also hypothesised that the participants' belief in the paranormal will affect the 
manner in which participants attend to the event and the way that they interpret it. 
Previous research indicates that people with strong paranormal belief may attend to 
situations differently from disbelievers (e. g. Jones & Russell, 1980). In the case of the 
present studies, participants may view the key bending differently because of their 
existing beliefs about psychokinesis. It is therefore anticipated that believers will be 
more likely to perceive the key as having continued to bend, regardless of whether they 
received the suggestion. This is because they will be motivated to perceive a paranormal 
event. 
The interpretation of the event was assessed by the degree to which the participants 
believe that the key bend performed in the video was carried out by paranormal means. 
Wiseman and Morris (1995) found that participants reporting paranormal belief may be 
more likely to rate apparently psychic demonstrations as paranormal. This is in 
accordance with findings that people's pre-existing attitudes will affect the manner in 
which they perceive an event, because they are motivated to experience an event so that 
it conforms to their expectations (Ainsworth, 1998). Thus, it is expected that participants 
with belief in the paranormal will be more likely to view the bending of the key as 
paranormal, whilst those who do not believe will attribute the bending of the key to 
other causes. Marks (2000) describes this phenomenon as one of self-perpetuating 
beliefs - pre-existing expectations influence the way an event is viewed, which in turn 
strengthens the belief by confirming its accuracy. 
Effect of belief over time 
It has previously been shown that the attitudes and expectations a person has will 
influence the manner in which they perceive an event. It is also true that these pre- 
existing biases can affect the way that they later remember the event. Bahrick, Hall and 
Berger (1996) showed that memories for school performance become biased towards the 
outcome that the participant finds emotionally gratifying. In the case of the present 
study, this finding would predict that two weeks after viewing the video, the disbelievers 
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would rate the events in the video as not being paranormal, whilst the believers would 
show acceptance of the possibility that the events were paranormal. 
Interaction between suggestion and belief 
Whilst it is expected that there will be a general effect of suggestion in the current study, 
it is also expected that participants will respond differently according to their belief in 
the paranormal. This is for two reasons. Firstly, previous studies investigating the link 
between paranormal belief and susceptibility to suggestion have indicated that there is a 
strong tendency for believers to be more suggestible. Wagner and Ratzeburg (1987) 
found a correlation between hypnotic suggestibility and paranormal belief. However, 
they queried whether this would necessarily predict a correlation between normal 
suggestibility and belief, as there was no research indicating that the two forms of 
suggestibility are related. Despite this, they concluded that both types of suggestibility 
involve imagination and acceptance of phenomena suggested by other people, so a 
correlation between suggestibility and paranormal belief may exist. This view was 
supported by Haraldsson (1985) who found a significant correlation between paranormal 
belief scores and scores on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS) (Gudjonsson, 
1984). The GSS measures `interrogative' suggestibility and assesses participants' 
tendency to respond to leading questions and change accounts of events as a response to 
pressure from an authority figure. As such, the GSS as a measure of suggestibility is 
more relevant to the current study than hypnotic suggestibility. Haraldsson (1985) 
suggested that the correlation between paranormal belief and suggestibility may be due 
to different means of information processing in believers and disbelievers. 
Secondly, the suggestion in the present study is concerned with an apparently 
paranormal event and researchers have shown that perceptions of such events can be 
selectively processed according to belief. For instance, Russell and Jones (1980) found 
that those who believe in the paranormal are likely to distort or reject information that is 
not congruent with their beliefs, whilst disbelievers report accurately, regardless of the 
content. In the context of the current suggestion experiment, the tendency should be for 
the believers to accept the suggestion - regardless of whether or not it represents what 
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they are experiencing - because it confirms their beliefs about what should be taking 
place. The case of the disbelievers is less clear cut. The research suggests that they 
should report the event accurately; however, their accuracy will be largely determined 
by whether or not they believe the suggestion. Clearly, if they believe the suggestion 
that the key is continuing to bend they will not be able to accurately report the event. 
Wiseman and Morris (1995) showed participants a videotape containing pseudo-psychic 
trickery, and asked them to recall the events presented. They found that participants who 
did not believe in the paranormal were far more likely to notice important and detailed 
information about the demonstration on the video than participants who believed in the 
paranormal. If this holds true for the present study, it could be expected that the 
disbelievers would notice that the key was not actually bending and therefore would not 
accept the suggestion, while the believers would be more likely to endorse it. 
Confidence 
Research examining the differences between real and false memories has commonly 
found that participants with false memories are significantly less confident than 
participants with real memories. Pedzek and Taylor (2000), in a review of the area, 
found that studies examining confidence all found this effect, although this was not 
always significant. Certainly, participants never showed more confidence in false 
memories than actual memories. As reports of false memories are generally less vivid, 
less detailed and have less clarity (Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999), it is hypothesised 
these factors contribute to the difference in confidence. However, these studies all refer 
to false memories developed as a result of post-event misinformation, or implanted 
memories of events that never happened. There is no research that examines confidence 
for false memories developed from during-event suggestion. Also, research has only 
examined whether participants have more confidence for true or false memories. The 
present studies also aim to examine the influence of other factors on confidence, such as 
paranormal belief, and memories that are or are not congruent with existing beliefs. 
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Confidence over time 
There is some ambiguity about the effect that time should have on the confidence of 
participants. Zaragoza and Mitchell (1996) state that participants become more 
confident in their memories over time, but this study involved repeated exposure to 
misinformation resulting in a false memory. Therefore, participants could simply be 
more confident that they were supplying the answer required, rather than confident in 
their actual memory. Similarly, Cutler and Penrod (1995) reported that witnesses 
become more confident about their memories the more they are questioned. They also 
showed that the confidence of witnesses is extremely malleable and can be affected by 
factors such as the way that they are questioned, and evidence that other people agree 
with their memory of events. Thus, it would be expected that the participants who have 
had their recollection of the video confirmed by others, and who had described the 
events to others in the intervening two weeks, would display greater confidence than 
they had previously. However, as previously mentioned, confidence should also be 
affected by whether or not participants hold accurate or inaccurate memories. 
There is also a strong possibility that the three factors of acceptance of suggestion, 
confidence and ratings of paranormality will interact when affecting the memories of 
participants. For example, a participant with strong belief in the paranormal who has 
received and accepted the suggestion may be more likely to go and discuss the video 
with friends than someone who was not motivated to believe the suggestion, or who did 
not receive it. Consequently, discussion of the video may increase confidence in the 
accuracy of their memory and their perceptions of whether the events shown in the 
video were paranormal. 
It is therefore predicted that there will be a significant effect of suggestion on reports of 
whether the key continued to bend. There will also be a significant effect of belief, as 
participants with strong paranormal belief will be more motivated to witness a 
psychokinetic effect. In addition, there will be an interaction between belief and 
suggestion, as participants with paranormal belief will also be more motivated to accept 
the suggestion. Participants with paranormal belief should also be more likely to 
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interpret the events as being paranormal in origin. It is further hypothesised that 
participants will be less confident in their false memories than their real memories. It is 
anticipated that time will have an effect on these factors. 
STUDY 5.1 
METHOD 
Design 
The study used a2x2x2 mixed design. Factor One examined whether suggestion 
would influence participants' recollection of a video that they had viewed. This was a 
between-subjects variable with two levels: Suggestion (in which participants viewed a 
video containing the suggestion that a key continued to bend after being placed on a 
table) and No Suggestion (in which participants viewed a video that did not contain this 
suggestion). Factor Two examined the effect of paranormal belief on memory of the 
video and was a between-subjects variable. Participants were split into two groups - 
disbelievers and believers - according to their responses on the Belief in the Paranormal 
Questionnaire. Factor Three investigated the effect of time on recollection. This was a 
within-subjects variable, again with two levels: Time One (immediately after viewing 
the video), and Time Two (two weeks after viewing the video). 
Three dependent variables (DV) were collected at each of the two times of questioning. 
The first DV measured the extent to which participants accepted the statement that the 
key had continued to bend. This was assessed by participant agreement with the key 
bending question, which read: `After the key was placed on the table, it continued to 
bend'. This was rated on a seven-point scale -1= `Definitely No' and 7= `Definitely 
Yes'. The hypothesis was that participants in the Suggestion condition, and participants 
who believed in the paranormal, would be significantly more sure that the key continued 
to bend, and that this difference would be more pronounced after two weeks. 
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The second DV assessed participants' confidence in the accuracy of their answer to the 
key bending question. This was measured on a seven-point scale (1 = Not at all 
confident' and 7= `Very confident'). It was hypothesised that participants who had 
reported false memories on the key bending question (i. e. that the key had continued to 
bend) would be less confident than those who reported true memories, and that this 
would be more evident two weeks later. 
The third DV measured the degree to which participants believed that the key bending 
was paranormal. Participants recorded their answers to the question `Do you think that 
the bending of the key was paranormal? ' on a seven-point scale (1 = `Definitely No', 7 
= `Definitely Yes'). It was hypothesised that participants who believed in the 
paranormal would provide higher ratings than participants who did not, and that the 
ratings would be higher after two weeks. 
Participants 
46 people participated in this study, of whom 40 returned two weeks later. All 
participants were undergraduate Psychology or Cognitive Science students at the 
University of Hertfordshire. 23 participants were in the Suggestion condition, of whom 
21 returned after 2 weeks. 23 participants were in the No Suggestion condition, of whom 
19 returned after 2 weeks. All participants received course credits for their involvement. 
Materials 
Videos 
Suggestion Video (see Appendix L for transcript) 
The Suggestion Video lasts for approximately two minutes, and consists of a performer 
appearing to bend a key. The video begins with a wide shot of the performer and an 
interviewer sitting at a table, on which several objects (cutlery, packs of cards, keys) are 
situated. The interviewer briefly points out the objects, then asks to performer to select 
an object. At this point, the camera shot changes to a close-up of the performer's hands 
selecting the key and, for the next ninety seconds, appearing to bend the key. 
Throughout the entire bending period, the performer's voice can be heard explaining 
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that the key is bending using psychic energy, and discussing the fact that he can feel 
heat coming from the key. After this period, the performer turns the key around in his 
hand, to demonstrate that it is bent, and places the key on the table. As the key lies on 
the table, the performer can be heard remarking that the key is continuing to bend. After 
fifteen seconds, he comments that it has finished bending. This suggestion is, in fact, 
false - the key did not continue to bend. The interviewer does not comment on the 
suggestion at any point. 
No Suggestion Video 
The No Suggestion Video is identical to the Suggestion Video with the exception of the 
last fifteen seconds. After the key is placed on the table, the visual element of the video 
is the same, but there is no soundtrack suggesting that the key is continuing to bend. 
Questionnaires 
Belief in the Paranormal Questionnaire (see Appendix M) 
This questionnaire was devised by Wiseman and Morris (1995) and consists of six 
questions covering the participants' belief in telepathy, precognition and psychokinesis. 
For each question, participants state their level of belief by circling a response on a 
seven-point scale, where 1 is `Definitely No' and 7 is `Definitely Yes'. A seventh 
question on the Questionnaire lists seven possibly psychic experiences and asks 
participants to tick which (if any) they have experienced. For the purposes of the current 
study, participant's belief was measured by their responses to Questions 5 and 6, which 
concerned belief in psychokinetic phenomena. The two questions were: "Do you think 
that some people can, just by mental effort, apply a noticeable force to an object? " and 
"Do you think that some people can, just by mental effort, alter the physical 
characteristics of the material from which an object is made? ". 
Response Questionnaire (see Appendix N) 
The Response Questionnaire consists of three statements relating to the video which are 
rated on a seven-point scale where 1 is `Definitely No' and 7 is `Definitely Yes'. For 
each of these questions, participants are also asked to rate their confidence in their 
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answer on a seven-point scale (1 = Not at all Confident, 7= Very Confident). Question 
I asks whether the interviewer touched the objects on the table at the beginning of the 
film, and Question 2 asked whether the performer said that the key was heating up as he 
bent it. The third question is related to the suggestion, and reads: 
`After the key was placed on the table, it continued to bend'. 
The fourth question asks participants whether they believe that the bending of the key 
was paranormal, and again is measured on a seven-point scale (1 = `Definitely No' and 
7= `Definitely Yes') with a seven-point confidence scale. The fifth question gives the 
participant some space to briefly provide an explanation for how they believe the key 
bent. 
Procedure 
Participants were run in groups of up to five that had previously been assigned to either 
the Suggestion or No Suggestion condition. They were first issued with the Belief in the 
Paranormal Questionnaire, which they completed without time restrictions. Each 
participant was then asked to ensure that they could see the television screen clearly. 
When the experimenter was satisfied that all participants had clear views of the screen, 
the tape was started. Participants saw either the Suggestion or No Suggestion Video, 
depending on which condition they had been assigned to. After the video ended, 
participants completed the Response Questionnaire without time limits. 
Participants were then asked to return two weeks later, and not to discuss the video with 
each other in the meantime. At the second session, participants were asked to fill in the 
Response Questionnaire again. After this was done, they were thanked for their time and 
then debriefed. 
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RESULTS 
Participants' score on the two Belief in the Paranormal Questions covering 
psychokinesis were used to classify them as believers or disbelievers. The scores ranged 
from 2 (strong sceptic) to 14 (strong believer). The overall mean score was 6.67 (std. 
dev. 3.2). Participants were split along the median - those scoring 6 and under were 
classified as disbelievers (N = 22; mean score 3.82, std. dev. 1.5), people scoring 7 and 
above were classified as believers (N = 24; mean score 9.29, std. dev. 1.76). 
Response to the key bending question 
Participants' answers to the key bending question on the Response Questionnaire ('After 
the key was placed on the table, it continued to bend') were used to measure their 
acceptance of the suggestion. Responses were given on a seven-point scale where 1 
indicated no agreement with the statement and 7 indicated strong agreement. This was 
recorded twice, immediately after viewing the video, and two weeks later. A2x2 
factorial Anova was conducted on the data recorded immediately after viewing the 
video, and this showed no significant effect of belief (F (1,42) = . 13, p= . 72), 
but a 
significant effect of condition (F (1,42) = 17.17, p= . 0002). Participants in the 
Suggestion condition showed greater conviction that the key continued to bend. There 
was an interaction approaching significance between condition and belief (F (1,42) = 
3.56, p= . 07). The 
disbelievers gave higher scores than the believers in the Suggestion 
condition, but lower scores in the No Suggestion condition. Table 5.1 presents the 
results for the disbelievers and believers at Time One, split by condition. 
TIME ONE BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION 3.43 4.56 3.87 
(2.03) (2.24) (2.14) 
N= 14 N=9 N=23 
NO SUGGESTION 2.3 1.54 1.87 
(1.16) (. 97) (1.1) 
N= 10 N= 13 N=23 
MEAN 2.96 2.77 2.87 
(1.78) (2.18) (1.96) 
N=24 N=22 N=46 
Table 5.1: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant responses to the key bending question at Time One, separated by 
belief and suggestion. 
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Difference over time 
The data collected at Time One and Time Two were compared, in order to assess 
whether the responses changed over time. This analysis was conducted only on the 
responses provided by the 40 participants who attended both sessions. A difference in 
scores was calculated by subtracting responses provided at Time One from the responses 
provided at Time Two. Therefore, positive difference scores indicate that conviction that 
the key continued to bend increased over time. Negative difference scores indicate less 
conviction that the key continued to bend when questioned at Time Two. These data are 
represented in Table 5.2. 
BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION -. 92 -. 11 -. 57 
(1.31) (1.45) (1.4) 
N= 12 N=9 N=21 
NO SUGGESTION -. 11 .5 . 
21 
(. 93) (. 71) (. 86) 
N=9 N=10 N=19 
MEAN -. 57 . 21 -. 
2 
(1.21) (1.13) (1.22) 
"f -- 11 \1 = 
19 
! `' = 
40 
Table 5.2: Mean (and standard deviation) difference in scores for Time One and Time Two, on answers to the key bending question. 
A2x2 factorial Anova demonstrated that this difference was almost significantly 
affected by condition (F (1,36) = 3.78, p= . 06) and 
belief (F (1,36) = 3.78, p =. 06), but 
that there was not a significant interaction between the two (F (1,36) = . 07, p= . 79). 
Participants in the Suggestion condition shifted more than those in the No Suggestion 
condition, and in the opposite direction - they were less likely to think that the key had 
continued to bend, while those in the No Suggestion condition were more likely to think 
it. This difference was replicated in the belief scores, with the believers changing their 
opinion more than the disbelievers, and away from the conclusion that the key continued 
to bend. 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present the mean scores for each of the two instances of data 
collection, according to condition. The nonsignificant interaction between condition and 
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belief justifies the use of two further Anovas, examining the effect of belief when 
separated by condition. A2x2 mixed Anova for participants in the Suggestion 
condition showed a significant effect of belief (F (1,19) = 4.86, p= . 
04) and an almost 
significant effect of time (F (1,19) = 3.64, p= . 
07), but no significant interaction 
between the two (F (1,19) = 1.77, p= . 
2). The disbelievers showed greater levels of 
conviction that the key continued to bend than the believers, and this belief was higher 
at Time One than Time Two. A second 2x2 mixed Anova examining the No 
Suggestion condition showed nonsignificant effects of belief (F (1,17) = 2.34, p= . 14) 
and time (F (1,17) = 1.26, p= . 28). The 
interaction between the two variables was also 
not significant (F (1,17) = 2.64, p= . 12). 
SUGGESTION BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
TIME ONE 3.43 4.56 3.86 
(2.03) (2.24) (2.03) 
N= 12 N=9 N=21 
TIME TWO 2.42 4.44 3.29 
(1.24) (2.01) (1.88) 
N= 12 N=9 N=2I 
MEAN 2.88 4.5 3.57 
'' 38) (2) (1.83) 
N= 12 N=9 N=21 
Table 5.3: Comparison of mean (and standard deviation) responses to the key bending question at Time One and Time Two, for 
participants in the Suggestion condition. 
NO SUGGESTION BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
TIME ONE 2.33 1.4 1.84 
(1.23) (. 7) (1.1) 
N=9 N=10 N= 19 
TIME TWO 2.22 1.9 2.05 
(. 97) (. 99) (. 97) 
N=9 N=10 N=19 
MEAN 2.28 1.65 1.95 
(1.01) (. 78) (. 93) 
N=9 N= 10 N= 19 
Table 5.4: Comparison of mean (and standard deviation) responses to the key bending question at Time One and Time Two, for 
participants in the No Suggestion condition. 
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Confidence 
For each question asked, participants also recorded their confidence in their answers on 
a seven-point scale. Confidence for answers to the key bending question was examined. 
A2x2 factorial Anova conducted on the data recorded immediately after viewing the 
video showed no significant effect of belief (F (1,42) = . 2.64, p= . 11), and also no 
significant effect of condition (F (1,42) = . 29, p= . 59). There was an interaction 
approaching significance between condition and belief (F (1,42) = 3.74, p= . 06). Thus, 
participants' responses were not influenced individually by the presence of suggestion 
or their belief in the paranormal, but when these factors combined, they may have had 
an effect. This was a result of the disbelievers in the Suggestion condition being less 
confident than those in the No Suggestion condition, while the believers in the 
Suggestion condition were more confident than their counterparts in the No Suggestion 
condition. Table 5.5 presents the confidence ratings immediately after viewing the 
video. 
TIME ONE BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION 5.57 5.44 5.52 
(155) (1.42) (1 47' 
N= 14 N=9 N=23 
NO SUGGESTION 5 6.46 5.83 
(1.63) (. 78) (1.4) 
N=10 N= 13 N=23 
MEAN 5.33 6.05 5.67 
(1.58) (1.17) (1.43) 
N=24 N=22 N=46 
Table 5.5: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant confidence on the key bending question at Time One, separated by 
belief and suggestion. 
Confidence was also examined with regard to whether participants answered Yes (a 
score of 5,6 or 7 on the seven-point scale), No (a score of 1,2, or 3) or Uncertain (a 
score of 4) to the key bending question. A factorial Anova showed no significant 
difference in the confidence of the three groups (F (2,45) = . 03, p= . 97). A comparison 
of those answering Yes and No (i. e. a comparison of false and actual memories) was 
also not significant (F (1,40) = . 
05, p= . 83). Table 5.6 presents the confidence ratings 
separated by response to the key bending question. 
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YES UNCERTAIN NO 
TIME ONE 5.6 5.6 5.71 
(1.08) (1.94) (1.49) 
N=10 N=5 N=31 
i aoie : ). o: Mean scores (and standard deviations) tor participant contidence on the key bending question, separated by their 
responses to the preceding question. 
Difference over time 
Again, data collected at Time One and Time Two were compared in order to assess 
whether the responses changed over time. Positive difference scores indicate that 
confidence increased over time. Negative difference scores indicate less confidence at 
Time Two. This difference in scores is shown in Table 5.7. 
BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION -. 17 -. 22 -. 19 
(1.95) (1.48) (1.72) 
N= 12 N=9 N=21 
NO SUGGESTION -. 56 -. 6 -. 58 
(. 53) (7) (. 61) 
N=9 N= 10 N= 19 
MEAN -. 33 -. 42 -. 38 
"E49) t; 1; )i 91.3fß 
N=21 
1 
N=19 
[ 
N=40 
Table 5.7: Mean (and standard deviation) difference in confidence scores for Time One and Time Two. 
A2x2 factorial Anova demonstrated that the difference in scores was not significantly 
affected by condition (F (1,36) = . 79, p= .3 
8) or belief (F (1,36) _ . 01, p= . 9), and that 
there was not a significant interaction between the two (F (1,36) = . 01, p= . 98). 
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 present the mean scores for each of the two instances of data 
collection, according to condition. Again, two further 2x2 mixed Anovas were 
conducted. In the Suggestion condition, there were nonsignificant effects of belief (F (1, 
19) = . 02, p= . 
88) and time (F (1,19) = . 24, p= . 63), and a nonsignificant 
interaction 
between the two variables (F (1,19) = . 01, p= . 94) . In the No Suggestion condition, 
there were significant effects of belief (F (1,17) = 5.62, p= . 
03) and time (F (1,17) = 
16.35, p= . 001), 
but no significant interaction between the two variables (F (1,17) = 
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. 
02, p= . 88). Disbelievers were more confident 
in their answers than believers, and both 
sets of participants were more confident at Time One than Time Two. 
SUGGESTION BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
TIME ONE 5.57 5.44 5.38 
(1.56) (1.42) (1.47) 
N= 12 N=9 N=21 
TIME TWO 5.17 5.22 5.19 
(1.85) (. 97) (1.5) 
N= 12 N=9 N=21 
MEAN 5.25 5.33 5.29 
(1.41) (. 97) (1.21) 
N= 12 N=9 N=21 
Table 5.8: Comparison of mean (and standard deviation) confidence for the key bending question at Time One and Time Two, for 
participants in the Suggestion condition. 
NO SUGGESTION BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
TIME ONE 5 6.46 5.83 
(1.63) (. 78) (1.4) 
N=9 N=10 N=19 
TIME TWO 4.33 5.8 5.11 
(1.8) (1.14) (1.63) 
N=9 N= IO N= 19 
MEAN -1.61 " '" 4 
(1.73) (. 94) (1.53) 
N=9 N=10 N=19 
Table 5.9: Comparison of mean (and standard deviation) confidence for the key bending question at Time One and Time Two, for 
participants in the No Suggestion condition. 
Paranormality ratings 
Participants' belief in the paranormality of the key bending was measured by their 
response to the paranormality question "Do you think that the bending of the key was 
paranormal? ". This was measured on a seven-point scale where 1 indicated `Definitely 
No' and 7 indicated `Definitely Yes'. A2x2 factorial Anova was conducted on the data 
provided immediately after viewing the video, and this showed no effect of suggestion 
(F (1,42) = 1.09, p= . 3), 
but an effect approaching significance of belief in the 
paranormal (F (1,42) = 3.43, p= . 
07). Believers gave higher paranormality ratings than 
the disbelievers did. There was no interaction between the two variables (F (1,42) = . 97, 
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p= . 33). Table 5.10 gives the mean paranormality ratings 
for data provided immediately 
after viewing the video. 
BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION 3.43 3 3.26 
(1.79) (1.8) (1.76) 
N=14 N=9 N=23 
NO SUGGESTION 3.4 2 2.61 
(1.27) (1.63) (1.62) 
N=10 N=13 N=23 
MEAN 3.42 2.41 2.94 
(1.56) (1.74) (1.71) 
N=24 N=22 N=46 
Table 5.10: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant responses to the paranormality question at Time One, separated by 
belief and condition. 
Difference over time 
Data collected at Time One and Time Two were compared in order to assess whether 
the responses changed over time. Positive difference scores indicate that paranormality 
ratings increased over time. Negative difference scores indicate lower paranormality 
ratings at Time Two. This difference in scores is shown in Table 5.11. 
BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION -. 5 -. 22 -. 38 
(1.62) (1.2) (1.43) 
N= 12 N=9 N=21 
NO SUGGESTION -. 44 0 -. 21 
(. 73) (. 47) (. 63) 
N=9 N= 10 N= 19 
MEAN -. 48 -. 11 -. 3 
(1.29) (. 88) (1.11) 
N=21 N=19 N=40 
Table 5.11: Mean (and standard deviation) difference tor participant responses to the paranormalny question for i ime one ana i ime 
Two. 
A2x2 factorial Anova demonstrated that the difference in scores was not significantly 
affected by condition (F (1,3 6) = . 15, p= . 
1) or belief (F (1,3 6) _ . 99, p= .3 
3), and that 
there was not a significant interaction between the two (F (1,36) _ . 
05, p= . 82). 
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Tables 5.12 and 5.13 present the mean scores for each of the two instances of data 
collection, according to condition. A2x2 mixed Anova conducted on the data for the 
Suggestion condition showed no significant effect of belief (F (1,19) = . 
16, p= . 7) or 
time (F (1,19) = 1.4, p= . 
25) and no significant interaction between the two variables (F 
(1,19) = 19, p= . 67). In the No 
Suggestion condition there was also no significant effect 
of belief (F (1,17) = 1.43, p= . 
25) or time (F (1,17) = 2.3, p= . 
15) and no significant 
interaction between the two variables (F (1,17) = 2.56, p= . 13). 
SUGGESTION BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
TIME ONE 3.43 3 3.24 
(1.79) (1.8) (1.79) 
N= 12 N=9 N=21 
TIME TWO 2.92 2.78 2.86 
(1.93) (1.3) (1.65) 
N= 12 N=9 N=21 
MEAN 3.17 2.89 3.05 
(1.7) (1.45) (1.56) 
N= 12 N=9 N=21 
I able S. 12: Comparison of mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant responses to the paranormality question at Time 
One and Time Two, for participants in the Suggestion condition. 
NO SUGGESTION BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
TIME ONE 3.4 2 2.61 
(1.27) (1.63) (1.62) 
N=9 N=10 N= 19 
TIME TWO 2.89 2.3 2.58 
(. 93) (1.77) (1.43) 
N=9 N= 10 N= 19 
MEAN 3.11 2.3 2.68 
(1.08) (1.75) (1.49) 
N=9 N=10 N=19 
Table 5.13: Comparison of mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant responses to the paranormality question at Time 
One and Time Two, for participants in the No Suggestion condition. 
DISCUSSION OF STUDY 5.1 
The results for this study supported the hypothesis that participants in the Suggestion 
condition would show a greater degree of belief that the key had continued to bend after 
being placed on the table in both sets of responses. Initially, there was no effect of 
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paranormal belief, with disbelievers and believers showing the same degree of 
conviction that the key had continued to bend. This was contrary to the hypothesis that 
participants who believed in the paranormal would show greater belief that the key 
would continue to bend. 
An analysis of the shift in responses after two weeks demonstrated that there were 
nearly significant effects of both belief and suggestion. The believers showed greater 
movement in responses than the disbelievers, and the Suggestion participants shifted 
more than the No Suggestion participants. However, both the believers and the 
participants in the Suggestion condition shifted their responses away from indicating 
that the key continued to bend. This was in contrast to the disbelievers and those in the 
No Suggestion condition, who showed slight shifts towards the conviction that the key 
continued to bend. 
In the Suggestion condition, the disbelievers gave significantly higher responses to the 
key bending question than the believers at both times of questioning. There was also 
nearly a significant effect of time in the Suggestion condition, with participants showing 
greater belief that the key had continued to bend at Time One than Time Two. These 
effects were not evident in the No Suggestion condition, where responses were equal 
across belief and time. 
Participants' confidence in their responses was not directly affected by either 
paranormal belief or the presence of suggestion when questioned immediately 
afterwards. There was, however, an interaction approaching significance between the 
two variables, with disbelievers in the Suggestion condition showing less confidence 
than disbelievers in the No Suggestion condition, and believers in the Suggestion 
condition showing more confidence than believers in the No Suggestion condition. 
There was no difference between believers and disbelievers, and Suggestion and No 
Suggestion participants when assessing the shift in confidence after two weeks. There 
was also no effect of belief or time on confidence in the Suggestion condition. However, 
in the No Suggestion condition the disbelievers showed more confidence than the 
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believers at both times of questioning. There was also a significant effect of time, with 
participants showing less confidence after two weeks. 
The hypothesis that participants who indicated false memories (i. e. that the key 
continued to bend) would be less confident that those reporting accurately was not 
supported, as confidence was equal across these groups. 
When participants were asked immediately after viewing the video if they thought the 
bending of the key was paranormal, there was a nearly significant effect of belief. The 
participants who believed in the paranormal showed greater conviction that the key bend 
was paranormal. This is in accordance with the hypothesis. There was no effect of 
suggestion in responses to the paranormality question. There was also no difference 
between the shifts in group responses after two weeks, and no effects of belief or time in 
either the Suggestion or No Suggestion conditions. This was contrary to the hypothesis 
that participants who believed in the paranormal would show greater belief that the key 
bend was paranormal after two weeks. 
Responses to the key bending question showed support for the hypothesis that the 
presence of misleading suggestion would cause participants to express more conviction 
that the key continued to bend when questioned immediately after seeing the video. 
However, the hypothesis that belief would also affect response immediately afterwards 
was not supported. There was some support for the hypothesis that time would affect 
participants' responses, but this was not in the predicted direction. Acceptance of the 
suggestion was not greater after two weeks, and the believers were no more likely to say 
that the key had continued to bend than the disbelievers. 
An interesting feature of the confidence ratings is that there is no significant difference 
in confidence for true and false memories. When questioned immediately after viewing 
the video, participants with false memories (i. e. they believed that the key had continued 
to bend after being placed on the table) were only slightly less confident than 
participants with true memories (i. e. they stated that the key did not continue to bend). 
138 
These findings are contrary to the established research, and the hypothesis that 
participants with false memories would be significantly less confident than those with 
true memories. 
The results from this study were both unexpected and somewhat unclear. As a 
consequence of this, it was decided to attempt a replication of the study. 
STUDY 5.2 
Study 5.2 was an exact replication of the previous study using the same key bend video. 
The aim in conducting the study was to provide a clarification of the previous results; 
specifically, why the disbelievers were more accepting of the suggestion than the 
believers. 
METHOD 
Design 
The study used a2x2x2 mixed design. Factor One examined whether suggestion 
would influence participants' recollection of a video that they had viewed. This was a 
between-subjects variable with two levels - the presence or absence of suggestion. 
There were two conditions: Suggestion, in which participants viewed a video containing 
the suggestion that a key continued to bend after being placed on a table, and No 
Suggestion, in which participants viewed a video that did not contain this suggestion. 
Factor Two examined the effect of paranormal belief on memory of the video and was a 
between-subjects variable. Participants were split into two groups - disbelievers and 
believers - according to their responses on the Belief in the Paranormal Questionnaire. 
Factor Three investigated the effect of time on recollection. This was a within-subjects 
variable with two conditions: Time One (immediately after viewing the video), and 
Time Two (two weeks after viewing the video). 
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Three dependent variables (DV) were collected both times that the participants were 
questioned. The first DV measured the extent to which participants accepted the 
statement that the key had continued to bend. This was assessed by participant 
agreement (rated on a seven-point scale -1= `Definitely No' and 7= `Definitely Yes') 
with the key bending question, which read: `After the key was placed on the table, it 
continued to bend'. The hypothesis was that participants in the Suggestion condition, 
and participants who believed in the paranormal, would be significantly more sure that 
the key continued to bend. 
The second DV assessed participants' confidence in the accuracy of their answer to the 
key bending question. This was measured on a seven-point scale (1 = `Not at all 
confident' and 7= `Very confident'). It was hypothesised that participants who had 
reported false memories on the key bending question (i. e. that the key had continued to 
bend) would be less confident than those who reported true memories. 
The third DV measured the degree to which participants believed that the key bending 
was paranormal. This was recorded on a seven-point scale (1 = `Definitely No', 7= 
`Definitely Yes') registering answers to the question `Do you think that the bending of 
the key was paranormal? '. It was hypothesised that participants who believed in the 
paranormal would provide higher ratings than participants who did not. 
Participants 
100 participants were run in Study 5.2, of which 39 were male and 61 female. The mean 
age was 22.15 (std. dev. 5.44, with a range of 18-48). In the Suggestion condition 22 
were male and 30 female with a mean age of 22.21 (std. dev. 5.55, range of 18-48), and 
in the No Suggestion condition 17 were male and 31 female with a mean age of 22.08 
(std. dev. 5.38, range of 18-41). 
25 of these participants returned two weeks later, of whom 5 were male and 20 female. 
The mean age was 20.8 (std. dev. 3.3, with a range of 18-34). In the Suggestion 
condition, 2 were male and 8 female with a mean age of 20.2 (std. dev. 2.04, range of 
140 
18-25), and in the No Suggestion condition 3 were male and 12 female with a mean age 
of 21.2 (std. dev. 3.95, range of 18-34). 
Materials 
The materials were the same as those used in Study 5.1. 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as that of Study 5.1. However, in this study, returning after 
two weeks was voluntary. Consequently, the return rate was very low. 
RESULTS 
Participants' scores on the two Belief in the Paranormal Questions covering 
psychokinesis were used to classify them as believers or disbelievers. The scores ranged 
from 2 (strong sceptic) to 14 (strong believer) (mean score was 7.14, std. dev. 3.2). 
Responses were split along the median -7 and under were classified as disbelievers (N 
= 51; mean score = 4.49, std. dev. 1.65), 8 and above were classified as believers (N = 
49; mean score = 9.9, std. dev. 1.74). 
Response to the key bending question 
Participants' answers to the key bending question on the Response Questionnaire ('After 
the key was placed on the table, it continued to bend') were used to measure their 
acceptance of the suggestion. This was recorded twice, immediately after viewing the 
video, and two weeks later. The data for participant responses in both Suggestion and 
No Suggestion conditions immediately after viewing the video are shown in Table 5.14. 
A2x2 factorial Anova was conducted on the data recorded immediately after viewing 
the video, and this showed no significant effect of belief (F (1,96) = . 39, p= . 53), 
but 
there was a significant effect of condition (F (1,96) = 26.44, p= . 0001), with 
participants in the Suggestion condition showing greater conviction that the key 
continued to bend. Thus, participants' responses were influenced by the presence of 
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suggestion, but not by their belief in the paranormal. There was no significant 
interaction between condition and belief (F (1,96) = . 
16, p= . 68). 
TIME ONE BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION 3.87 3.95 3.90 
(2.19) (2.46) (2.27) 
N=31 N=21 N=52 
NO SUGGESTION 1.78 2.17 2.02 
(1.01) (1.21) (1.14) 
N= 18 N=30 N=48 
MEAN 3.10 2.9 3 
(2.09) (2.01) (2.05) 
N=49 N=51 N= 100 
I able 5.14: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant responses to the key bending question at Time One, separated by 
belief and suggestion. 
Difference over time 
The data collected at Time One and Time Two were compared, in order to assess 
whether the responses changed over time. This analysis was conducted only on the 
responses provided by the 25 participants who attended both sessions. A difference in 
scores was calculated by subtracting responses provided at Time One from the responses 
provided at Time Two. Positive scores indicate increased conviction that the key 
continued to bend when questioned at Time Two. Negative scores indicate less 
conviction over time. Table 5.15 records this data. 
BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION -. 5 -. 5 -. 5 
(2.08) (1.64) (1.72) 
N=4 N=6 N=10 
NO SUGGESTION 0 -. 17 -. 07 
(1.58) (2.64) (1.98) 
N=9 N=6 N= 15 
MEAN -. 15 -. 33 -. 24 
(1.68) (2.1) (1.86) 
N= 13 N= 12 N=25 
Table 5.15: Mean (and standard deviation) difference in scores for Time One and Time Two, on answers to the key bending 
question. 
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A2x2 factorial Anova demonstrated that this difference was not significantly affected 
by condition (F (1,21) = . 
26, p= . 
62) or belief (F (1,21) = 01, p= . 92), and there was 
not a significant interaction between the two (F (1,21) = . 01, p= . 92). Tables 5.16 and 
5.17 present the mean scores for each of the two instances of data collection, according 
to condition. 
SUGGESTION BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
TIME ONE 3.25 5.83 4.8 
(1.5) (1.47) (1.93) 
N=4 N=6 N=10 
TIME TWO 2.75 5.33 4.3 
(2.87) (2.36) (2.75) 
N=4 N=6 N= 10 
MEAN 3 5.58 4.55 
(2.04) (1.77) (2.22) 
N=4 N=6 N=10 
Table 5.16: Comparison of mean (and standard deviation) responses to the key bending question at Time One and lime l wo, for 
participants in the Suggestion condition. 
Two 2x2 mixed Anovas examined the data for the Suggestion and No Suggestion 
conditions. In the Suggestion condition, there was an. effect approaching significance of 
belief (F (1,8) = 4.54, p= . 07), 
but no effect of time (F (1,8) = . 76, p= . 
41) and no 
interaction between the two variables (F (1,8) = . 01, p= . 
99). The disbelievers gave 
higher mean ratings than the believers. In the No Suggestion condition, there was no 
effect of belief (F (1,13) = . 003, p= . 
96), time (F (1,13) = . 02, p= . 
9) and no 
interaction between the variables (F (1,13) = . 02, p= . 
88). 
NO SUGGESTION BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
TIME ONE 1.89 2 1.93 
(1.05) (. 89) (. 96) 
N=9 N=6 N= 15 
TIME TWO 1.89 1.83 1.87 
(1.45) (2.04) (1.64) 
N=9 N=6 N= 15 
MEAN 1.89 1.92 1.9 
(. 99) (. 86) (. 91) 
N=9 N=6 N= 15 
Table 5.17: Comparison of mean (and standard deviation) responses to the key bending question at lime One and lime t wo, tor 
participants in the No Suggestion condition. 
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Confidence 
For each question asked, participants also recorded their confidence in their answers on 
a seven-point scale. Confidence for answers to the key bending question was examined. 
A2x2 factorial Anova conducted on the data recorded immediately after viewing the 
video showed no significant effect of belief (F (1,96) = . 71, p= . 
4), but a significant 
effect of condition (F (1,96) = 15.11, p= . 
0002), with participants in the Suggestion 
condition showing greater confidence than those in the No Suggestion condition. Thus, 
participants' responses were not influenced by their belief in the paranormal, but were 
strongly influenced by the presence of suggestion. There was no significant interaction 
between condition and belief (F (1,96) = 1.22, p= . 27). The mean confidence 
for the 
key bending question immediately after viewing the video are shown in Table 5.18. 
TIME ONE BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION 6 6.1 6.04 
(1.18) (1.45) (1.28) 
N=31 N=21 N=52 
NO SUGGESTION 5 4.3 4.56 
(2.03) (2.2) (2.14) 
N= 18 N=30 N=48 
MEAN 5.63 5.04 5.3_i 
(1.6) (2.11) (1.89) 
N=49 N=51 N= 100 
Table 5.18: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant confidence on the key bending question at Time One, separated by 
belief and suggestion. 
Participants were separated by response to the key bending question. Participants who 
gave ratings of 1-3 were classified as having answered No, ratings of 4 were classified 
as Uncertain and ratings of 5-7 were classified as Yes. A factorial Anova showed a 
nonsignificant difference in the confidence of the three groups (F (2,99) = 2.64, p= 
. 08). A comparison of those answering 
Yes and No (i. e. a comparison of false and actual 
memories) was approaching significance (F (1.80) = 3.2, p= . 07). Participants who 
responded Yes to the statement were more confident than those who responded No. 
Table 5.19 shows the confidence ratings separated by response to the key bending 
question. 
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YES UNCERTAIN NO 
TIME ONE 6.1 4.73 5.27 
(1.24) (2.2) (1.9) 
N= 19 N= 19 N=62 
Table 5.19: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant confidence on the key bending question, separated by their 
responses to the preceding question. 
Difference over time 
Again, data collected at Time One and Time Two were compared in order to assess 
whether the responses changed over time. Positive scores indicate more confidence at 
Time Two, negative scores indicate less confidence at Time Two. These data are shown 
in Table 5.20. 
BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION 
. 75 . 
33 
.5 
(1.5) (1.63) (1.51) 
N=4 N=6 N=10 
NO SUGGESTION -. 44 . 
83 
. 
07 
(2.01) (1.6) (1.91) 
N=9 N=6 N= 15 
MEAN -. 08 . 58 . 
24 
r: A9) (1.56) (1 7'. ' 
N= 13 N= 12 N=25 
Table 5.20: Mean (and standard deviation) difference in confidence scores for Time One and Time Two. 
A2x2 factorial Anova demonstrated that the difference in scores was not significantly 
affected by condition (F (1,21) = . 22, p= . 64) or 
belief (F (1,21) = . 34, p= . 56), and 
that there was not a significant interaction between the two (F (1,21) = 1.3, p= . 26). 
Tables 5.21 and 5.22 present the mean scores for each of the two instances of data 
collection, according to condition. 
A2x2 mixed Anova conducted on the data for the Suggestion condition showed no 
effect of belief (F (1,8) = . 16, p= . 
7), time (F (1,8) = 1.0, p= . 
35) and no interaction 
between the variables (F (1,8) = . 17, p= . 
69). A second 2x2 mixed Anova conducted 
on the data for the No Suggestion condition showed no effect of belief (F (1,13) = 3.07, 
p= . 
1), time (F (1,13) = . 02, p= . 89) and no 
interaction between the variables (F (1,13) 
= 1.7, p=. 22). 
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SUGGESTION BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
TIME ONE 5.5 5.33 5.4 
(1.29) (2.25) (1.84) 
N=4 N=6 N=10 
TIME TWO 6.25 5.67 5.9 
(. 96) (1.51) (1.29) 
N=4 N=6 N=10 
MEAN 5.88 5.5 5.65 
(. 85) (1.73) (1.4) 
N=4 N=6 N= 10 
Table 5.21: Comparison of mean (and standard deviation) confidence for the key bending question at Time One and Time Two, for 
participants in the Suggestion condition. 
NO SUGGESTION BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
TIME ONE 4.44 5.17 4.73 
(2.01) (1.6) (1.83) 
N=9 N=6 N= 15 
TIME TWO 4 6 4.8 
(1.87) (1.1) (1.86) 
N=9 N=6 N= 15 
MEAN 4.22 5.58 4.77 
(1.66) (1.11) (1.58) 
N=9 N=6 N= 15 
Table 5.22: Comparison of mean (and standard deviation) confidence for the key bending question at Time One and lime Iwo, for 
participants in the No Suggestion condition. 
Paranormality ratings 
Participants' belief in the paranormality of the key bending was measured by their 
response to the paranormality question "Do you think that the bending of the key was 
paranormal? ". This was measured on a seven-point scale where 1 indicated `Definitely 
No' and 7 indicated `Definitely Yes'. A2x2 factorial Anova was conducted on the data 
provided immediately after viewing the video, and this showed no effect of suggestion 
(F (1,96) = . 48, p= . 
49), but a significant effect of belief in the paranormal (F (1,96) = 
10.86, p= . 
00 1). As with Study 5.1, believers gave higher paranormality ratings than the 
disbelievers did. There was no interaction between the two variables (F (1,96) = . 04, p 
= . 
98). Table 5.23 gives the mean paranormality ratings for data provided immediately 
after viewing the video. 
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BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION 3.32 2.33 2.92 
(1.35) (1.59) (1.52) 
N=31 N=21 N=52 
NO SUGGESTION 3.11 2.13 2.5 
(1.78) (1.22) (1.52) 
N=18 N=30 N=48 
MEAN 3.25 2.22 2.72 
(1.51) (1.38) (1.53) 
N=49 N=51 N= 100 
i able mean scores (ana stanctara deviations) tor participant responses to the paranormality question at Time One, separated by 
belief and condition. 
Difference over time 
A2x2 factorial Anova demonstrated that the difference in scores was significantly 
affected by condition (F (1,21) = 4.94, p= . 04), 
but not belief (F (1,21) = . 1, p= . 75), 
and that there was not a significant interaction between the two (F (1,21) = . 1, p= . 75). 
Participants in the Suggestion condition changed their scores more than those in the No 
Suggestion condition, and away from the possibility that the key bend was paranormal. 
The difference scores are shown in Table 5.24. 
BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION -1 -1 -1 
(. 82) (1.1) (. 94) 
N=4 N=6 N=10 
NO SUGGESTION 0 . 
33 
. 13 
(1.73) (. 52) (1.36) 
N=9 N=6 N= 15 
MEAN -. 31 -. 33 -. 32 
(1.55) (1.07) (1.31) 
N= 13 N= 12 N=25 
Table 5.24: Mean (and standard deviation) difference in paranormality scores tör 1'ime One and l ime 7 wo. 
Tables 5.25 and 5.26 present the mean scores for each of the two instances of data 
collection, according to condition. A2x2 mixed Anova conducted on the data for the 
Suggestion condition found no effect of belief (F (1,8) = . 28, p= . 
61), but a significant 
effect of time (F (1,8) = 10, p= . 01). 
Participants rated the key bend as more 
paranormal at Time One. There was no significant interaction between the two variables 
(F (1,8) _ . 
01, p= . 
99). A2x2 mixed Anova conducted on the No Suggestion data 
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found no effect of belief (F (1,13) = 1.09, p= .3 1), time (F (1,13) = 1.37, p= . 72, and 
no interaction between the two variables (F (1,13) = . 
21, p= . 
66). 
SUGGESTION BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
TIME ONE 3.75 3.17 3.4 
(2.06) (2.04) (1.96) 
N=4 N=6 N=10 
TIME TWO 2.75 2.17 2.4 
(1.5) (1.47) (1.43) 
N=4 N=6 N= 10 
MEAN 3.25 2.67 2.9 
(1.76) (1.69) (1.65) 
N=4 N=6 N=10 
Table 5.25: Comparison of mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant responses to the paranormality question at Times 
One and Two, for participants in the Suggestion condition. 
NO SUGGESTION BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
TIME ONE 2.78 1.83 2.4 
(1.48) (1.33) (1.45) 
N=9 N=6 N= 15 
TIME TWO 2.78 2.17 2.53 
(1.79) (1.6) (1.69) 
N=9 N=6 N= 15 
MEAN 2.78 2 2.47 
(1.39) (1.45) (1.42) 
N=9 N=6 N= 15 
Table 5.26: Comparison of mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant responses to the paranormality question at Times 
One and Two, for participants in the No Suggestion condition. 
DISCUSSION OF STUDY 5.2 
The hypothesis that participants in the Suggestion condition would show greater levels 
of belief that the key continued to bend was supported. However, there was no effect of 
belief in the paranormal, contrary to the hypothesis that participants with greater 
paranormal belief would show more conviction that the key continued to bend. This 
positive effect of suggestion and lack of belief effect are in accordance with the results 
obtained in Study 5.1. 
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There was no effect of either belief or suggestion on shift in responses after two weeks. 
In the Suggestion condition, there was an effect approaching significance of belief, with 
the disbelievers showing more belief that the key continued to bend than the believers. 
However, there was no effect of time in either the Suggestion or No Suggestion 
conditions, and no effect of belief in the No Suggestion condition. Therefore, the 
hypothesis that believers and participants in the Suggestion condition would show more 
belief that the key continued to bend after two weeks than disbelievers and No 
Suggestion participants was not supported in either Study 5.1 or Study 5.2. 
When examining the confidence scores, a significant effect of suggestion was found 
immediately after viewing the video, with participants in the Suggestion condition 
showing more confidence than those in the No Suggestion condition. The interaction 
between suggestion and belief was not significant. It is worth noting, however, that the 
interaction found in Study 5.1 (where disbelievers in the Suggestion condition showed 
less confidence than disbelievers in the No Suggestion condition) was not present in 
Study 5.2. Instead, disbelievers in the Suggestion condition showed greater confidence 
than those in the No Suggestion condition. 
There was no effect of belief or suggestion on the shift in scores after two weeks, and 
neither the Suggestion nor the No Suggestion condition showed effects of belief or time. 
There was also no overall difference in confidence between participants who had 
answered Yes, No or Uncertain on the key bending question. However, there was an 
effect approaching significance when Yes and No responses were examined. 
Participants who had answered Yes showed more confidence than those who had 
answered No. This is contrary to the hypothesis that participants with accurate memories 
(i. e. those who answered No to the key bending question) would be more confident than 
those with inaccurate memories. 
As with Study 5.1, the paranormality ratings provided by the participants show an 
almost significant effect of belief. The believers give higher responses to the 
paranormality question than the disbelievers. This is in accordance with the hypothesis. 
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It must be noted, however, that as with Study 5.1 no groups of participants show strong 
belief that the key bend was actually paranormal. There was no effect of suggestion 
upon responses to the paranormality question. 
When examining the shift in responses over time, no effect of belief was found. There 
was a significant effect of suggestion, with participants in the Suggestion condition 
showing greater change in responses than those in the No Suggestion condition. 
However, the Suggestion participants shifted towards more negative responses, whilst 
the No Suggestion participants gave more positive responses. 
In the Suggestion condition, there was no effect of belief on paranormality ratings, but 
there was an effect of time. Participants gave higher ratings at Time One than Time 
Two. There was no effect of either belief or time on paranormality ratings in the No 
Suggestion condition. Contrary to the hypothesis, participants did not increase their 
belief in the paranormality of the key bend over time. 
The results for responses collected after two weeks are difficult to assess due to the 
extremely low response rate, but they do show broadly the same pattern as that 
witnessed in Study 5.1. Immediately after viewing the video, there was a strong effect of 
suggestion, but little effect of belief on answers to the key bending question and 
confidence. Belief did affect paranormality ratings, but suggestion did not in either 
study. Responses did not vary greatly over time for either of the three dependent 
variables, but where they did, the responses were lower for Time Two than Time One. 
Studies 5.1 and 5.2 appear to provide some support for the multiple-trace theories of 
misinformation and false memory. Participants do appear to be accepting the suggestion 
that the key continued to bend, and this misinformation effect was still present two 
weeks later. However, contrary to expectations, there was no increase in acceptance of 
the suggestion after two weeks. With both studies, the confidence data did not support 
the hypothesis that participants with false memories would be less confident than those 
with true memories. This raises the issue of whether the questions that the participants 
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are being asked really assess their memories, and whether the responses recorded 
actually represent what the participants remember. This could also provide an alternative 
explanation for the tendency of disbelievers to appear to accept a suggestion 
contradictory to their beliefs. Does a positive response to the statement "After the key 
was placed on the table it continued to bend" really reflect a participant's belief that they 
have seen this event, or rather indicate a recollection that this is what they were told? 
The strategic effects explanation for the misinformation effect states that an effect of 
suggestion does not indicate that the participants have actually believed the misleading 
information. Instead, they could simply be providing the answer that is consistent with 
what they have been told, or they could be guessing the answer or providing the 
information they think that the experimenter wants (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). In 
order to examine whether the during-event suggestion in the present study was actually 
affecting perception, a third study was designed. In this, participants would receive one 
of two different questionnaires, either the original presented to participants in the first 
two studies, or a new one asking participants to state specifically whether they saw the 
key continuing to bend. 
STUDY5.3 
INTRODUCTION TO STUDY 5.3 
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) questioned the traditional methods of assessing 
acceptance of suggestion. They commented that a difference in recollection between a 
control group and a group receiving a suggestion is not necessarily evidence that the 
memories of the experimental group have been substantially altered. They indicated that 
the experimental group will always perform worse than the control group when 
questioned on misleading information, as they have received and encoded information 
that the control group has not. It is also possible that participants may be responding in 
the way they think the experimenter expects, or simply guessing their answers. 
Therefore, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) indicated that apparent acceptance of 
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suggestion is not necessarily proof of memory impairment. This is known as the 
`strategic effects' explanation of misinformation. This assertion was challenged by other 
researchers (e. g. Tversky & Tuchin, 1989). However, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) 
make a valid point - in order to draw conclusions from the false memory research, it is 
vital to ensure that false memories are actually being examined. As a consequence of 
this, many researchers have employed techniques that can demonstrate both memory 
impairment and misjudgment (e. g. Belli, 1989). 
Additionally, Loftus (1996, in a review of the area) demonstrates that the wording of a 
questionnaire can have an strong influence on the information that is recalled. For 
instance, asking participants whether they saw `a' broken headlight, as opposed `the' 
broken headlight, can have significant effects on both accuracy and confidence of recall. 
Further, asking how small a person is (as opposed to how tall they are) produces 
significantly lower estimates of height, and asking how fast cars were going when they 
`hit' each other elicits lower estimates than using the words `smashed' or 'collided'. 
Consequently, it can be seen that a participant's response to a question is not necessarily 
an objective response based on their memory - it may be a subjective response based on 
the wording of the question. 
Study 5.3 adapted this concept in order to assess whether participants were reporting 
what they had actually seen in the key bending video, or were merely repeating what the 
performer had said. In this study, the questions were examining whether acceptance of 
the suggestion altered participants' perceptions of the event, or just the way that they 
reported it. This was achieved by giving half of the participants the original 
questionnaire (containing the statement `After the key was placed on the table, it 
continued to bend') and the other half a new questionnaire stating `After the key was 
placed on the table, I saw it continue to bend'. If participants' perceptions of events 
were altered by the suggestion, they would give equal responses to both questionnaires. 
However, if the participants were not reporting what they actually believed they had 
seen, the new questionnaire would receive substantially lower mean ratings. 
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METHOD 
Design 
The study used a2x2x2 design. Factor One examined whether suggestion would 
influence participants' recollection of a video that they had viewed. This was a between- 
subjects variable with two conditions: Suggestion, in which participants viewed a video 
containing the suggestion that a key continued to bend after being placed on a table, and 
No Suggestion, in which participants viewed a video that did not contain this 
suggestion. Factor Two examined the effect of paranormal belief on memory of the 
video and was a between-subjects variable. Participants were split into two groups - 
disbelievers and believers - according to their responses on the Belief in the Paranormal 
Questionnaire. Factor Three examined the effect of question wording on response. This 
was a between-subjects variable with two conditions: Continued where participants 
responded to the statement `After the key was placed on the table, it continued to bend', 
and I Saw, where participants responded to the statement `After the key was placed on 
the table, I saw it continue to bend'. 
Three dependent variables (DV) were collected. The first DV measured the extent to 
which participants accepted the statement that the key had continued to bend. This was 
assessed by participant agreement (rated on a seven-point scale -1= `Definitely No' 
and 7= `Definitely Yes') with the key bending question. The hypotheses were that 
participants in the Suggestion condition, and participants who believed in the 
paranormal, would be significantly more sure that the key continued to bend. 
Additionally, it was hypothesised that the wording of the question would affect 
participants' responses - participants in the Continued condition would give higher 
mean responses that those in the I Saw condition. 
The second DV assessed participants' confidence in the accuracy of their answer to the 
key bending question. This was measured on a seven-point scale (1 = `Not at all 
confident' and 7= `Very confident'). It was hypothesised that participants who had 
reported false memories on the key bending question (i. e. that the key had continued to 
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bend) would be less confident than those who reported true memories, and that question 
wording would affect confidence. 
The third DV measured the degree to which participants believed that the key bending 
was paranormal. This was recorded on a seven-point scale (1 = `Definitely No', 7= 
`Definitely Yes') registering answers to the question `Do you think that the bending of 
the key was paranormal? '. It was hypothesised that participants who believed in the 
paranormal would provide higher ratings than participants who did not. 
Participants 
89 participants were run in this study. They were all undergraduate Psychology or 
Cognitive Science students at the University of Hertfordshire. 49 participants were in 
the Suggestion condition, of whom 25 received the Response Questionnaire and 24 
received the Altered Response Questionnaire. 40 Participants were in the No Suggestion 
condition, of whom 19 completed the Response Questionnaire and 21 completed the 
Altered Response Questionnaire. 
Materials 
The materials were the same as those used in Studies 5.1 and 5.2, with one addition. 
Altered Response Questionnaire (see Appendix 0) 
This was identical to the Response Questionnaire, with the exception of the key bending 
question. The wording in this questionnaire was altered to: 
`After the key was placed on the table, I saw it continue to bend'. 
Participants who received the Response Questionnaire were assigned to the Continued 
condition, and those who received the Altered Response Questionnaire were assigned to 
the I Saw condition. 
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Procedure 
Participants in this study were run in groups of up to 20 that had previously been 
assigned to either the Suggestion or No Suggestion condition. The participants 
completed the BPQ, and were then asked to make sure that they could each see the 
television screen. It was explained to them that they would be asked to complete a 
questionnaire after watching the video, so they should watch carefully. Participants were 
then shown the videotape - either the Suggestion or No Suggestion video, according to 
the assigned condition. Afterwards, they were randomly given either the Response 
Questionnaire, or the Altered Response Questionnaire (the questionnaires were given 
out alternately) and asked to complete them. Participants were then thanked for their 
time and debriefed. 
RESULTS 
Participants' score on the two Belief in the Paranormal Questions covering 
psychokinesis were used to classify them as believers or disbelievers. The scores ranged 
from 2 (strong sceptic) to 13 (strong believer) (mean score was 6.3, std. dev. 2.77). 
Participants were split along the median - those scoring 6 and under were classified as 
disbelievers (N: = 22; mean score = 4.15, std. dev. 1.44), those scoring 7 and above were 
classified as believers (N= 23; mean score 8.71, std. dev. 1.7). 
Response to the key bending question 
Participants' answers to the key bending question on the Response Questionnaire or 
Altered Response Questionnaire were used to measure their acceptance of the 
suggestion. The data for participant responses in both Suggestion/No Suggestion 
conditions for the I Saw condition are shown in Table 5.27. Table 5.28 contains the data 
for the Continued condition. Table 5.29 shows the overall means. 
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I SAW BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION 3.31 2.91 3.13 
(1.8) (1.51) (1.65) 
N= 13 N= 11 N=24 
NO SUGGESTION 2.2 2 21 
(1.03) (1.48) (1.26) 
N=10 N=lI N=21 
MEAN 2.83 2.46 2.64 
(1.59) (1.54) (1.55) 
N=23 N=22 N=45 
auic -). /. /. ivi an scares kanu stanuaru uevianons) ror participant responses to the key bending question in the I Saw condition, 
separated by belief and suggestion. 
A2x2x2 Anova was conducted on the data and this showed no significant effect of 
belief (F (1,81) = . 93, p= . 34), 
but there were significant effects of both the Suggestion 
condition (F (1,81) = 39.57, p= . 0001) and the Wording condition (F (1,81) = 6.95, p= 
. 01). Participants in the Suggestion condition gave higher responses to the question than 
those in the No Suggestion condition, and participants in the Continued condition were 
more likely to say the key continued to bend than those in the I Saw condition. Thus, 
participants' responses were influenced by the presence of suggestion and the form of 
questioning, but not by their belief in the paranormal. 
CONT. BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION 5.33 5.13 5.2 
(2.06) (1.99) (1.98) 
N=9 N= 16 N=25 
NO SUGGESTION 2.1 1.56 1.84 
(1.45) (1.01) (1.26) 
N= 10 N=9 N= 19 
MEAN 3.63 3.84 3.75 
(2.39) (2.43) (2.38) 
N= 19 N=25 N=44 
Table 5.28: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant responses to the key bending question in the Continued condition, 
separated by belief and suggestion. 
There was a significant interaction between the Suggestion and Wording conditions (F 
(1,81) = 11.65, p= . 001), with participants 
in the I Saw/Suggestion condition giving 
lower responses than those in the Continued/Suggestion condition, but participants in 
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the I Saw/No Suggestion condition giving higher responses than the Continued/No 
Suggestion condition. There were not significant interactions between Wording and 
belief (F (1,81) = . 012, p= . 913) or 
Suggestion and belief (F (1,81) = . 
01, p= . 92). 
There was no overall significant interaction between the Suggestion and Wording 
conditions and belief (F (1,81) = . 
15, p= . 7). 
BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS SUGGESTION NO MEAN 
SUGGESTION 
MEAN 3.19 3.19 4.18 1.98 3.19 
(2) (2.15) (2.09) (1.25) (2.07) 
N=42 N=47 N=49 N=40 N=89 
ante 3. L i: uveraii mean scores (ancl standard deviations) for participant responses to the key bending question, across both 
conditions. 
Confidence 
A2x2x2 Anova was conducted on the data and this showed no significant effect of 
belief (F (1,81) = 1.8 8, p= . 17), Suggestion condition (F (1,81) = 2.51, p= . 12) or 
Wording condition (F (1,81) = . 
9, p= . 
35). Participants' confidence was not influenced 
by the presence of suggestion, the form of questioning or their belief in the paranormal. 
Tables 5.30 and 5.31 show the mean confidence for the I Saw and Continued conditions. 
Table 5.32 shows the overall means. 
I SAW BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION 5 5.36 5.17 
(1.96) (1.63) (1.79) 
N=13 N=I1 N=24 
NO SUGGESTION 5.6 6.09 5.86 
(1.27) (1.58) (1.42) 
N= 10 N= 11 N=21 
MEAN 5.26 5.73 5.49 
(1.69) (1.64) (1.65) 
N=23 N=22 N=45 
Table 5.30: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant contidence for the key bending question in the I saw condition, 
separated by belief and suggestion. 
There were no significant interactions between the Suggestion and Wording conditions 
(F (1,81) = . 
09, p= . 77), Wording and 
belief (F (1,81) = . 
03, p= . 87) or 
Suggestion and 
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belief (F (1,81) = . 45, p= . 
5). There was also no significant interaction between the 
Suggestion and Wording conditions and belief (F (1,81) = . 
24, p= . 62). 
CONT. BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION 5.56 5.69 5.64 
(2.07) (1.78) (1.85) 
N=9 N= 16 N=25 
NO SUGGESTION 5.6 6.56 6.05 
(1.58) (. 53) (1.27) 
N=10 N=9 N=19 
MEAN 5.58 6 5.82 
(1.77) (1.5) (1.62) 
N= 19 N=25 N=44 
Table 5.31: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant confidence for the key bending question in the Continued 
condition, separated by belief and suggestion. 
BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS SUGGESTION NO MEAN 
SUGGESTION 
MEAN 5.4 5.87 5.41 5.95 5.65 
(1.71) (1.54) (1.81) (1.34) (1.63) 
N=42 N=47 N=49 N=40 N=89 
Table 5.32: Overall mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant confidence for the key bending question, separated by the 
Suggestion condition and belief. 
Confidence was also examined with regard to response to the key bending question. 
Participants who gave ratings of 1-3 were classified as having answered No, ratings of 
4 were classified as Uncertain and ratings of 5-7 were classified as Yes. A factorial 
Anova demonstrated a significant difference in the confidence of the three groups (F (2, 
88) = 6.19, p= . 003). However, a comparison of those answering 
Yes and No (i. e. a 
comparison of false and actual memories) was not significant (F (1.72) = . 39, p =. 53). 
Participants who were unsure whether the key had continued to bend were less 
confident, but those answering Yes and No showed confidence that was approximately 
the same. These data are shown in Table 5.33. 
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YES UNCERTAIN NO 
TIME ONE 5.76 4.44 5.98 
(1.7) (2.22) (1.2) 
N=21 N= 16 N=52 
'awwe -J-3. rvicau SCUMS kann SLanaaru UCVIauuns) pur participant commence on the key bending question, separated by their 
responses to the preceding question. 
Paranormality ratings 
Participants' belief in the paranormality of the key bending was measured by their 
response to the paranormality question "Do you think that the bending of the key was 
paranormal? ". This was measured on a seven-point scale where I indicated `Definitely 
No' and 7 indicated `Definitely Yes'. A2x2x2 factorial Anova was conducted on the 
data provided, and this showed no effect of suggestion (F (1,81) = . 83, p= . 37), no 
effect of belief in the paranormal (F (1,81) = . 57, p= . 45), and no effect of Wording 
condition (F (1,81) = . 01, p= . 91). There were no significant interactions between the 
Suggestion and Wording conditions (F (1,81) = . 01, p= . 91), Wording and belief (F (1, 
81) = . 04, p= . 85) or Suggestion and belief (F (1,81) = . 21, p= . 65). The three variables 
did not significantly interact (F (1,81) = . 04, p= . 85). 
Tables 5.34 and 5.3 5 show the mean response to the paranormality question for the I 
Saw and Continued conditions. Table 5.36 shows the overall means. 
I SAW BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION 3.46 3.18 3.33 
(1.51) (. 98) (1.27) 
N=13 N=11 N=24 
NO SUGGESTION 3.1 3 3.05 
(1.1) (2.19) (1.72) 
N=10 N= 11 N=21 
MEAN 3.3 3.09 3.3 
(1.33) (1.66) (1.49) 
N=23 N=22 N=45 
Table 5.34: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for the paranormality question in the I Saw condition, separated by belief and 
suggestion. 
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CONT. BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS MEAN 
SUGGESTION 3.67 3.13 3.32 
(1.12) (1.15) (1.15) 
N=9 N=16 N=25 
NO SUGGESTION 3.1 3 3.05 
(2.13) (2.06) (2.04) 
N=10 N=9 N= 19 
MEAN 3.37 3.08 3.21 
(1.71) (1.5) (1.58) 
N= 19 N=25 N=44 
Table 5.35: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for the paranormality question in the Continued condition, separated by belief and 
suggestion. 
BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS SUGGESTION NO MEAN 
SUGGESTION 
MEAN 3.33 3.09 3.33 3.05 3.2 
(1.49) (1.56) (1.2) (1.85) (1.52) 
N=42 N=47 N=49 N=40 N=89 
Table 5.36: Overall mean scores (and standard deviations) for the paranormality question, separated by the Suggestion and belief. 
DISCUSSION OF STUDY 5.3 
As with the first two studies, there was a strong effect of condition -- participants ... the 
Suggestion condition showed a greater belief that the key continued to bend. This was in 
accordance with the hypothesis. Another finding similar to those found in Studies 5.1 
and 5.2 was that, contrary to the hypothesis, there was no significant difference between 
disbelievers and believers in terms of acceptance of suggestion. However, the 
examination of questionnaire wording did show a significant effect and a significant 
interaction with suggestion. Overall, participants in the Continued condition gave a 
higher mean score on the key bending question than participants in the I Saw condition; 
this indicates that participants are differentiating between what they saw and what they 
are told, but will respond with what they were told if the question is not specific. 
Participants in the Continued condition were more likely to give a positive response than 
those in the I Saw condition when a suggestion had been received. However, in the No 
Suggestion condition, I Saw got a higher mean rating. This supports the notion that 
participants in the Continued condition were reporting what they were told, rather than 
what they believed that they saw. Therefore, the results are not solely an indication that 
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suggestion affects perception and recollection - there is also a response bias affecting 
reports of the video. This raises important questions about the concept of suggestion. 
Whilst it may appear that a suggestion has substantially altered a person's perception, 
the findings of this study indicate that this is not always the case; the participants are 
actually retaining two separate memories: one for what they saw occur, and one for what 
the performer said had occurred. 
There was no interaction between paranormal belief and the I Saw/Continued 
conditions. Believers and disbelievers were equally likely to give higher ratings on the 
Continued questionnaire. This is contrary to the prediction that believers would be more 
motivated to state that they had seen the key continue to bend. 
The confidence data did not show any effect of belief, or any differences between the 
Wording or Suggestion conditions. The lack of difference in the Wording conditions is 
interesting, as it appears that participants were confident in their responses, even if they 
were reporting something that they did not actually see. As previously mentioned, the 
Wording condition was assessing two different kinds of memory (memory for what was 
seen, and memory for what was said) and participants were equally confident for both 
kinds. 
As with the previous two studies, there was no evidence that participants with false 
memories were less confident than those with true memories. In fact, they were equally 
confident, and significantly more confident than those participants who were unsure of 
whether the key continued to bend. This is contrary to the existing research indicating 
that false memories tend to be less vivid and detailed than actual memories, and 
therefore participants have less confidence in them. 
There was no difference between believers and disbelievers when rating whether the key 
bend was achieved by paranormal means. Again, this is contrary to the hypothesis that 
believers would provide higher ratings than disbelievers. In fact, neither group was 
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convinced that the key was bent by paranormal means. There was also no effect of 
suggestion or wording on paranormality ratings. 
This study has provided support for the strategic effects explanation of misinformation 
studies. Clearly participants did not simply indicate that they believed that the key 
continued to bend - the wording of the question was influential in eliciting responses. 
However, a significant effect of suggestion still remained after the question wording was 
changed, demonstrating that the results were not entirely influenced by strategic effects. 
Participants appeared to also have believed the suggestion, although to a lesser extent 
than previously indicated. This suggests that participants experienced a form of source 
confusion when viewing the video, and this caused them to actually perceive the event 
being suggested to them. 
This study only tested responses immediately after viewing the video, and thus cannot 
be used to assess whether the suggestion actually affected memory rather than 
perception. Thus, a fourth study was conducted to examine responses two weeks later. 
STUDY 5.4 
INTRODUCTION TO STUDY 5.4 
This study attempted to combine the concepts explored in the previous two protocols. 
Firstly, it again examined whether participants would give different responses on the 
questionnaires testing perception impairment or reporting error. Secondly, it examined 
whether there would be a difference in response after a period of time. That is, this study 
questioned whether the reporting difference would still be apparent when participants 
were recording memories rather than perceptions. This was achieved by questioning 
participants two weeks after viewing the video. Unlike Studies 5.1 and 5.2, participants 
were not questioned immediately after viewing the video. This was to ensure that they 
were reporting their memories of the video, rather than memories of what they said in 
the first questionnaire. By testing participants two weeks later, it was hoped that theories 
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on the formation of false memories would be tested. Study 5.3 clearly demonstrated that 
participants held two separate perceptions of what had occurred (what they saw. and 
what they heard); after two weeks, would these still be separate, or would there be some 
transformation of memory? The various multiple-trace theories of memory indicate that, 
even if the suggestion did not cause participants to incorrectly perceive the event at the 
time, it may still affect memory afterwards although there is ambiguity as to how this 
may occur. The fuzzy trace theory (Brainerd, Reyna, & Poole, 2000) predicts that 
participants will have a less detailed memory of the video after two weeks, as they will 
be relying on gist information rather than verbatim information. They will, therefore, be 
more likely to indicate that the key continued to bend. Hyman and Kleinknecht's (1999) 
theory would also predict that participants will report that the key continued to bend 
after two weeks if they found the suggestion plausible at the time. The source activation 
confusion model (Ayers & Reder, 1998) suggests that participants will have two 
separate recollections of the video - one for what they saw and one for what the 
performer said. The recollection that is most active at the time of testing will determine 
the responses provided. It may be that the actual question in the testing stage will cause 
the memory of what the performer said to be activated. In this case, the SAC would also 
predict acceptance of the suggestion after two weeks. 
One factor that was not tested in Study 5.4 was that of suggestion itself. Studies 5.1 to 
5.3 all demonstrated that participants in the Suggestion condition recorded higher levels 
of belief that the key had continued to bend than participants in the No Suggestion 
condition. Therefore, all participants in Study 5.4 watched the Suggestion video. 
METHOD 
Design 
The study used a2x2 design. Factor One examined the effect of paranormal belief on 
memory of the video and was a between-subjects variable. Participants were split into 
two groups - disbelievers and believers - according to their responses on the Belief in 
the Paranormal Questionnaire. Factor Two examined the effect of question wording on 
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response. This was a between-subjects variable, with two conditions: Continued where 
participants responded to the statement `After the key was placed on the table, it 
continued to bend', and I Saw, where participants responded to the statement `After the 
key was placed on the table, I saw it continue to bend'. 
Three dependent variables (DV) were collected. The first DV measured the extent to 
which participants accepted the statement that the key had continued to bend. This was 
assessed by participant agreement (rated on a seven-point scale -1= `Definitely No' 
and 7= `Definitely Yes') with the key bending question. The hypotheses were that 
participants who believed in the paranormal would be significantly more sure that the 
key continued to bend and that the wording of the question would affect participants' 
responses - participants in the Continued condition would give higher mean responses 
that those in the I Saw condition. 
The second DV assessed participants' confidence in the accuracy of their answer to the 
key bending question. This was measured on a seven-point scale (1 = `Not at all 
confident' and 7= `Very confident'). It was hypothesised that participants who had 
reported false memories on the key bending question (i. e. that the key had continued to 
bend) would be less confident than those who reported true memories, and that question 
wording would affect confidence. 
The third DV measured the degree to which participants believed that the key bending 
was paranormal. This was recorded on a seven-point scale (1 = `Definitely No', 7= 
`Definitely Yes') registering answers to the question `Do you think that the bending of 
the key was paranormal? '. It was hypothesised that participants who believed in the 
paranormal would provide higher ratings than participants who did not. 
Participants 
All participants were members of Art History Adult Education classes who voluntarily 
completed the study. 47 were run initially, of whom 42 returned after two weeks (a 
return rate of 93.33%). 39 of these were female and 3 were male. In the Continued 
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condition, 1 participant was male and 22 were female, and in the I Saw condition, 2 
were male and 17 were female. 
Of the 42 participants who returned after 2 weeks, the modal age group was 51-60, and 
ages ranged from the 31-40 age group to the 71+ group. In the I Saw condition, the 
modal age group was again 51-60, and ages ranged from the 31-40 age group to the 71 + 
group. In the Continued condition, ages ranged from the 41-50 group to the 61-70 group 
and the modal age group was 51-60. 
Materials 
The materials were the same as those used in Study 5.3, with the exception of the No 
Suggestion video, which was not used. 
Procedure 
Participants were run in groups of up to 16. All participants were shown the Suggestion 
video. After completing the Belief in the Paranormal Questionnaire and ensuring that 
they could all see the television screen, participants were shown the video. They were 
then told that the experimenter would return in two weeks to give them a questionnaire 
relating to the video, and were asked not to discuss the video until after that time. 
The experimenter returned two weeks later and randomly distributed the Response 
Questionnaire and the Altered Response Questionnaire (the questionnaires were given 
out alternately). After completion, participants were thanked for their time and 
debriefed. 
RESULTS 
Participants' score on the two Belief in the Paranormal Questions covering 
psychokinesis were used to classify them as believers or disbelievers. The scores ranged 
from 2 (strong sceptic) to 11 (strong believer) (mean score was 5.17, std. dev. 3.35). 
Responses were split along the median -4 and under were classified as disbelievers (N 
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= 21; mean = 2.43, std. dev. . 75), 
5 and above were classified as believers (N = 21; 
mean = 8.43, std. dev. 1.99). 
Response to the key bending question 
Participants' answers to the key bending question on the Response Questionnaire or 
Altered Response Questionnaire were used to measure their acceptance of the 
suggestion. The data for participant responses in the I Saw/Continued conditions are 
shown in Table 5.37. 
A2x2 factorial Anova found no effect of either belief (F (1,38) = . 17, p= . 68) or 
Wording (F (1,3 8) = . 22, p= . 64), and there was no significant interaction between 
belief and the Wording condition (F (1,38) = . 01, p= . 99). Participants gave similar 
responses to the question, regardless of belief or the form of questioning. 
BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS TOTAL 
I SAW 5.4 5.67 5.53 
(1.84) (1.94) (1.84 
N=10 N=9 N= 19 
CONTINUED 5.64 5.92 5.78 
(1.91) (1.88) (1.86) 
N= 11 N= 12 N=23 
TOTAL 5.52 5.81 5.67 
(1.83) (1.86) (1.83) 
N=21 N=21 N=42 
Table 5.37: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant responses to the key bending question, separated by belief and 
condition. 
Confidence 
A2x2 factorial Anova found no effect of Wording condition (F (1,38) = . 02, p= . 9). 
There was, however, a significant effect of belief (F (1,38) = 4.5, p= . 04). Disbelievers 
had more confidence in their answer to the key bending question than the believers. 
There was no significant interaction between belief and the Wording condition (F (1,38) 
= . 
37, p= . 55). 
The mean confidence scores are shown in Table 5.38. 
166 
BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS TOTAL 
I SAW 5.3 6.56 5.89 
(1.95) (. 73) (1.6) 
N=10 N=9 N= 19 
CONTINUED 5.64 6.33 6 
(1.91) (. 89) (1.48) 
N= 11 N= 12 N=23 
TOTAL 5.48 6.43 5.95 
(1.89) (. 81) (1.51) 
N=21 N=21 N=42 
aoic i.. a: wean scores kana stanaara aeviations) for confluence tor responses to the key bending question, separated by belief and 
condition. 
As with the previous studies, participant confidence was examined according to their 
response to the key bending question. Participants who gave ratings of 1-3 were 
classified as having answered No, ratings of 4 were classified as Uncertain and ratings 
of 5-7 were classified as Yes. A factorial Anova showed that there were significant 
differences between the answers of the three groups (F (2,41) = 4.94, p= . 01). This 
difference was still evident when comparing those answering Yes and No (i. e. a 
comparison of false and actual memories) (F (1,37) = 9.04, p= . 005). Participants 
answering Yes were far more confident than those answering Uncertain or No. The 
mean scores are shown in Table 5.39. 
YES UNSURE NO 
6.3 4.75 4.6 
(. 95) (2.87) (2.3) 
N=33 N=4 N=5 
Table 5.39: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for participant confidence on the key bending question, separated by their 
responses to the preceding question. 
Paranormality ratings 
Participants' belief in the paranormality of the key bending was measured by their 
response to the paranormality question "Do you think that the bending of the key was 
paranormal? ". This was measured on a seven-point scale where 1 indicated `Definitely 
No' and 7 indicated `Definitely Yes'. A2x2 factorial Anova was conducted on the data 
provided, and this showed no effect of condition (F (1,38) = . 44, p= . 51) and no effect 
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of belief (F (1,38) = . 
85, p= . 
36). There was also no interaction between the two 
variables (F (1,38) = . 
65, p= . 
43). The mean responses to the paranormality question 
are shown in Table 5.40. 
BELIEVERS DISBELIEVERS TOTAL 
I SAW 2.75 2.18 2.42 
(1.67) (1.72) (1.68) 
N= 10 N=9 N= 19 
CONTINUED 3.13 2.6 2.78 
(2.38) (1.89) (2.02) 
N=I1 N=12 N=23 
TOTAL 2.94 2.42 2.62 
(1.98) (1.79) (1.86) 
N=21 N=21 N=42 
Table 5.40: Mean scores (and standard deviations) for the paranormality question, separated by belief and condition. 
DISCUSSION OF STUDY 5.4 
This study yielded some unexpected results. The first element of interest was that the 
distinction between the I Saw and Continued conditions was lost - participants in each 
condition were equally likely to believe that the key continued bending. This is contrary 
to the hypothesis that participants in Continued condition would give higher responses 
than those in the I Saw condition. This suggests that, after a time lapse, participants are 
no longer able to differentiate two separate memories of an event - what they saw and 
what they were told. Instead, the participants overwhelmingly reported what they were 
told, and confidently stated that they saw the key continue to bend. As with Study 5.3, 
there was no significant difference between believers and disbelievers in the two 
conditions. Although the disbelievers actually provided slightly higher ratings in both 
conditions, both believers and disbelievers gave high ratings for the key bending 
question. 
Another point of note was that participants in this study give much higher mean 
responses than in the previous studies. This difference cannot be compared statistically, 
as the participants are from different samples. However, a possible explanation for this 
may be that these participants' recollection of the video was not tested immediately after 
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viewing, thus the testing at two weeks was the first time that they were asked to record 
their perception of what happened. This time interval may have allowed memories to 
become more distorted than those of participants who were asked to record their 
impressions immediately, as participants are now reporting what they remember 
occurring, rather than how they remember answering previously. 
There was also no difference in paranormality ratings. 
The confidence data showed that the disbelievers were significantly more confident than 
believers in both conditions. This is contrary to the findings from the previous three 
studies, and it is obvious that the difference is due to the disbelievers being extremely 
confident - their mean responses are far higher than responses from participants in the 
previous studies - rather than the believers being underconfident. This, again, supports 
the idea that the disbelievers are approaching the task as a magic trick, but does not 
explain why they are so much more confident than the believers. As with Study 5.3, 
there was no difference in confidence between the two wording conditions. However, in 
the previous study, this was seen to confirm the view that participants held two separate 
memories (what they saw and what they were told) and were equally confident of both. 
In the present study, there is no separation of the memories, and participants are 
extremely confident that the key continued to bend, regardless of the questioning used. 
This study also found a significant difference between false and true memories. 
However, the difference is in the opposite direction to that expected - participants with 
false memories are more confident than those with true memories. This is consistent 
with the results in Study 5.2, where participants who answered Yes to the key bending 
question gave almost significantly higher confidence ratings than those who answered 
No. 
There are some interesting implications of this study for theories of false memory. 
Firstly, it is possible that task demand effects may diminish over time. The lack of 
wording effect in this study suggests that after two weeks participants are not affected 
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by how a question is worded - they simply remember the misinformation as fact. There 
is support for both fuzzy trace theory and Hyman and Kleinknecht's (1999) theory, as 
both theories predicted that the suggestion would be magnified after two weeks. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This series of studies has yielded some interesting insights into the area of suggestion 
and misperception. It has clearly demonstrated that giving a suggestion as an event is 
viewed will alter reports of that event. Whilst the initial change in report is not 
immediately enormous - generally developing responses from belief that the key did not 
continue to bend towards uncertainty - it introduces ambiguity into accounts of the 
videotape. Additionally, the results in Study 5.4 provide some indication that over time 
these reports become increasing biased towards what the performer suggests, if 
participants are not tested initially on what they have seen. This supports findings by 
Wiseman and Lamont (1997) who record that members of the public viewing a magic 
trick (specifically the Indian Rope Trick) will confabulate the trick in their mind over 
time, so that it becomes increasingly impressive. 
It is also worth noting that in Study 5.1, there was a tendency for participants in the No 
Suggestion group to become more likely to indicate that the key had continued to bend, 
when questioned after two weeks. It is possible that this is also due to an extremely 
subtle suggestion in the form of the Response Questionnaire - perhaps answering a 
question about whether or not the key did continue to bend introduced a possibility to 
them that they had not previously considered, and over time they became more uncertain 
as to whether this actually happened. 
The results of Study 5.3 indicate that the suggestion from the performer does not always 
alter the perception of the participants. Immediately after viewing the video, they are 
clearly able to differentiate what they have actually seen from what the performer 
suggested. On a general level, this is an important demonstration of the necessity of 
precisely wording questions, so there is no disparity between what the experimenter 
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thinks they are asking, and what the participant is actually answering. Examining this 
series of experiments, the disparity between the I Saw and Continued conditions raises 
some interesting questions. If participants were aware that they did not see the key 
continue to bend, why did they respond positively to the statement that it had continued? 
It may be that, while the participants did not actually see the key moving themselves, 
they believed that it had continued to bend. Another possibility is that the participants 
misinterpreted the question and believed that they were being asked to record what the 
performer had actually said, rather than what they had seen. This provides some support 
for the strategic effects hypothesis as a partial explanation of misinformation effects. 
However, a significant effect of suggestion was present even after the strategic effects 
were controlled for. 
Despite the initial disparity between the two wording conditions, the participants do 
appear to develop false memories of the event after a period of time. This was 
demonstrated in Study 5.4, in which all participants responded positively to the 
statement, regardless of which wording condition they were in. Thus, it is not 
necessarily important to change someone's perception of an event in order to distort 
their memories of it; it may only be necessary to introduce an alternative scenario, or an 
indication of what might be taking place. In this respect, during-event suggestion 
appears to act in the same way as post-event suggestion, and thus traditional 
misinformation theories are also relevant to during-event misinformation. It seems that 
during-event misinformation may act in two separate ways. Firstly, participants' 
perception of the event may be distorted by the suggestion. Secondly, the suggestion 
may affect memory over time, as participants become confused as to the source of the 
misinformation. However, the fact that this effect is shown more strongly in Study 5.4 
than in either Study 5.1 or 5.2 suggests that false memories may become more 
developed if recollection of the event is not tested immediately. 
Some of the most puzzling results in this series of studies are those regarding belief. In 
every study, the disbelievers were as convinced as, or more convinced than, the 
believers that the key continued to bend after being placed on the table. One possible, 
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albeit unlikely, explanation for this is that the disbelievers were actually so impressed by 
the demonstration that they changed their views on psychokinesis. This could easily be 
examined in future studies by giving a further test of belief after viewing the video. 
However, a more plausible explanation is that the demonstration in the video did not 
actually challenge their beliefs regarding psychokinesis. If the tape was viewed as a 
demonstration of a magic trick (rather than a genuine psychokinetic event), there was no 
logical inconsistency in the disbelievers accepting the suggestion that the key had 
continued to bend, as they had already accepted that the key had been bent by non- 
paranormal means. This is supported to some extent by the paranormality ratings, as the 
disbelievers consistently provided low scores. 
Another possible cause of the lack of effect of belief is the conditions in which the 
videotape was being viewed. With the exception of Study 5.4, the experiments took 
place in a university laboratory, and all participants were undergraduates in psychology 
or associated subjects. In addition, the performer in the video was introduced by a 
psychologist (Richard Wiseman) who may have been known to the participants as a 
sceptic. Perhaps these conditions cued them to approach the task in a sceptical frame of 
mind? Another factor to bear in mind is the relative scarcity of people claiming PK 
powers in recent years. In the late 1970s, there were a number of psychic claimants 
receiving regular coverage in the media (Marks, 2000), but it is now far more common 
to see magicians performing similar tricks without claiming PK abilities. Thus, it may 
be that the participants are simply more used to viewing such demonstrations as magic 
tricks. If participants were approaching the demonstration as a magic trick, then testing 
their belief in psychokinesis would not be relevant, as at no stage would their beliefs 
regarding psychokinesis come into question. 
Another unusual feature of this series of studies are the confidence responses. Each time 
the participants were questioned, their confidence in false memories was as strong (or 
stronger) than their confidence in true memories. This is contrary to the existing 
research on false memories, which indicates that confidence for true memories will be 
much higher. However, Loftus (1996) reports that research in eyewitness testimony is 
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not as clear cut. Witnesses may display high degrees of confidence, regardless of the 
accuracy of their response. This can be affected by factors such as the emotiveness of 
the situation, the time delay in questioning witnesses and the amount of questioning 
involved. It is possible that a situation involving during-event suggestion is closer to 
eyewitness testimony than to studies where false memories are implanted after an event 
has been witnessed. Additionally, there is some indication from the data in the present 
studies that confidence is not simply affected by whether a memory is true or false. The 
presence or absence of suggestion, and participants' belief in psychokinesis, also appear 
to have some effect on confidence for memory. 
Despite the uncertainties regarding the effects of belief and confidence, this series of 
studies did demonstrate that during-event suggestion does significantly alter reports of 
an event. There are four possible explanations for this effect, which are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Firstly, the suggestion may cause participants to attend to a situation 
differently, altering their perception of what is occuring. Secondly, the suggestion may 
alter participants' interpretations of an ambiguous event. Thirdly, the suggestion may 
affect memory for an event, if not the initial perception of it. Finally, the suggestion may 
alter the way a participant reports an event, even if they have not accepted the 
suggestion and their perception and memory has not been affected. 
The success of the during-event suggestion in these studies is an exciting finding which 
has not been previously researched in detail. It has obvious implications for the areas of 
testing psychic claimants and psychic fraud. However, there are also wider implications, 
as it is unlikely that this phenomenon is limited only to events regarding the paranormal. 
An interesting, and logical, next step would be to investigate this finding with regard to 
everyday events. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
REVIEW OF RESULTS 
The first part of this section reviews the results found in each chapter. The effects of 
suggestion and paranormal belief and the interaction between the two factors are then 
considered in more detail. 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that imagination inflation was a successful means of developing 
false memories for pictures. However, there was no interaction between false memory 
and paranormal belief. Chapter 3 investigated the effects of belief and suggestion on 
experiences in Hampton Court and found a significant effect of belief on unusual 
experiences. However, there was no effect of pre-event suggestion and no interaction 
between suggestion and belief. Chapter 4 examined during-event suggestion (positive 
and negative) and belief in the context of a seance room. There was an effect of negative 
suggestion and an effect of belief on experiences in the seance room. There was also an 
interaction between belief and positive suggestion. Chapter 5 assessed the effects of 
suggestion and belief on reports of a key bend. It found a significant and consistent 
effect of during-event suggestion on the reports, but no effect of belief and no 
interaction between belief and suggestion. 
Effects of imagination inflation and suggestion 
Chapter 2 utilised the phenomenon of source confusion developed as a result of 
imagination inflation in order to generate false memories. This was shown to be an 
extremely effective technique, with participants generating false memories for 
approximately one quarter of the words presented. All other studies used suggestion 
presented at different times as a means of false memory generation. The pre-event 
suggestion given in the second Hampton Court study was not shown to be a successful 
instrument for biasing perceptions of events. The lack of effect of pre-event suggestion 
may have been a function of the means by which the suggestion was imparted, or a 
reaction to the suggestion by the participants. Certainly, previous literature would 
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indicate that both perception and recollection of events can be affected by pre-event 
suggestion (e. g. Thorne & Himelstein, 1984; Rantzen & Markham, 1992). The effect of 
during-event suggestion on perception and recall was testing in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 4 showed a limited effect of positive suggestion on recall of events in the 
seance room, with only a few participants responding to the suggestion that a stationary 
object was moving. However, the majority of participants responded to the negative 
suggestion that a moving object was stationary. The first three studies in Chapter 5 
demonstrated an overwhelming effect of during-event suggestion on reports of the key 
bending video. (Suggestion was not tested in Study 5.4). The introduction of the 
suggestion that the key continued to bend after being placed on the table caused a 
significant increase in reports that this actually happened. 
Confidence ratings 
The results obtained in Chapter 2 corresponded with existing research indicating that 
confidence for false memories tends to be less than confidence for actual memories (e. g. 
Porter et al. 1999). In each of the three imagination inflation studies described in 
Chapter 2, participants recorded significantly less confidence for their false memories 
than for their actual memories. However, the key bending studies in Chapter 5 also 
tested confidence and did not find this effect. In Study 5.2 (Time One) there was an 
effect approaching significance indicating that participants were more confident in their 
false memories than their actual memories. This was also found significantly in Study 
5.4. Studies 5.1 and 5.3 found no difference between false and actual memories. 
Effects of paranormal belief 
The results of Chapter 2 indicated that belief in the paranormal correlates significantly 
with vividness of visual imagery and transliminality, and also suggested possible 
correlations with dissociate experiences and forgetting. The correlations with imagery, 
transliminality and dissociation were predicted from the previous literature; however, 
the indication that susceptibility to forgetting correlates with belief was unexpected and 
has not previously been investigated. Belief in the paranormal was found to be 
connected with experiencing of unusual phenomena in the second Hampton Court study 
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(Study 3.2), but not Study 3.1. In Chapter 4 there was an effect approaching significance 
of belief on whether the participants experienced any other phenomena in the seance 
room than that which the experimenters manipulated. The believers reported more 
additional phenomena than disbelievers. The key bending studies in Chapter 5 indicated 
little or no effect of belief on the tendency of participants to record the key as having 
continued to bend. 
Paranormality ratings 
In studies which asked participants to rate whether the witnessed events were 
paranormal, it was anticipated that believers would give higher ratings than disbelievers. 
This is in accordance with research findings that events tended to be assessed according 
to preconceived ideas. In the Hampton Court chapter, both studies found that believers 
tended to give higher ghost ratings than disbelievers; that is, believers were more likely 
to assess their unusual experiences as being due to a ghost. In addition, believers in 
Study 3.2 had experienced significantly more previous anomalous experiences than 
disbelievers, and were more likely to anticipate an unusual event happening to them. 
Believers in the seance study (Chapter 4) gave significantly higher responses than 
disbelievers on the question of whether they felt the events in the seance were 
paranormal. In the key bending studies (Chapter 5) there was some further support for 
these findings, with believers giving higher paranormality ratings at Time One in both 
Studies 5.1 and 5.2. However, at Time Two in these studies and in Studies 5.3 and 5.4, 
there were no significant differences between believers and disbelievers. 
Interaction between paranormal belief and false memory/perception 
In the imagination inflation studies of Chapter 2, only one study (2.1) indicated a 
correlation between false memory and paranormal belief. As previously discussed, this 
lack of correlation between the two factors in the imagination inflation paradigm is also 
evident in the studies of Blackmore and Rose (1997, and Rose & Blackmore, 2001). 
The interaction between paranormal belief and susceptibility to suggestion was also not 
evident in the Hampton Court suggestion study (Study 3.2) (although this might be a 
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function of the fact that very few people responded to the suggestion at all in this study). 
In the seance study of Chapter 4, there was a significant interaction between paranormal 
belief and suggestion, with believers in the paranormal responding to the positive 
suggestion more than the disbelievers. However, the same effect was not present with 
regard to the negative suggestion. In that case, there was no difference between the 
believers, uncertain participants and disbelievers. The during-event suggestion in the 
key bending studies described in Chapter 5 also provided little support for an interaction 
between paranormal belief and susceptibility to suggestion. There was an almost 
significant interaction between them in Study 5.1 (Time One), but every other time the 
relationship was tested, no effect was found. One of the aims of this thesis was to 
examine whether a relationship exists between paranormal belief and susceptibility to 
false memory. The studies described appear to indicate that there is no such relationship. 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Measurement of paranormal belief 
A point of note in the thesis is that differing measures of belief have been used in each 
of the chapters. This may make it difficult to generalise across the thesis about the 
behaviour of `paranormal believers' and `paranormal disbelievers'. It has been noted by 
researchers in paranormal belief that belief in one particular aspect of the paranormal 
does not necessarily generalise to global paranormal belief (Irwin, 1993). For instance, a 
participant may believe in seance room phenomena because they have strong religious 
beliefs including life after death. It does not follow, though, that the same individual will 
have a belief in other phenomena that could be termed psychokinetic, or indeed 
telepathy or clairvoyance. Therefore, when investigating the concept that perceptions 
and recollections of a particular event will be determined by pre-existing views, it is 
advantageous to be as specific as possible when assessing those views. Consequently, 
participants in Chapter 3,4, and 5 were only classified according to their views on the 
subject being assessed. 
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With regard to the studies presented in Chapter 2, these followed on from Blackmore 
and Rose's (1997) claim that global paranormal belief will be related to false memory 
development. Tobacyk and Milford's (1983) Paranormal Belief Scale was used to assess 
paranormal belief. It is noted that the effectiveness of this scale has been questioned 
(e. g. Thalbourne, 1995) and it may therefore be appropriate to use a different scale (e. g. 
the Australian Sheep-Goat scale, Thalbourne & Delin, 1993) in future studies examining 
the relationship between false memory and paranormal belief. However, it should also 
be noted that both Thalbourne (1995) and Irwin (1985a) found significant correlations 
between the Paranormal Belief Scale and other measures of belief. 
Methods of delivering suggestion 
Two interesting issues are evident with regard to the manner of suggestion delivery used 
within this thesis. The first is raised as a result of the disparity between positive effects 
of suggestion and lack of misinformation effect. The seance and Hampton Court studies 
found little or no positive effect of suggestion. This is in contrast to the key bending 
studies and the pre-event suggestions carried out by Lindsay and Johnson (1989b) and 
Rantzen and Markham (1992), which found effects even though the misinformation did 
not take the form of misleading post-event suggestion. This raises the question of 
whether the misinformation effect is primarily a laboratory-based effect, with little 
application in the real world? Studies of eye-witness testimony and false confessions 
(e. g. Loftus & Ketcham, 1991,1994; Ofshe & Watters, 1994) indicate that this is not the 
case. They report findings that misleading suggestions can reliably and strongly 
influence memories outside an artificial laboratory situations. However, it should be 
noted that they were concerned with alteration to recollections of events. The suggestion 
in the Hampton Court studies (Chapter 3) and seance study (Chapter 4) involved 
alteration of event perception. It is therefore unclear whether the suggestion failed 
because the technique is not successful at affecting perception, or for different reasons 
involving the presentation and reception of the suggestion. 
Secondly, both the Hampton Court and seance studies indicated a small (nonsignificant) 
inhibitory effect of suggestion, whereby participants in the suggestion condition 
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reported the desired event less often than those who did not receive the suggestion. It is 
worth considering whether there is a point at which the subtlety of a suggestion is lost 
and participants become aware that they are being manipulated. The existing literature 
has rarely considered this issue. There are two possible reasons for this. The first is that 
misinformation studies have tended to be small scale and involve substitution of one 
item for another, very similar item. For example, Loftus, Miller and Burns (1978) 
substituted a stop sign for a yield sign. This is in keeping with the suggestion of Hyman 
and Kleinknecht's (1999) that events should be plausible in order for misinformation to 
be effective. However, in contrast to this, Porter, Yuille and Lehman (1999) managed, 
through misinformation, to implant memories of a traumatic, large scale event. Another 
reason for the lack of related research is that misinformation has traditionally been 
concerned with memory for an event, rather than perception of it. In the situation where 
memory is being manipulated participants may query the inclusion of a misinformation 
item, but they have no means of testing their disagreement with it. When misinformation 
is used to attempt the alteration of the perception of an event, a participant has an 
immediate and effective way of ensuring that the suggestion is inaccurate. It may be, 
therefore, that an inhibitory effect of misinformation is a new finding directly related to 
the technique of perception alteration. This is clearly an area which requires further 
investigation. 
`Real world' research 
It has often been remarked that investigations of human behaviour tend to be too reliant 
on laboratory-based studies and participants who are undergraduate (psychology) 
students (e. g. Myers, 1994). Coolican (1994) cites three major problems with this form 
of research. Firstly, it narrows the range of behaviour that can be studied. Secondly, 
individuals' behaviour within the laboratory studies is not necessarily indicative of their 
behaviour outside it. Thirdly, given the limitation in participant population and the 
artificiality of the situation, there are strong possibilities that results found inside a 
laboratory may not generalise to the rest of the population. 
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With this information, one of the strengths of this thesis is the fact that half of the 
studies described (2.3,3.1,3.2,4,5.4) took place using participants who were neither 
psychology students nor connected with a university. In addition, three of the studies 
(3.1,3.2,4) involved events which, while not mundane or everyday, more closely 
replicated situations in which individuals typically experience paranormal events. The 
seance and Hampton Court studies were closely related to circumstances that individuals 
who believe in the paranormal may seek out. 
There are, however, additional problems attached to conducting experiments with 
volunteer participants outside of a university. The first is that the participants are, 
essentially, a self-selecting sample. It may be argued that an individual who voluntarily 
seeks out a study involving anomalous experiences is not typical of the population at 
large. For example, a disbeliever who attends a study on seances presumably has more 
interest in the area than a disbeliever who stays away. There is a possibility that a 
disbeliever attending such studies will either be less sceptical than the general 
population disbelievers, or more knowledgeable and critical that the general population. 
Therefore, whilst a study conducted outside the laboratory may provide results that are 
different from those obtained with student participants, the results may not, in fact, be 
any more generalisable to the population at large. It is true, however, that there may be a 
large overlap between people who attend paranormal studies and people who attend 
paranormal events. Therefore, the results obtained are probably closer to real life 
situations than any that could be obtained within the laboratory. 
Other problems arising as a result of conducting field studies are those of time and 
participant motivation. Whilst the participants may enjoy the actual seance or ghost 
detection activity, they rarely have the time or motivation to fill in several personality 
variable questionnaires. It would have been of interest to investigate the link between 
experiences in the seance and Hampton Court with variables such as transliminality, 
imagery and dissociation. However, it simply was not practical or reasonable to expect 
participants to devote such large amounts of time to the studies. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FALSE MEMORY AND MISPERCEPTION RESEARCH 
The studies described within the thesis have considered various means for creating false 
memories and influencing perception of events through misinformation. The findings 
indicate that suggestion may be successful for a number of reasons. Firstly, the results of 
Chapter 5 demonstrate that part of the misinformation effect is due to task demands and 
the manner in which the participant is tested. This indicates that it is not necessary for 
memory or perception to be altered in order to affect responses. Secondly, suggestion is 
successful at affecting memory for an event, as an individual becomes confused as to the 
source of information. However, the findings from the thesis have also indicated that 
suggestion may be effective in altering the perception of an individual, and that this 
effect is not necessarily related to pre-existing beliefs. 
Traditional theories of the misinformation effect have focused on explanations of how 
misinformation affects memories. It is worthwhile considering whether they allow for 
the findings that misinformation can also be effective in altering perception. 
Hyman and Kleinknecht's (1999) explanation of the misinformation effect stated that 
three processes were required in order for suggestion to be effective. Firstly, the 
misinformation should be plausible; secondly, there should be construction of a false 
memory; thirdly, source confusion should take place. The fuzzy trace theory (FTT) and 
the source-activation confusion model (SAC) broadly supported this idea, indicating that 
false memory arises as a result of source confusion when two (or more) opposing 
representations of an event are in existence. 
With regard to the three processes theory there are some points to consider. Firstly is the 
issue of plausibility. The prediction at the start of the research was that disbelievers 
would find the suggestions less plausible than believers, as they did not have a 
motivation to accept that paranormal phenomena were occurring. However, as has 
previously been discussed, they found the suggestions plausible because they did not 
believe that anything paranormal had occurred. Therefore, it is worth noting that 
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plausibility is a factor that is essentially defined by the participant rather than the 
experimenter. 
The second process identified by Hyman and Kleinknecht was that of memory 
construction. Given that the key bending studies in Chapter 5 indicate that it is possible 
to alter accounts of events through during-event suggestion, it may be necessary to 
change this stage to `memory or perception construction'. However, there is some 
ambiguity about the degree to which perception is altered at the time. The questionnaire 
wording findings in Study 5.3 indicate that a small percentage of participants do 
genuinely believe that they have seen the key continue to bend. In this case, their 
perception has been altered and they will retain only one representation of the event in 
their minds. There is some confusion as to the position of the third process in this 
scenario - that of source confusion. Either the source confusion plays a part in the 
second process and is active in causing the perception construction, or the individuals 
bypass the source confusion stage. For other participants, there is an awareness that they 
received two distinct pieces of information - that which they saw, and that which they 
heard. Hyman and Kleinknecht's theory predicts that they will still be able to form false 
memories of the event through source confusion, providing that they find the suggestion 
plausible. Therefore, the three processes theory offers an explanation of how during- 
event suggestion could alter recollections of an event, but needs to be clarified in order 
to explain how perceptions of the event could be changed. 
The FTT suggests that for any event, two separate representations are encoded in the 
memory. Firstly, the verbatim trace exactly records what occurred, but is subject to 
fading. The gist trace is a general and vague account, often supported by related 
schemas, which remains over time and is increasingly consulted as the verbatim trace 
recedes. The FTT would predict that participants develop false memories as their 
consultation of the verbatim trace fades and is replaced by the gist trace. This is 
intensified by the fact that misinformation research typically involves substituting minor 
or irrelevant items and peripheral information is often stored in the gist trace rather than 
the verbatim trace which is concerned with the main information in a scene. The 
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misinformation studies described in Chapter 3 and 4 (seance and Hampton Court) 
involved suggestion for an important component of the scene and the FTT perhaps goes 
some way to explaining the lack of misinformation effect in these studies. In the key' 
bending studies, the participants presumably found the actual key bend performed by the 
magician the central piece of action, with the events after the key was placed on the 
table less important. If this is the case, the FTT provides an explanation for why the 
suggestion was more successful in these studies. It also suggests that the misinformation 
could produce a false memory even if perception is not affected at the time. However, 
the FTT does not explain why the misinformation might change a participant's 
perception of the events as they happen. 
The SAC model indicates that individuals will retain several memory traces related to 
various components of the event witnessed, and these traces will be connected to other 
memory traces with similar themes and qualities. Each time one of these traces is 
accessed, activation occurs in the related traces. The SAC model suggests that the 
memory trace most active at the time of testing is the one that will be accessed and 
reported. It should also follow that this trace will remain more active than the other 
traces which have not been accessed, and will therefore become the predominant 
memory trace for that particular event. In post-event misinformation studies, the SAC 
predicts that participants will retain memory traces of the correct information and the 
suggestion. However, because the suggestion is the most recent, and therefore most 
active, trace, it is accessed at the time of testing. Pre- and during-event suggestion will 
also be successful if something causes the misinformation trace to be more active than 
the correct information trace at the time of testing. However, if a participant's 
perception of an event is altered, there is presumably only one representation of the 
event in memory. There is, therefore, no possibility of accessing alternative traces which 
could create source confusion. 
It appears that models describing the misinformation effect are successful in explaining 
how the misinformation can affect and remain in memory. This is true for pre- and 
during-event suggestion. However, they do not fully explain how misinformation can 
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cause a distortion in the perception of the percipient. There is an assumption that 
misinformation can only be effective in the memory, and not through any other 
cognitive processes. If the findings involving perception alteration can be replicated and 
extended, models of the misinformation effect will have to be revised in order to 
consider these new results. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PARANORMAL BELIEF RESEARCH 
This thesis has considered three possible explanations for the tendency of paranormal 
believers to experience more anomalous events than disbelievers. The first of these is 
that believers and disbelievers attend to situations differently, and thus believers will 
encounter more events which could be regarded as paranormal. This idea was supported 
by the tendency of believers in the seance and Hampton Court study to report more 
unusual events than disbelievers, despite the fact that the presented situation was the 
same for both groups. 
The second explanation for the increased number of experiences of believers is that they 
interpret ambiguous stimuli differently from disbelievers. Specifically, the literature 
suggests that believers will interpret the stimuli in a manner that is congruent with their 
existing beliefs. This explanation was also supported by the studies in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Believers were more likely to rate events as being of a paranormal origin than 
disbelievers in both chapters. Although the actual origin of experiences in Hampton 
Court (whether paranormal, imagined or due to normal factors) could not be determined, 
all events in the seance study were controlled by the experimenters. It is clear, therefore, 
that attributions of paranormality by believers are not always reliable. This confirms 
previous findings indicating that believers will react according to their existing beliefs 
when assessing the situation (e. g., Russell & Jones, 1980; French, 1992a). 
The third explanation is that believers in the paranormal are generally more suggestible 
than disbelievers. This hypothesis was not corroborated by the research described within 
the thesis. Little evidence was found to support this idea, with the anticipated effect 
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occurring only once, in the seance study of Chapter 4. This is despite the studies by 
Wagner and Ratzeburg (1987), Atkinson (1994) and Irwin (1989) indicating that such a 
relationship exists. Although the believers did occasionally accept suggestion to a 
greater degree than disbelievers, this may be a consequence of the material used to 
administer the suggestion. Acceptance of a suggestion about paranormal events may be 
due to selective interpretation rather than a general suggestibility. 
Blackmore and Rose (1997) suggested that believers in the paranormal would be more 
susceptible to false memory than disbelievers. This hypothesis was supported by 
research indicating that paranormal belief and false memory should both be associated 
with higher levels of visual imagery, dissociation and transliminality. The studies in 
Chapter 2 found the reported link between belief and vividness of visual imagery, and 
also some evidence for belief correlating with dissociative experiences, transliminality 
and forgetting. However, the lack of correlations between these factors and false 
memory development means that, although there was no link between belief and false 
memory, the possibility that it does exist cannot be ruled out. It is possible that the types 
of false memory that do correlate with those personality variables are not the same as 
the type investigated in the Chapter 2 studies. Therefore, further research considering 
other forms of false memory development should be conducted to further investigate 
this area. 
Therefore, the research presented within the thesis indicates that believers are not as 
prone to false memory generation and suggestibility as previously assumed. However, 
there is scope for research examining whether believers report experiencing paranormal 
phenomena simply as a function of their existing attitudes towards the event. This 
supports the idea forwarded by Zusne and Jones (1989) that consistency in paranormal 
belief is important as it is part of a larger network of attitudes to factors such as religion 
and science, and maintence of paranormal belief ensures unanimity in other beliefs. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
Imagination inflation and paranormal belief 
The central argument of Blackmore and Rose's (1997) paper was that people who 
believe in the paranormal will be more susceptible to false memory because they 
confuse reality and imagination. Although this relationship was not found using the 
word/photographs paradigm, it may be present in other scenarios. Two potential areas of 
research are using imagination inflation for apparently paranormal events and for 
autobiographical events. It would be interesting to ask participants to imagine events 
such as witnessing a ghost or experiencing a telepathic occurrence. If believers were 
seen to show more acceptance of these imaginings as real, Blackmore and Rose's 
hypothesis would be supported in part. Although believers may not have a global 
susceptibility to imagination inflation, it may be a factor in specific belief-confirming 
situations. With regard to autobiographical events research, testing participants with 
situations such as the `lost in a mall' (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995) study or the diary study 
of Loftus and Polage (1999) would provide valuable insights. It has been established 
that paranormal believers have a tendency to misinterpret data as providing evidence for 
their beliefs, but testing them on real-life events would investigate whether they really 
do have a tendency to imagine events that did not happen, or distort recollections of 
events that did happen. Examining the relationship between belief in the paranormal and 
susceptibility to source confusion in those situations would provide clarification as to 
the existence of the relationship between the two factors. 
Misperception and false memory 
The key bending studies described in Chapter 5, and the seance study in Chapter 4, 
began to investigate the effects of misleading during-event suggestion on both 
perception of events and recollection of them. They were successful in demonstrating 
that during-event suggestion can affect reports of events, and that this can occur 
independently of existing beliefs. This is an important finding that should be 
investigated further. Of particular interest were the indications from Study 5.3 that 
suggestion can affect perception of events even after wording effects are controlled for, 
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and from Study 5.4 that there may be a greater level of suggestion acceptance after a 
period of time, if recollection is not tested in the meantime. A major study that should be 
conducted is one that assesses the combined effects of these factors. The paradigm of 
Studies 5.1 and 5.2, in which participants are tested on their suggestion acceptance at 
two stages could be extended, such that questionnaire wording is also considered, and a 
further group of participants are only tested at the second stage of questioning. This 
would overcome the difficulties of Chapter 5 in which participants from the separate 
studies were drawn from different population samples and therefore their results could 
not be considered in conjunction. A particularly interesting concept to investigate is 
whether it is necessary to perceive an event according to misinformation in order to later 
develop a false memory of it. 
Negative suggestion 
The seance study described in Chapter 4 indicated that a suggestion referring to a lack of 
an event as it happens can affect perception and/or recollection of that event. This is an 
area that has not been widely researched and offers potential for further study. It would 
be interesting to assess whether negative suggestion is also successful in changing 
participants' reports of situations that have already occurred (post-event suggestion) and 
of events that are about to occur (pre-event suggestion). 
Attribution of ostensibly paranormal events 
A finding that seemed apparent in both the seance and key bending chapters is that 
participants did not always make the expected attributions about the events that they 
were witnessing. In particular, the disbelievers were often willing to accept the apparent 
success of paranormal events because they were making different assumptions as to the 
cause of the event. It was expected that they would reject suggestions that challenged 
their view that paranormal events do not exist; however the suggestions that they 
witnessed did not provide the necessary conflict. Instead, they rejected the notion that 
the events were paranormal and viewed them as plausible magic tricks. It is possible that 
these attributions could be affected by varying the situations in which the event is 
presented. For instance, showing individuals footage of psychic or psychokinetic 
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claimants before they participate may cause them to make different attributions than 
participants who have been shown footage of magicians performing similar feats. 
Additionally, there may be cultural and generational differences in the attributions. 
Participants who are familiar with claims of psychokinesis and seance phenomena may 
be more accepting of the claims that those with more familiarity of magical effects. For 
instance, individuals who witnessed the rise of Uri Geller's spoon-bending claims in the 
1970s (Marks, 2000) may be more inclined to accept all claims of psychokinesis as true. 
Effect of participation on belief 
None of the studies described within this thesis considered whether the act of 
participating in the study could have affected belief in the paranormal. In the Hampton 
Court studies (Chapter 3) and the seance study in Chapter 4 it would have been an 
interesting addition to the data, particularly as the seance responses were collected two 
weeks after participating. There is a possibility that the participants may have had their 
belief affected either positively or negatively by the situation and this, in turn, may have 
affected the responses that they provided. Any future studies would be enhanced by a 
consideration of whether belief in the paranormal remains stable over the course of the 
participation. 
Misinformation over time 
Studies investigating laboratory-elicited false memory and autobiographical false 
memory have reached differing conclusions about the effects of time on memory. Payne, 
Elie, Blackwell and Neushatz (1996) report, for example, that misinformation effects on 
laboratory generated events may last for up to approximately 48 hours before 
deteriorating. In contrast, researchers of autobiographical false memories indicate that 
they increase over a period of years (e. g. Loftus & Ketcham, 1991; Schmolck, Buffalo 
& Squire, 2000). This can, presumably, be affected by factors such as repeated retrieval 
of the information (Roediger, Jacoby, & McDermott, 1996) and the social situation in 
which the event is encoded and retrieved (Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001). It 
would be interesting to investigate the effects of time on false memories for paranormal 
events and whether misinformation given before or during an event can have a long- 
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term effect. A follow-up of the Hampton Court and seance studies after a period of time 
would be a valuable source of information. These follow-ups could be manipulated so 
that some participants are asked about their memories a number of times over that 
period while others are only asked once. This would provide information about whether 
repeated questioning enhances or degrades false memories developed as a result of 
misinformation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The aims of this thesis were threefold. Firstly, to investigate whether misleading 
information is able to affect the perception of an event in addition to the recollection of 
it, by presenting the misinformation at different stages of the study. Secondly, to 
consider the possible link between false memory and paranormal belief. Finally, to 
examine whether believers and disbelievers differ in their susceptibility to suggestion 
presented at different stages. 
The work concerning presentation of suggestion at different stages yielded some 
unusual results. Contrary to previous research, pre-event suggestion did not affect 
reports of an event. However, it is unclear whether the suggestion failed because the 
technique is not successful at affecting perception, or for different reasons involving the 
presentation and reception of the suggestion. The during-event suggestion had more 
success in the laboratory than in a real-life situation. There was mixed success in the 
seance studies, with negative suggestions being accepted more readily than positive 
suggestions, and the positive suggestion being accepted primarily by believers. 
However, there was a strong and consistent effect of suggestion on perception and 
memory of events in the key bending studies, and it is clear that during-event suggestion 
offers great potential as an area of future research. 
With regard to the second aim, there was little success in establishing a link between 
global paranormal belief and false memory. However, it is noted that there is potential 
for future study involving different facets of false memory. There were mixed results for 
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the third aim of the thesis. There was some indication that believers may be more 
susceptible to suggestion than disbelievers in specific situations. A more reliable effect 
was that believers and disbelievers interpret situations differently, and believers will be 
more ready to make attributions of paranormality in ambiguous situations. It is therefore 
concluded that, while believers may be no more susceptible to misinformation and false 
memory than disbelievers, the two groups will experience situations in contrasting ways 
because they attend to situations differently and form differing interpretations with 
regard to the cause of events. 
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APPENDIX A: 
PARANORMAL BELIEF SCALE 
(TOBACYK, & MILFORD, 1983) 
214 
BELIEF IN PARANORMAL QUESTIONNAIRE. 
The questionnaire cont<lins 25 statements relating co paranormal p enoc, ena -e; ie each sýýe: ± er is raring scale of 1-5. Please use the racing scale to r your degree of a; went With each sta; ýý, ",, where; 
a 
1= strongly disagree with the statement 3= undecided 5= strongly agree with the stat ement Please complete a racing scale for each statement. The questionnaire is comple, ly anonymous, 
STATEMENT RATING SCALE The soul continues to exist though the body may die. 1 2 3 4 5 
Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces. 1 2 3 4 5 
Black magic really exists. 1 2 3 5 
Black cats can bring had luck. 1 2 3 4 5 
Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection) 1 2 3 4 5 
The abominable snowman of Tibet exists. 1 2 3 4 5 
Dreams can provide- information about the iucure. 1 2 3 4 
There is a devil. 1 2 3 4 5 
Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic powers, does occur. 1 2 3 
Witches do exist. 1 2 3 4 ý 
If you break a mirror you will have had luck. 1 2 3 4 5 
During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spite t c`r le`ve the body. 1 2 3 
The Loch Ness mopst; r of Scotland exists. 1 2 3 5 
Some people have the ability to predict the tu ire. 1 2 3 4 
I believe in God. 1 2 3 4 
A person's thoughts can influence the movement of a physical object_ 1 2 3 
\bodoo is a real method to use paranormal powers. 41 1 ? 3 
The number "I3" is unlucky. 1 2 3 4 
Reincarnation does occur. 1 2 3 4 5 
Big Foot exists. 
The idea of predicting the future is foolish. 1 2 3 4 5 
There is a heaven and hell. 1 ' 3 4 5 
Mind reading is not possible. 
1 2 3 4 1 
There are actual cases of Voodoo death. 1 2 3 4 5 
It is possible to communicate with t ie dead. 
1 2 3 4 -5 Th ant; -yo u. 
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Participant number: 
You will shortly be asked to imagine each of the items listed below. Please work through them in 
order, spending a short while on each item. After you have imagined each item, please use the 
lines on the right hand side of the page to rate the image produced, using the following rating 
scale: 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 
Clear and reasonably vivid 
Moderately clear and vivid 
Vague and dim 
No image at all, you only `know' you are thinking of the object 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Think of some relative or friend whom you frequently see (but who is not with you at 
present) and consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind's eye. 
1. The exact contour of face, head, shoulders and body 
2. Characteristic poses of head, attitudes of body, etc. 
3. The precise carriage, length of step, etc., in walking 
4. The different colours worn in some familiar clothes 
Visualise a rising sun. Consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind's eye. 
5. The sun is rising above the horizon into a hazy sky 
6. The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness 
7. Clouds. A storm blows up, with flashes of lightning 
8. A rainbow appears 
Think of the front of a shop which you often go to. Consider the picture that comes before 
your mind's eye. 
9. The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite side of the 
road 
10. A window display including colours, shapes and details of 
individual items for sale 
11. You are near the entrance. The colour, shape and details of 
the door 
12. You enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter assistant 
serves you. Money changes hands 
Finally, think of a country scene which involves trees, mountains and a lake. Consider the 
picture that comes before your mind's eye. 
13. The contours of the landscape 
14. The colour and shape of the trees 
15. The colour and shape of the lake 
16. A strong wind blows on the trees and on the lake causing waves 
220 
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You were shown a series of slides depicting animals. Some of the slides featured 
photographs of the animals, but for others you were asked to imagine the animal named. 
For each item on the following list, please tick a box to indicate whether you saw the 
PHOTOGRAPH or IMAGINED the animal. Additionally, please rate your confidence 
for each answer by circling a number on the 1-7 scale provided, using the following 
guidelines: 
1234567 
Not at all 
confident 
Uncertain Very 
confident 
PHOTOGRAPH IMAGINED CONFIDENCE 
1 LION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 WOLF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 WHALES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 HORSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 DEER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 DUCKS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 ELEPHANT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 SEALS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 PIGS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 FROG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 ELK 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 SHEEP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 DONKEYS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 OWLS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 MOUSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 FLAMINGOES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17 TIGER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18 BUFFALO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19 FISH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20 RABBIT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21 GIRAFFE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22 TORTOISE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23 BEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24 COWS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Participant number: 
Please circle "True" or "False" after each of the statements below. 
1. At times I perform certain little rituals to ward off negative TRUE FALSE 
influences. 
2. I have experienced an altered state of consciousness in which TRUE FALSE 
I felt that I became cosmically enlightened. 
3. At the present time, I am very good at make-believe and TRUE FALSE 
imagining. 
4. I have felt that I had received special wisdom, to be TRUE FALSE 
communicated to the rest of humanity. 
5. I have sometimes sensed an evil presence around me, TRUE FALSE 
although I could not see it. 
6. My thoughts have sometimes come so quickly that I couldn't TRUE FALSE 
write them all down fast enough. 
7. It is sometimes possible for me to be completely immersed in TRUE FALSE 
nature or in art and to feel as if my whole state of 
consciousness has somehow temporarily been altered. 
8. Often I have a day when indoor lights seem so bright that they TRUE FALSE 
bother my eyes. 
9. I have experienced an altered state of consciousness which I TRUE FALSE 
believe utterly transformed (in a positive manner) the way I 
looked at in self. 
10. I think that I really know what some people mean when they TRUE FALSE 
talk about mystical experiences. 
11. I have gone through times when smells seemed stronger and TRUE FALSE 
more overwhelming than usual. 
12. I can clearly feel again in my imagination such things as the TRUE FALSE 
feeling of a gentle breeze, warm sand under my bare feet, the 
softness of fur, cool grass, the warmth of the sun, and the 
smell of freshly cut grass. 
13. A person should try to understand their dreams and be guided TRUE FALSE 
by or take warnings from them. 
14. At times I somehow feel the presence of someone who is not TRUE FALSE 
physically there. 
15. For several days at a time I have had such a heightened TRUE FALSE 
awareness of sights and sounds that I cannot shut them out. 
16. I sometimes have a feeling of gaining or losing energy when TRUE FALSE 
certain people look at me or touch me. 
17. When listening to organ music or other powerful music, I TRUE FALSE 
sometimes feel as if I am being lifted up into the air. 
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APPENDIX J: 
SEANCE INITIAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
233 
WELCOME TO `SEANCE' 
We would like to conduct a small survey into the phenomena that you experience during 
the seance. In order to send you a short questionnaire in a couple of weeks time we 
would appreciate it if you could complete this form. 
Please answer honestly - all of the information you provide will remain completely 
confidential. The term `paranormal' refers to phenomena which you believe to be 
beyond normal explanation. 
Do you believe that paranormal phenomena sometimes occur during seances? 
Definitely Uncertain Definitely 
Yes No 
1234567 
Your details 
Name 
Address 
Postcode 
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APPENDIX K: 
SEANCE FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONNAIRE 
235 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Many thanks for taking part in our `seance' experiment. As promised, here is a brief 
questionnaire which asks for your thoughts about the events which took place. 
Once you have completed the questionnaire please return it to us in the pre-paid 
envelope enclosed (no stamp required) and we will send you a complete report of our 
findings in a few weeks time. 
0 Please answer the following questions as honestly as possible. 
0 Please complete the questionnaire in the order in which it is written. 
" The term 'paranormal' refers to phenomena which you believe to be beyond any 
normal explanation. 
" Please do not ask other people who were also at the seance about their answers - we 
are interested in what YOU think. 
" All of your answers will be kept strictly confidential. 
Again, many thanks for taking part. 
Best Wishes 
Dr Richard Wiseman 
SECTION 1 
Please tick 'Yes', 'Uncertain' or `No ' to indicate whether you believe the following 
statements are correct. 
During the seance....... 
the bell moved. 
Yes Uncertain No 
If you have ticked 'yes' or 'uncertain', please describe what you remember seeing: 
236 
..... the maraca moved. 
Yes Uncertain No 
If you have ticked 'yes' or 'uncertain', please describe what you remember seeing: 
..... the slate moved. 
Yes Uncertain No 
If you have ticked 'yes' or 'uncertain', please describe what you remember seeing: 
..... the ball moved. 
Yes Uncertain No 
If you have ticked 'yes' or 'uncertain', please describe what you remember seeing: 
237 
..... the tambourine moved. 
Yes Uncertain No 
If you have ticked 'yes' or'uncertain', please describe what you remember seeing: 
..... the candlestick moved. 
Yes Uncertain No 
If you have ticked 'yes' or 'uncertain', please describe what you remember seeing: 
SECTION 2 
1) Did you experience any phenomena not mentioned above? 
Yes Uncertain No 
If you have ticked 'yes' or 'uncertain', please briefly describe the phenomena 
below: 
238 
2) Do you think that any of the phenomena that you experienced during the seance 
were paranormal? 
Yes Uncertain No 
If you have ticked 'yes' or 'uncertain', please list the phenomena which you believe 
might have been paranormal: 
3) Have you attended a seance at the Fortean Times Unconvention before? 
Yes No 
Any other comments? 
Please return the questionnaire us in the pre-paid envelope enclosed (no stamp 
required) and we will send you a complete report of our findings in a few weeks 
time. 
Many thanks. 
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APPENDIX L: 
TRANSCRIPT OF SUGGESTION VIDEO 
240 
Camera shot is of a table with two men seated behind it, and various items on the 
table in front of the interviewer. 
Interviewer: OK, well, thanks for coming along this afternoon. We're filming this 
moves ESP cards 
from two cameras. The first is a wide shot of the whole table and the second a 
gestures to indicate table 
close up of this area here. There's few bits and pieces here, some spoons, forks, 
rubs table in front of performer points to items 
keys, ESP cards. It's really up to you, whatever you're most comfortable with. 
Over to you. 
Performer: OK, um, we'll begin with a key. 
looks at items selects key from pile, slides it to middle of table. 
Camera cuts to close up 
What I'm going to try to do is to pass energy to the key through the fingers... the 
takes the end of key in right hand and picks it up 
fingers of my left hand, by passing through psychic energy and causing the metal 
covers whole oj'key with left hand, then the right end of the key is helot in the right hand 
while the left hand rubs the middle of the key .................. continues rubbing...... 
of the key to bend. Now at the moment, it's getting a little warmer and there's a 
moves left hand so slightly more of the key shows. Left hand is making larger rubbing 
moves 
slight bend. I don't know if you can see that on the camera yet. If I... I'll turn the 
key round a little bit and hopefully allow you to see. There's a bend emerging at 
turns key toward camera to show bend .................... continues rubbing....................... 
the end of the key. It's bending a little bit more now, and it's a little bit hotter. It's 
starting to cool -I think that's probably as far as it's going to go this time. If I put 
that down on the table 
uses left hand to place right end of key on table - key tips over onto left end 
you'll be able to see that's something like a 25° angle. 
Performer moves the key so the bend is clearly visible. 
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APPENDIX M: 
BELIEF IN THE PARANORMAL 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
(WISEMAN AND MORRIS, 1995) 
242 
Participant Number 
1. Do you think that some people are able to gain, by paranormal means, access to information being thought of by others? 
1234567 
Definitely Uncertain Definitely 
No Yes 
2. Do you think that some people are able to gain, by paranormal means, access to 
information that nobody else is aware of at the time (e. g. the order of a shuffled 
deck of cards)? 
1234567 
Definitely Uncertain Definitely 
No Yes 
3. Do you think that some people can, by paranormal means, know what is going to 
happen in the future? 
1234ýe7 
Definitely Uncertain Definitely 
No Yes 
4. Do you think that some people can influence a frequently occurring event (e. g. a 
number of rolls of dice) such that the outcome of that event deviates away from 
chance (e. g. the dice show more or less `sixes' than would be predicted by chance 
alone)? 
1 
Definitely 
No 
2 3 4 
Uncertain 
5 6 7 
Definitely 
Yes 
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5. Do you think that some people can, just by mental effort, apply a noticeable 
force to an object? 
Definitely Uncertain Definitely 
No Yes 
6. Do you think that some people can, just by mental effort, alter the physical 
characteristics of the material from which an object is made? 
1234567 
Definitely Uncertain Definitely 
No Yes 
7. Do you believe that you have experienced any of the following (please tick as 
appropriate): 
a) Telepathy 
b) Psychokinesis 
c) Precognition 
dj Out of Body Experiences 
e) Sighting of an Apparition 
f) UFO Sightings 
g) Lucid Dreams 
244 
APPENDIX N: 
KEY RESPONSE QUESTIONNAIRE 
245 
Participant number 
Please rate your level of agreement/disagreement and confidence with each of the 
following questions by circling a number on the seven point scales below. 
1) At the beginning of the film the interviewer touched the objects on the table: 
1 
Definitely 
No 
1 
Not at all 
Confident 
2 3 4 
Uncertain 
5 6 
How confident are you of your answer to this question? 
23456 
2) The performer said that the key was heating up as he bent it: 
1 
Definitely 
No 
1 
Not at all 
Confident 
2 3 4 
Uncertain 
5 6 
How confident are you of your answer to this question? 
23456 
7 
Definitely 
Yes 
7 
Very 
Confident 
7 
Definitely 
Yes 
7 
Very 
Confident 
Please turn over... 
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3) After the key was placed on the table it continued to bend: 
1 
Definitely 
No 
1 
Not at all 
Confident 
2 3 4 
Uncertain 
5 6 
How confident are you of your answer to this question? 
23456 
4) Do you think that the bending of the key was paranormal? 
1 
Definitely 
No 
I 
Not at all 
Confident 
2 3 4 
Uncertain 
5 6 
How confident are you of your answer to this question? 
23456 
5) Briefly outline your explanation for the bending of the key. 
7 
Definitely 
Yes 
7 
Very 
Confident 
7 
Definitely 
Yes 
7 
Very 
Confident 
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APPENDIX 0: 
ALTERED RESPONSE QUESTIONNAIRE 
248 
Participant number 
Please rate your level of agreement/disagreement and confidence with each of the 
following questions by circling a number on the seven point scales below. 
1) At the beginning of the film the interviewer touched the objects on the table: 
1 
Definitely 
No 
1 
Not at all 
Confident 
2 3 4 
Uncertain 
5 6 
How confident are you of your answer to this question? 
23456 
2) The performer said that the key was heating up as he bent it: 
1 
Definitely 
No 
1 
Not at all 
Confident 
2 3 4 
Uncertain 
5 6 
How confident are you of your answer to this question? 
23456 
7 
Definitely 
Yes 
7 
Very 
Confident 
7 
Definitely 
Yes 
7 
Very 
Confident 
Please turn over... 
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3) After the key was placed on the table I saw it continue to bend: 
1 
Definitely 
No 
1 
Not at all 
Confident 
2 3 4 
Uncertain 
5 6 
How confident are you of your answer to this question? 
23456 
4) Do you think that the bending of the key was paranormal? 
1 
Definitely 
No 
1 
Not at all 
Confident 
2 3 4 
Uncertain 
5 6 
How confident are you of your answer to this question? 
23456 
5) Briefly outline your explanation for the bending of the key. 
7 
Definitely 
Yes 
7 
Very 
Confident 
7 
Definitely 
Yes 
7 
Very 
Confident 
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